Waterford School Dist. v. State Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 18 July 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 51344
• Citation: 296 N.W.2d 328,98 Mich.App. 658
• Parties: WATERFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT, a fourth class school district of the State of Michigan, and Stanley W. Kurzman, Doris C. Warner, A. J. Stepanski, M. Virginia Ross, Virginia Palmer, Eldon C. Rosegart, Charlotte J. Clark, each in his or her official capacity as a member of the Waterford School Board, and also in his or her individual capacity as taxpayers within the geographical boundaries which encompass the Waterford School District, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and State Treasurer, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 328

296 N.W.2d 328

98 Mich.App. 658

WATERFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT, a fourth class school district of the State of Michigan, and Stanley W. Kurzman, Doris C Warner, A. J. Stepanski, M. Virginia Ross, Virginia Palmer Eldon C. Rosegart, Charlotte J. Clark, each in his or her official capacity as a member of the Waterford School Board and also in his or her individual capacity as taxpayers within the geographical boundaries which encompass the Waterford School District, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and State Treasurer, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 51344.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

July 18, 1980.

Released for Publication Sept. 24, 1980.

Bruce T. Leitman, Bloomfield Hills, William G. Wolfram, Farmington Hills, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., James E. Riley, Paul J. Zimmer, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants-appellees.

Before J. H. GILLIS, P. J., and KAUFMAN and MAHER, JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal from a decision of the Oakland County Circuit Court granting accelerated judgment to defendants.

This litigation is the result of a reduction in state funding to the Waterford School District. Defendants, pursuant to the school aid formula found in 1979 P.A. 94, § 21(1); M.C.L. § 388.1621(1); M.S.A. § 15.1919(921)(1), reduced the state aid for education to the school district from the $663.60 per pupil provided in fiscal 1978-79 to $613.01 per pupil for fiscal 1979-80. Plaintiffs allege that this violated both the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 9, §§ 25-34, ¹ and M.C.L. § 21.242; M.S.A. § 5.3194(612). ² The named plaintiffs are the Waterford School District and seven individuals, each in their capacity as members of the Waterford School Board and as individual taxpayers.

In granting the accelerated judgment, the lower court ruled that the Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving alleged violations of the Headlee Amendment as well as exclusive jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a state officer.

The lower court's belief that it lacked jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Headlee Amendment was based on its interpretation of Const.1963, art. 9, § 32. Section 32 reads:

"Any taxpayer of the state shall have standing to bring suit in the Michigan State Court of Appeals to enforce the provisions of Sections 25 through 31, inclusive, of this Article and, if the suit is sustained, shall receive from the applicable unit of government his costs incurred in maintaining such suit."

The primary rule for the construction of constitutional provisions is that of "common understanding". The interpretation that should be given is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of people, would arrive at. A second rule is that to clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered. Traverse City School District v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 405, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971). Moreover, the framers of a provision must be presumed to have been aware of existing laws and court decisions and to have drafted accordingly. Saginaw City Council v. Saginaw Policemen & Firemen Retirement System Trustees, 321 Mich. 641, 647, 32 N.W.2d 899 (1948).

The plain language of § 32 indicates an intent to provide standing to taxpayers to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment. Standing is the legal term used to denote the existence of a party's interest in the outcome of a litigation; an interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy. Michigan License Beverage Ass'n v. Behnan Hall, Inc., 82 Mich.App. 319, 324, 266 N.W.2d 808 (1978). Traditionally, a private citizen has no standing to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where he is not hurt in any manner differently than the citizenry at large. See, e. g., Inglis v. Public School Employees Retirement Board, 374 Mich. 10, 131 N.W.2d 54 (1964). Therefore, a taxpayer has no standing to challenge the expenditure of public funds where the threatened injury to him is no different than that to taxpayers generally. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923); Hertel v. Racing Comm'r, 68 Mich.App. 191, 242 N.W.2d 526 (1976).

In Michigan, the common law bar on taxpayer suits has been relaxed by statute. The Revised Judicature Act permits litigation to prevent the illegal expenditure of state funds or to test the constitutionality of a related statute "in the names of at least five residents of this state who own property assessed for direct taxation by the county wherein they reside". M.C.L. § 600.2041(3), M.S.A. § 27A.2041(3). The taxpayers must demonstrate that they will sustain substantial injury or suffer loss or damage as taxpayers, through increased taxation and the consequences thereof. Mendez v. Detroit, 337 Mich. 476, 482, 60 N.W.2d 319 (1953), Jones v. Racing Comm'r, 56 Mich.App. 65, 68, 223 N.W.2d 367 (1974). A taxpayer lacks standing unless these requirements are met.

