Grumet v. Cuomo
| Decision Date | 08 March 1995 |
| Citation | 164 Misc.2d 644,625 N.Y.S.2d 1000 |
| Parties | , 100 Ed. Law Rep. 252 Louis GRUMET and Albert W. Hawk, Plaintiffs, v. Mario CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York; The New York State Education Department; Thomas Sobol, as Commissioner of the New York State Education Department; The New York State Board of Regents; Carl H. McCall, as New York State Comptroller; The Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District; The Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District; and Dr. William J. Basset, Jr., as District Superintendent of the Orange-Ulster Boces, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Jay Worona, Pilar Sokol, Albany, NY, for plaintiffs.
Dennis C. Vacco, Atty. Gen., Mary Ellen Clerkin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, NY, for State Defendants.
Ingerman, Smith, Greenberg, Gross, Richmond, Heidelberger, Reich & Scricca, Lawrence W. Reich, Northport, NY, for Monroe-Woodbury Cen. School Dist.
George H. Barber, Albany, NY, for Kiryas Joel Village School Dist.
Gerard John DeWolf, Albany, NY, for amicus curiae New York State United Teachers.
Marc D. Stern, New York City, for amicus curiae American Jewish Congress.
The Satmar Hassidim once again find litigation to be a concomitant to their separate lives in the Village of Kiryas Joel. The instant controversy has its genesis in a conflict that has traveled through the courts of this state, to the State Legislature, once again through the state courts, to the United States Supreme Court, again to the State Legislature, and now once again, to this court. 1 The conflict itself juxtaposes the need to protect the separation of church and state, a constitutional principle that defines our civil life, against the fervent desire of the Satmar Hassidim to lead a religious life completely separate from their secular surroundings.
The history and background of the Satmars are well described in the recent United States Supreme Court case, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 129 L.Ed.2d 546, (hereinafter "Kiryas Joel") and only the operative facts will be recounted here.
The Incorporated Village of Kiryas Joel is located in the Town of Monroe in Orange County. It is a homogenous religious enclave whose citizens are all members of the Satmar Hassidim sect, which prescribes a strictly religious way of life for its adherents. Most all Satmar children attend private parochial academies. The Satmar children involved in this controversy are the handicapped who suffer from a range of disabilities. It is these children that the Satmars cannot provide for in their parochial schools. For these children, the Satmars turn to the State of New York for the care and education the children are entitled by law to receive. 20 U.S.C., section 1400 et seq.; New York Education Law, Article 89 (McKinney, 1981 and Supp.1994).
The Monroe-Woodbury Central School District had provided public schooling to these children at locations outside Kiryas Joel. This was eventually deemed unsatisfactory by most of the children's parents. Most of these children were withdrawn from the secular schools outside the Village because of "the panic, fear and trauma (the children) suffered in leaving their own community and being with people whose ways were so different." (Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury Central School District v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 180-181, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767).
The State Legislature entered the controversy by enacting Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 which created the Kiryas Joel Village School District to be comprised of the territory of the Village of Kiryas Joel.
Chapter 748 of the New York Session Laws of 1989 is as follows:
"Section 1. The territory of the Village of Kiryas Joel in the Town of Monroe, Orange County, on a date when this act shall take effect, shall be and hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the Kiryas Joel Village School District and shall have and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district under the provisions of the Education Law.
§ 2. Such district shall be under the control of a Board of Education, which shall be composed of from five to nine members elected by the qualified voters of the Village of Kiryas Joel, said members to serve for terms not exceeding five years.
§ 3. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next succeeding the date on which it shall have become a law."
The School District created under Chapter 748 thereafter commenced providing special education services to the handicapped children of Kiryas Joel and other handicapped children from beyond the Village. Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court, in a decision which included four concurring opinions and one dissenting opinion, found the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the establishment cause. (Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2484). A plurality of the court found the Legislature's Act to be substantially equivalent to defining a political subdivision and hence the qualification for its franchise by a religious test, resulting in a purposeful and forbidden "fusion of governmental and religious functions." (Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2490, citing Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126, 103 S.Ct. 505, 512, 74 L.Ed.2d 297).
Within days after the Kiryas Joel decision was handed down by the Supreme Court, the New York Legislature enacted Chapters 241 and 279 of the Laws of 1994 in response. Chapter 279 effects a repeal of Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 and abolishes the Kiryas Joel Village School District. Among other transition provisions, the statute provided for the continued operation of the District in its current form until formally replaced or superseded by another school district pursuant to Article 31 of the Education Law. During the transition period, the territory of the former Kiryas Joel Village School District ("KJVSD") was deemed to be part of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District (the district from whence the KJVSD originally came).
Chapter 241 of the Laws of 1994 amends section 1504 of the Education Law, to permit every city, town or village, in existence as of the effective date of the amendment, wholly within a single central or union free school district, but whose boundaries are not coterminous with the boundaries of such school district, to organize a new union free school district consisting of the entire territory of such municipality whenever the educational interests of the community require it if certain additional requirements are fulfilled. (See, Education Law, section 1504[3].) The additional requirements to be met by a municipality are: (1) the enrollment of the municipality seeking to organize such new school district equals at least 2,000 children, and is no greater than sixty percent of the enrollment of the existing school district from which such new school district will be organized; (2) such new school district would have an actual valuation per total wealth pupil unit at least equal to the statewide average; (3) the enrollment of the existing school district from which such new school district will be organized equals at least 2,000 children, excluding the residents of such municipality; and (4) the actual valuation per total wealth pupil unit of such existing school district will not increase or decrease by more than ten percent following the organization of the new school district by such municipality. (See, Education Law, section 1504[3][a].)
Days after Chapter 241 was enacted, the Monroe-Woodbury Board of Education voted unanimously to approve the creation of a new school district for the Village of Kiryas Joel under the new law. Less than one month after the United States Supreme Court declared Chapter 748 unconstitutional, the residents of Kiryas Joel approved the creation of the new school district by a vote of 2,848 in favor and 341 against creating a new district. Two days after the vote, the new school district was a legal entity.
Immediately, the plaintiffs herein commenced the instant action which seeks to enjoin the implementation of the statute and seeks a declaration that Chapter 241 of the Laws of 1994 is unconstitutional in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article XI, section 3 of the New York State Constitution. The plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order was denied. (See, Grumet v. Cuomo, 162 Misc.2d 913, 617 N.Y.S.2d 620 [Harris, J.].) The case is now presented to this court on cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212.
The first question to be addressed is that of standing. (County of Rensselaer v. Regan, 173 A.D.2d 37, 578 N.Y.S.2d 274). Plaintiffs Grumet and Hawk sue in their capacities as citizen taxpayers. The uncontroverted allegations in the complaint clearly show that each plaintiff meets a definition of citizen taxpayer contained in the State Finance Law, section 123-a and, therefore, they have statutory standing to maintain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief to prevent the unconstitutional disbursement of state funds. (Grumet v. Board of Education, 187 A.D.2d 16, 20, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123). It is undisputed that the new school district, formed pursuant to Chapter 241, is the recipient of state funds and therefore that statute can be challenged in a citizen taxpayer action. Id.
"The First Amendment's guarantee that 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion' ... is more than a pledge that no single religion will be designated as a state religion." (Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 381, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3221, 87 L.Ed.2d 267 (citations omitted)). The Establishment Clause "is also more than a mere injunction that governmental...
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