Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp.

Decision Date15 September 2004
Citation2004 ME 119,860 A.2d 851
PartiesWilliam GROVER v. BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Stephen B. Wade (orally), Marc N. Frenette, Skelton, Taintor & Abbott, P.A., Auburn, for plaintiff.

Theodore H. Kirchner (orally), Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, L.L.C., Portland, for defendant.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS and LEVY, JJ.

LEVY, J.

[¶ 1] Boise Cascade Corporation appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Oxford County, Gorman, J.) following a jury verdict in favor of William Grover awarding him $440,000 in damages. This is the second appeal in this action, which arose from injuries Grover sustained when he fell off a platform while inspecting a paper machine at Boise Cascade's Rumford mill.1 Boise Cascade contends that the court erred by: (1) permitting Grover's counsel to question the prospective jurors after the parties exercised their challenges for cause; (2) denying Boise Cascade's motion for a judgment as a matter of law because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict; and (3) excluding evidence of Grover's receipt of workers' compensation and disability benefits. Because the court erred by allowing the examination of jurors after the parties exercised their challenges for cause, we vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Grover was employed as a sales engineer in 1995 by Tamfelt, a company that manufactures and supplies engineered fabrics for paper machines. Tamfelt serviced Boise Cascade's paper mill in Rumford.

[¶ 3] On the day of his injuries, Grover was at the mill to inspect a papermaking machine. He testified that before he fell, he was either backing up or walking sideways up the stairs to a platform while tracing a vacuum line that ran along the ceiling. The paper machine was on the left side of the stairs and platform. Grover was wearing safety glasses, which have side shields to prevent anything from hitting his eyes. He was also using a flashlight to assist him in seeing the vacuum line.

[¶ 4] After moving up the stairs, he arrived at a platform, the sides of which are usually guarded with safety chains that latch.2 Grover began sliding his right hand up along the chain rail on the right side of the stairs. He tripped when he attempted to step around a protruding valve stem and started to fall toward the paper machine, on the left side of the stairs and platform. He reached for the chain railing that should have been latched on the left side of the platform, but it was not there. He stated that he "threw [his] body away from the" machine to avoid being killed, fell to the ground instead of into the machine, and briefly lost consciousness. Grover suffered a brain injury as a result of the fall.

[¶ 5] Grover filed a negligence action against Boise Cascade, claiming that Boise Cascade "inadequately, negligently, and carelessly maintained" the mill by failing to "have adequate handrails and/or guardrails and gating as required by safety regulations" and failing to have adequate lighting. Boise Cascade filed a motion for a summary judgment, which the Superior Court (Delahanty, J.) granted. It found that Boise Cascade could not be liable because the danger was obvious to Grover, which precludes liability pursuant to section 343A(1) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).3 See Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp., 2003 ME 45, ¶ 6, 819 A.2d 322, 323

. We vacated the summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the dangerous condition, i.e., the unlatched safety chain, was "obvious" to Grover. Id. ¶ 7, 819 A.2d at 323-24.

[¶ 6] Prior to the trial, Grover filed a motion in limine seeking permission for attorney-conducted jury voir dire after the challenges for cause were exercised and before the exercise of peremptory challenges. Grover separately submitted a letter to the court setting forth the proposed areas of questioning and specific questions, and Boise Cascade filed a written objection to Grover's motion. After a hearing, the court granted Grover's motion in limine.

[¶ 7] As the trial commenced, the voir dire unfolded as follows: First, the court conducted voir dire of the jury panel, including questions based on specific requests made by Grover.4 Second, both parties exercised their challenges for cause. Third, the names of seventeen prospective jurors were drawn from the remaining jurors, and Grover's attorney was then permitted to individually question the prospective jurors for a total of thirty-five minutes. The questioning occurred in the presence of all the prospective jurors.

