Grumet v. Cuomo

• Decision Date: 09 August 1994
• Citation: 617 N.Y.S.2d 620,162 Misc.2d 913
• Parties: , 95 Ed. Law Rep. 340 Louis GRUMET and Albert W. Hawk, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York; The New York State Education Department; Thomas Sobol, as Commissioner of the New York State Education Department; The New York State Board of Regents; Carl H. McCall, as New York State Comptroller; The Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District; The Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District; and Dr. William J. Basset, Jr., as District Superintendent of the Orange-Ulster BOCES, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 620

617 N.Y.S.2d 620

162 Misc.2d 913, 95 Ed. Law Rep. 340

Louis GRUMET and Albert W. Hawk, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York; The New York State Education Department; Thomas Sobol, as Commissioner of the New York State Education Department The New York State Board of Regents; Carl H. McCall, as New York State Comptroller; The Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District; The Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District; and Dr William J. Basset, Jr., as District Superintendent of the Orange-Ulster BOCES, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Albany County.

Aug. 9, 1994.

Jay Worona, New York State School Bd. Ass'n, Albany, for plaintiffs.

G. Oliver Koppell, Atty. Gen. of State of New York (Mary Ellen Clerkin, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), Dept. of Law, Albany, for Mario Cuomo and others, defendants.

George H. Barber, Albany, for defendant Kiryas Joel Village School Dist.

Ingerman, Smith, Greenberg, Gross, Richmond, Heidelberger, Reich & Scricca, Northport, for defendant Board of Educ. of the Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist.

Gerard John DeWolf, Albany, for New York State United Teachers--amicus curiae.

JOSEPH HARRIS, Justice.

Plaintiffs in this action for a declaratory judgment seek a judgment declaring unconstitutional Chapters 241 and 279 of the Laws of 1994 enacted by the New York State Legislature in response to the determination of the United States Supreme Court declaring Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 unconstitutional as in violation of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

This case is first and foremost about handicapped children and the need to deliver to them, under their unique circumstances, the special public educational resources mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C., sec. 1400 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. IV) to be furnished to all handicapped children in the United States--and N.Y.Education Law, Art. 89 (McKinney 1981 and Supp.1994)--and about religion only incidentally.

The antecedents of this case are stated in the plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court authored by Justice Souter ¹ in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District, Petitioner v. Louis Grumet et al.; Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, Petitioner v. Louis Grumet et al.; Attorney-General of New York, Petitioner v. Louis Grumet et al. (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 and 93-539), decided June 27, 1994 (512 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546), and hereinafter referred to as Kiryas Joel I, to differentiate that case from the instant case hereinafter referred to as Kiryas Joel II. These antecedents are set forth in footnote 2 not for the purpose of rearguing Kiryas Joel I but as a reference to understand the new fact pattern of Kiryas Joel II. ² The opening skirmishes of this new battle have begun. Plaintiffs herein have applied In order for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to be issued, the plaintiffs must first demonstrate (1) a clear likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury if the TRO is not granted; and (3) that a balancing of the equities favors the issuance of a stay.

for a temporary restraining order and for preliminary injunctive relief enjoining implementation of Chapters 241 and 279 of the Laws of 1994--more particularly, enjoining the funding and further operation of the Kiryas Joel Union Free School District pending determination of the constitutionality of these statutes. ³

FACTS

On June 27, 1994, in Kiryas Joel I, 512 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994), the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the New York State Court of Appeals which declared Chapter 748 of the New York Session Laws of 1989 to be unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Chapter 748 of the New York Session Laws of 1989 read as follows:

"Section 1. The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the town of Monroe, Orange county, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the Kiryas Joel village school district and shall have and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district under the provisions of the education law.

§ 2. Such district shall be under the control of a board of education, which shall be composed of from five to nine members elected by the qualified voters of the village of Kiryas Joel, said members to serve for terms not exceeding five years.

§ 3. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next succeeding the date on which it shall have become a law."

The flaw found in Chapter 748 as perceived by the majority of the Supreme Court, mandating a declaration of its unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, is its violation of the principle that "a State may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen according to a religious criterion." (Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct., at 2488.) (Plurality opinion, Souter, J.).

Despite the fact that Chapter 748 delegated power not by express reference to the religious beliefs of the Satmar community that exclusively comprised the village of Kiryas Joel, but to the residents of the "territory of the village of Kiryas Joel" (1989 N.Y.Laws, ch. 748), Justice Souter found this forbidden effect as necessarily flowing from "the way the boundary lines of the school district divide[d] residents according to religious affiliation, under the terms of an unusual and special legislative act." (Kiryas Joel I, supra, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct., at 2489, plurality opinion--Souter, J.).

Further bothersome to Justice Souter and the plurality justices joining his opinion was the fact that the Kiryas Joel Village School District, created by a special and unusual act of the legislature, gave reason for concern "whether the benefit received by the Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other religious (and nonreligious) groups. ... The anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature's exercise of state authority in creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court without any direct way to review such state action for the purpose of safeguarding a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion ... Because the religious community of Kiryas Joel did not receive its new governmental authority simply as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law, we have no assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive one; unlike an administrative One of the general principles permeating the majority opinion in Kiryas Joel I is that civil power must be exercised in a manner neutral to one religion as against another and religion in general as against non-religion. "... [T]he principle is well grounded in our case law, as we have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges. In Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 673, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1413, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970), for example, the Court sustained a property tax exemption for religious properties in part because the State had 'not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such,' but had exempted 'a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations.' " (Kiryas Joel I, supra, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct., at 2491, plurality opinion--Souter, J.).

agency's denial of an exemption from a generally applicable law, which 'would be entitled to a judicial audience' ... a legislature's failure to enact a special law is itself unreviewable." (Kiryas Joel I, supra, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct., at 2491).

The majority opinion does not foreclose an accommodation of religion, so long as the government conduct is applied neutrally and the benefit provided is equally available to all religious and non-religious entities similarly situated to that entity being afforded the benefit. "Government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and ... may do so without violating the Establishment Clause." (Kiryas Joel I, supra, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct., at 2492, plurality opinion--Souter, J.).

The fact that Chapter 748 facilitates the practice of religion is not what renders it an unconstitutional establishment. (Kiryas Joel I, supra, plurality opinion--Souter, J.). "We do not disable a religiously homogeneous group from exercising political power conferred on it without regard to religion." (Kiryas Joel I, supra, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct., at 2493-2494, plurality opinion--Souter, J.). Chapter 748 violates the Establishment Clause because it "fails the test of neutrality. It delegates a power ... to an electorate defined by common religious belief and practice, in a manner that fails to foreclose religious favoritism. It therefore crosses the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment." (Kiryas Joel I, supra, 512 U.S., at ----, 114 S.Ct., at 2494, plurality opinion--Souter, J.).

However, it is manifest in the majority opinion of Kiryas Joel I, and nothing therein precludes, that the village of Kiryas Joel may form its own school district provided that it results from enabling general legislation that is based on neutral and non-religious criteria. This would dissolve the impermissible fusion of government and religion inherent in Chapter 748.

The above, while manifest in the majority opinion, is most clearly enunciated in the opinion of Justice O'Connor concurring in part with the majority opinion and in...