Grumet v. Cuomo

• Decision Date: 26 August 1996
• Citation: 647 N.Y.S.2d 565,225 A.D.2d 4
• Parties: , 113 Ed. Law Rep. 362 Louis GRUMET et al., Appellants, v. Mario CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 565

647 N.Y.S.2d 565

225 A.D.2d 4, 113 Ed. Law Rep. 362

Louis GRUMET et al., Appellants, v. Mario CUOMO, as Governor of the State of New York, et al Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Aug. 26, 1996.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General (Julie S. Mereson and Daniel Smirlock, of counsel), Albany, for Mario Cuomo, respondent.

Ingerman, Smith, Greenberg, Gross, Richmond, Heidelberger, Reich and Scricca (Lawrence W. Reich, of counsel), Northport, for Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury, respondent.

George H. Barber, Albany, for Kiryas Joel Board of Education, respondent.

Covington & Burling (David B. Isbell and Michael L. Rosenthal, of counsel), Washington, DC, for National Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, amicus curiae.

Marc D. Stern, New York City, for American Jewish Congress, amicus curiae.

Donna M. C. Giliberto, Albany, for New York State Conference of Mayors & