Grounds v. Tolar Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 02 April 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. C-4652,C-4652 |
| Citation | 707 S.W.2d 889,29 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 307 |
| Parties | 32 Ed. Law Rep. 337 Gary GROUNDS, Petitioner, v. TOLAR INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment involving a school teacher/coach's rights under an employment term contract. Gary Grounds was a teacher/coach with the Tolar Independent School District. The District did not renew his employment contract, declaring him a probationary employee. Thereafter, Grounds appealed to the State Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner found that Grounds was not a probationary employee and ordered that he be re-employed in the same professional capacity. The District neither filed a motion for rehearing pursuant to the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a, § 16(e) (Vernon Supp.1986) (the "APTRA"), nor appealed the Commissioner's decision to a district court in Travis County, naming the Commissioner as a party, pursuant to APTRA § 19 and Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 11.13(c) and 21.207(b) (Vernon Supp.1986). Instead the District filed a declaratory judgment action in the 266th District Court of Hood County. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the District and the court of appeals affirmed. 694 S.W.2d 241 (Tex.App. 2 Dist.1985).
The primary issue is whether an administrative order is subject to collateral attack in violation of the procedural prerequisites of the agency's enabling statute and the APTRA. We hold that it is not, and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the order of the State Commissioner of Education.
Gary Grounds was employed by the District under a one-year term contract for the 1982-83 school year. The contract defined Grounds' position as "teacher." He was re-employed under a second one-year term contract for 1983-84, which defined his position as "Teacher/Coach Football (Head Football coach)." This contract contained a clause which stated that an "employee is subject to assignment and reassignment at any time during the contract term." At that time, the District had not adopted a probationary policy for new employees under the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, Tex.Educ.Code Ann. §§ 21.201-21.211 (Vernon Supp.1986), (the "TCNA"). Subsequently, in November of 1983, midway through Grounds' second year, the District adopted a probationary evaluation policy for teachers employed less than two years, pursuant to § 21.209.
On February 28, 1984, the District notified Grounds that his contract would not be renewed for the 1984-85 school year. On March 5, 1984, Grounds requested a hearing pursuant to TCNA § 21.209, which was denied on the basis that he was a probationary employee. Grounds appealed the decision to the State Commissioner of Education pursuant to TCNA § 21.207 and Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 11.13.
On May 14, 1984, the Commissioner reversed the District's decision, finding that Grounds was not a probationary employee, and ordered re-employment in the "same professional capacity" for the 1984-85 school year. On May 29, 1984, the District offered Grounds a new contract for the 1984-85 school year for teaching without any coaching duties, and without the $3500.00 coaching supplement. Grounds refused this contract claiming that he was entitled to a contract which allowed him to be employed in the "same professional capacity," pursuant to § 21.204(b). Thereafter, this lawsuit ensued.
Grounds argues that the court of appeals erred in holding that a teacher/head football coach was within the same professional capacity as teacher and in holding that the District did not have to appeal directly from the State Commissioner's decision but could collaterally attack the decision in any district court.
Term contracts are governed by the TCNA. Section 21.202 provides for periodic teacher evaluations. Section 21.204 provides that a school board must give written notice of the proposed nonrenewal before the April 1 preceding the end of the employment term of the contract. The board must employ the teacher for an additional year in the "same professional capacity" if it fails to give notice. § 21.204(b). The board must further provide a hearing within 15 days of a teacher's request, provided that the request is made within 10 days of the notice for nonrenewal. § 21.205. TCNA § 21.207 provides:
(a) If the teacher is aggrieved by the decision of the board of trustees, he may appeal to the State Commissioner of Education pursuant to Section 11.13 of this Code. The Commissioner may not substitute his judgment for that of the board of trustees, unless the decision below was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or not supported by substantial evidence.
(b) Either party may appeal the Commissioner's decision to a district court in Travis County. (emphasis added).
Section 11.13(c) provides:
Any person, county, or school district aggrieved by any action of the Central Education Agency or decision of the commissioner of education may appeal to a district court in Travis County, Texas. Appeals should be made by serving the commissioner of education with citation issued and served in the manner provided by law for civil suits. The petition shall state the action or decision from which the appeal is taken. Upon trial the court shall determine all issues of law and fact. (emphasis added).
These sections must also be read in conjunction with judicial review of contested cases under APTRA § 19, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this Act.
The section is cumulative of other means of redress provided by statute.
(b) Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition within 30 days after the decision complained of is final and appealable. Unless otherwise provided by statute:
(1) the petition is filed in a District Court of Travis County, Texas;
(2) a copy of the petition must be served on the agency and all parties of record in the proceedings before the agency; and
(3) the filing of the petition vacates an agency decision for which trial de novo is the manner of review authorized by law, but does not affect the enforcement of an agency decision for which another manner of review is authorized. (emphasis added).
The Legislature creates rules and regulations for administrative agencies and procedures for obtaining judicial review of their decisions. Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Council of Co-Owners of Saida II Towers Condominium Association, 706 S.W.2d 644, 29 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 257 (1986); City of Amarillo v. Hancock, 150 Tex. 231, 239 S.W.2d 788, 790 (1951). When a cause of action is derived from a statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable, for lack of jurisdiction. Saida II, at 646; Mingus v. Wadley 115 Tex. 551, 285 S.W. 1084, 1087 (1926); Butler v. State Board of Education, 581 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Therefore, aggrieved parties who wish to appeal the Commissioner's decision must do so in compliance with the TCNA, which must be read in conjunction with APTRA § 19(b).
The District did not follow the statutory prerequisites for review. The TCNA provides in § 21.207 that either party "may" appeal the Commissioner's decision, but if t...
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