Grosse Ile Committee for Legal Taxation v. Township of Grosse Ile

• Decision Date: 15 December 1983
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 63042,63337
• Citation: 342 N.W.2d 582,129 Mich.App. 477
• Parties: GROSSE ILE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL TAXATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The TOWNSHIP OF GROSSE ILE, A Municipal Corporation, the Grosse Ile Board of Education, the Wayne County Bureau of Taxation, Wayne County Board of Commissioners, and Wayne County Community College, Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, Wayne County Intermediate School District, and Wayne County, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 582

342 N.W.2d 582

129 Mich.App. 477

GROSSE ILE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL TAXATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The TOWNSHIP OF GROSSE ILE, A Municipal Corporation, the Grosse Ile Board of Education, the Wayne County Bureau of Taxation, Wayne County Board of Commissioners, and Wayne County Community College, Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, Wayne County Intermediate School District, and Wayne County, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket Nos. 63042, 63337.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 3, 1983.

Decided Oct. 10, 1983.

Released for Publication Dec. 15, 1983.

Joselyn, Rowe, Jamieson, Grinnan, Callahan & Hayes, P.C. by James A. Callahan, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Burley, Smiertka, Swank and Misko, P.C. by Thomas J. Misko, Trenton, for Tp. of Grosse Ile.

Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg by George N. Bashara, Jr., and Michael P. O'Rourke, Detroit, for Grosse Ile Bd. of Educ.

George H. Cross, Corp. Counsel, and Robert G. Schuch, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, for Wayne County Bureau of Taxation, Wayne County Bd. of Com'rs and Wayne County.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone by Larry J. Saylor, Detroit, for Wayne County Community College, Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority and Wayne County Intermediate School Dist.

Before BEASLEY, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and WAHLS, JJ.

V.J. BRENNAN, Judge.

Plaintiff ¹ appeals by leave granted from an order by the Michigan Tax Tribunal, which sua sponte dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Case No. 63042). Plaintiff has also filed a complaint for mandamus with this Court to compel defendant Wayne County Board of Commissioners to review the Grosse Ile Township tax rate and to lower those rates to comply with the millage limitations established by Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6. (Case No. 63337).

Plaintiff began an action in the Wayne County Circuit Court with a complaint which sought relief from aggregate taxes which exceeded the 50-mill limitation of Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6. In the complaint, plaintiff described itself as "an assumed name for residents of the Township of Grosse Ile, residing in Wayne County State of Michigan", and requested an injunction against defendants Wayne County Bureau of Taxation and Township of Grosse Ile, to prevent them from imposing excess taxes on Grosse Ile Township residents. In addition, plaintiff sought a "roll-back" of all excess taxes, repayment to Grosse Ile Township residents of any excess taxes (or, alternatively, credits on future tax assessments), and any other equitable and legal relief deemed proper by the circuit court.

The various defendants individually moved for summary and accelerated judgments against plaintiff, alleging, among other things, that plaintiff's action in circuit court was premature because plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies (i.e., file with the Tax Tribunal) and that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue its action because plaintiff is not a taxpayer. On October 15, 1981, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff's case because it was premature, plaintiff having failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by filing its action with the Tax Tribunal, which the court found had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's action.

On November 2, 1981, plaintiff filed a petition with the Tax Tribunal, again seeking a writ of mandamus against the Wayne County Board of Commissioners and a permanent injunction forbidding the imposition of any taxes in excess of the 50-mill limitation of Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6, as to all the defendants. Prior to the Tax Tribunal's ruling, plaintiff moved to add as parties defendant: Wayne County Community College, Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, Wayne County Intermediate School District, and Wayne County as party defendants. This motion was apparently never addressed by the Tax Tribunal, because on February 4, 1982, the Tax Tribunal sua sponte ordered plaintiff's case dismissed. The Tax Tribunal found that, although plaintiff limited its claim to a violation of Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6, the claim necessarily implicated Const.1963, art. 9, Secs. 25-34 (the "Headlee amendment"). The Tax Tribunal then found that, under the Headlee amendment, "exclusive and original jurisdiction over an appeal to enforce the limitations provisions of Sections 25 through 34 of Article 9 rests within the Michigan Court of Appeals".