[¶ 8] Grover's questions centered on each prospective juror's family and employment backgrounds, willingness to award damages for intangible injuries, and willingness to impose liability in the absence of intentional conduct. Boise Cascade renewed its objection to the voir dire process, but did not object to any of the specific questions Grover intended to ask. The questioning of the first prospective juror examined by Grover's attorney is representative of the voir dire that followed:

Mr. Wade: Just like to start out asking you a couple of questions, if I could. I know that you're a social worker; is that correct?
Juror 26: That's correct.
Mr. Wade: Can you tell me what it is about your job that you're particularly good at? What do you think makes you very good at what you do?
Juror 26: Listening.
Mr. Wade: If you could have any job in the world, what would it be?
Juror 26: A social worker with Maine veterans.
Mr. Wade: Is that where you're working now?
Juror 26: That's correct.
Mr. Wade: Do you have children?
Juror 26: Yes, I do.
Mr. Wade: Are they grown?
Juror 26: They are.
Mr. Wade: Do you have grandchildren?
Juror 26: Yes.
Mr. Wade: What — could you give me one or two characteristics that you'd really like to see instilled into your grandchildren?
Juror 26: Same sense of family I instilled in my children.
Mr. Wade: I didn't hear.
Juror 26: Same sense of family I instilled in my children.
Mr. Wade: Thank you very much. Have lawsuits affected anything that you do at your work?
Juror 26: No.
Mr. Wade: My — my mother thinks giving money for pain and suffering doesn't do any good. Other people think it's okay. Can you tell me which way you lean? Are you closer to my mother who doesn't think it does any good, or do you think it's okay?
Juror 26: I think it's okay.
Mr. Wade: Boise Cascade did not hurt Mr. Grover on purpose. Some people say it's not fair to make them pay if what happened was an accident and they didn't do it on purpose. What do you think about that?
Juror 26: I think if it was reasonable cautions taken for all the employees working there, that Boise Cascade would not be liable, not reasonable, then [I would] have to consider that.
Mr. Wade: Have you or any of your family members had a serious head injury or lost consciousness for a period of time?
Juror 26: Yes.
Mr. Wade: Was that you?
Juror 26: Yes.
Mr. Wade: And when was that, sir?
Juror 26: I was four years old.
Mr. Wade: Do you have any problems today from that?
Juror 26: Not that I'm aware of.
Mr. Wade: So you basically survived that okay?
Juror 26: Yes.
Mr. Wade: Great. That's all the questions I have for you.

[¶ 9] After the jury selection process was completed, Boise Cascade made an oral motion for a mistrial, which the court denied. Boise Cascade moved for a judgment as a matter of law after the close of Grover's case, which the court also denied.

[¶ 10] During trial, Boise Cascade sought to admit evidence of Grover's receipt of workers' compensation and disability benefits in connection with Grover's claim for lost future earnings. Boise Cascade wished to establish that Grover was receiving approximately $34,000 a year from his workers' compensation and disability benefits. The purpose of the proposed evidence was to discredit Grover's credibility and show his lack of motivation to seek employment. Boise Cascade argued that "[i]t's clear what we're going to have here is a claim for future lost earnings and if the claim is going to be that $50,000 a year sets his earning capacity, that he's going to be permitted to testify that he can't do anything except minimum wage." The court excluded the evidence based on M.R. Evid. 403 and the collateral source rule.

[¶ 11] The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Grover, with a damage award of $440,000. After trial, Boise Cascade filed a motion for a new trial based on the voir dire process and the exclusion of the evidence of workers' compensation and disability benefits. The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Peremptory Challenges

[¶ 12] We review challenges to jury voir dire for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, mindful that a court has broad discretion over the manner of conducting voir dire. State v. O'Hara, 627 A.2d 1001, 1003 (Me.1993). When exercising its discretion, a court must make informed judgments "based upon a foundation of law and reason." State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 730 (Me.1991) (quotation marks omitted). A trial court's interpretation of a civil rule of procedure is subject to plenary review on appeal. Serv. & Erection Co. v. State Tax Assessor, 684 A.2d 1, 2 (Me.1996).

[¶ 13] Boise Cascade contends that Maine law does not permit a court or attorneys to conduct a second voir dire prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges of the potential jurors who have not been disqualified for cause, and that the procedure followed here asserted improper influence on the prospective jurors and unnecessarily intruded on their privacy. The process, Boise Cascade argues, violated the concept that jury selection is intended to impanel an impartial jury, and therefore constitutes reversible error.

1. Examination of Prospective Jurors

[¶ 14] Title 14, section 1204 provides that once the court has acted on challenges...

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