It is apparent that § 32 was intended to further ease the limitations on taxpayer suits. The Headlee Amendment grew out of the spirit of "tax revolt" and was designed to place specific limitations on state and local revenues. The ultimate purpose was to place public spending under direct popular control. Drafters' Notes-Tax Limitation Amendment, pp. 2-4 (Taxpayers United Research Institute, February 15, 1979). One aspect of popular control involves litigation to force compliance with the constitutional provisions. Section 32 facilitates control by permitting a single taxpayer to bring suit in this Court. In the present case, standing is provided both by § 32 and M.C.L. § 600.2041, M.S.A. § 27A.2041.

The amendment has only minimal impact on subject matter jurisdiction. While a single taxpayer is provided standing to bring suit in the Court of Appeals to enforce the provisions of Const.1963, art. 9, §§ 25-31, there is no indication that this Court is to have exclusive jurisdiction over all litigation that involves the amendment. Absent a specific grant of exclusivity, we must conclude that where standing is otherwise present, the circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction over suits based on the Headlee Amendment.

The circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, provided with original jurisdiction over all matters not prohibited by law. Const.1963, art. 6, § 13. The Revised Judicature Act provides, at M.C.L. § 600.605, M.S.A. § 27A.605:

"Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state."

See Lester v. Sheriff of Oakland County, 84 Mich.App. 689, 694-695, 270 N.W.2d 493 (1978). Since there is no grant of exclusivity, the general provisions of the Constitution and Revised Judicature Act must govern, and subject matter jurisdiction be found to lie in the circuit courts. ³

We also conclude that the circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain mandamus actions against state officers. Prior to January 1, 1977, the effective date of 1976 P.A. 317, § 4401 of the Revised Judicature Act limited mandamus jurisdiction over state officers to the Court of Appeals. However, this section has since been amended to provide:

"An action for mandamus against the state officer shall be commenced in the court of appeals, or in the circuit court in the county in which venue is proper or in Ingham county, at the option of the party commencing the action." M.C.L. § 600.4401(1), M.S.A. § 27A.4401(1).

The amendment not only removed the prior grant of exclusivity, but affirmatively provided the circuit courts with jurisdiction over these actions. Saginaw Valley Trotting Ass'n, Inc. v. Michigan Racing Comm'r, 84 Mich.App. 564, 568, 269 N.W.2d 676 (1978); Schweitzer v. Board of Forensic Polygraph Examiners, 77 Mich.App. 749, 753 n. 5, 259 N.W.2d 362 (1977). Nonetheless, the trial court reasoned that mandamus jurisdiction is still limited by GCR 1963, 714.1(1). ⁴ Despite the revision of M.C.L. § 600.4401(1), M.S.A. § 27A.4401(1), the Supreme Court has not altered the corresponding court rule. The trial judge interpreted this as an indication that the Supreme Court intends to control mandamus jurisdiction and to prevent circuit courts from entertaining such actions with regard to state officers. See 4 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated, (1979 Pocket Part), p. 21.

This interpretation ignores the broad jurisdictional grant of Const.1963, art. 6, § 13:

"The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law."

There is a presumption of jurisdiction absent specific exclusions provided by law. See M.C.L. § 600.601, M.S.A. § 27A.601, Practice Commentary, 32 M.C.L. 250, Lester v. Sheriff of Oakland County, supra. Such prohibitions provided by law are the product of the Legislature. To the extent GCR 1963, 714.1(1) is in direct conflict with the jurisdictional provisions of the Revised Judicature Act, M.C.L. § 600.101 et seq., M.S.A. § 27A.101 et seq., we conclude that the latter are controlling. The particular section was amended subsequent to the promulgation of the court rules, so we presume that the Legislature was fully aware of the language of GCR 1963, 714.1(1) and consciously sought to alter its impact. Therefore, the mandate of M.C.L. § 600.4401, M.S.A. § 27A.4401 must take precedence over GCR 1963, 714.1(1). The lower court erred in ruling that mandamus jurisdiction was lacking.

Defendants now argue that even if subject matter jurisdiction existed, accelerated judgment was proper as to the school district and the individual plaintiffs as school board members. Defendants contend...