In its appeal to this Court, plaintiff included the four "new" defendants mentioned above as parties defendant, but did not allege any different violation of the law or seek any new relief against these defendants. This Court granted plaintiff's application for delayed appeal from the Tax Tribunal's order of dismissal and also issued an order to all the defendants to show cause why the relief sought by plaintiff should not be granted. In the same order, the application for delayed appeal (Case No. 63042) was consolidated with the complaint for mandamus (Case No. 63337).

We first discuss the jurisdictional aspects of this case, because both the circuit court and the Tax Tribunal dismissed this case on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court found that the Tax Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, and the Tax Tribunal found that this Court had exclusive jurisdiction.

In its complaint in the circuit court and its petition in the Tax Tribunal, plaintiff sought injunctive relief to prevent defendants from imposing taxes in excess of the 50-mill limitation of Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6. In response to this allegation, several of the defendants raised the affirmative defense that the Headlee amendment, Const.1963, art. 9, Secs. 25-34, amended the constitution to permit townships and various other governmental entities to exceed the 50-mill limitation, provided a majority of the electors in the district had approved the increase. Although plaintiff vehemently denied that it was raising a claim that the Headlee amendment had been violated, the Tax Tribunal dismissed plaintiff's cause of action because it found that the Headlee amendment was implicated. Under the Headlee amendment, Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 32 "[a]ny taxpayer of the state shall have standing to bring suit in the Michigan State Court of Appeals to enforce the provisions of Sections 25 through 34". The Tax Tribunal interpreted this as providing for exclusive original jurisdiction over Headlee amendment claims in the Court of Appeals.

We agree with the plaintiff and defendants Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority, Wayne County Community College, and Wayne County Intermediate School District in their contention that plaintiff's action is limited only to a claim that the total property tax levy within the Township of Grosse Ile exceeds the 50-mill limitation set forth in Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6. The argument raised by the other defendants that Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 31 provides an exception to the 50-mill limitation of Sec. 6, where a tax increase is voter approved, is merely an affirmative defense and does not form the basis for jurisdiction under Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 32. The fact that those sections must be interpreted in order to resolve plaintiff's claim does not mean that plaintiff has, in fact, alleged a violation of the Headlee amendment. Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the circuit court or the Tax Tribunal had original jurisdiction over plaintiff's action which alleged a violation of Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6.

Although this case ultimately involves a determination of whether the 50-mill limitation in Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 6, has been modified and/or eliminated by the passage of the Headlee amendment, we find that jurisdiction was originally within the Tax Tribunal. See M.C.L. Sec. 205.731; M.S.A. Sec. 7.650(31). Where individual property owners contest the legality of the tax bills they receive, the Legislature intended such matters to be heard in the Tax Tribunal. Further, constitutional issues may be raised before the Tax Tribunal with appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals. Henshaw v. State Tax Comm., 92 Mich.App. 585, 588, 285 N.W.2d 382 (1979).

Next, we address the question of whether the plaintiff has standing to bring these actions. Plaintiff is the assumed name for three individual residents of the Township of Grosse Ile. In each of these proceedings, most of the eight defendants have challenged plaintiff's right to seek injunctive relief because plaintiff is not itself a taxpayer. At no time has plaintiff responded to these challenges, and plaintiff has apparently declined to amend its pleadings so as to name the plaintiffs individual taxpayers.

Assuming that the plaintiff committee is composed of individual taxpayers, we believe that, although the committee does not have standing to bring these actions, the individual taxpayers would have standing to pursue the proceedings authorized by the Tax Tribunal Act, M.C.L. Sec. 205.701 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 7.650(1) et seq. In addition, the individual taxpayers would have "traditional taxpayer standing" to pursue such proceedings. Standing is the legal term used to denote the existence of a party's interest in the outcome of a litigation; an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy. Michigan License Beverage Ass'n v. Behnan Hall, Inc., 82 Mich.App. 319, 324, 266 N.W.2d 808 (1978). Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where he is not hurt in any manner differently than the citizenry at large. Inglis v. Public School Employees Retirement Board, 374 Mich. 10, 131 N.W.2d 54 (1964). Therefore, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of public funds where the threatened injury to him is no different than that to taxpayers generally. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923); Waterford School Dist. v. State Board of Education, 98 Mich.App. 658, 662, 296 N.W.2d 328 (1980)....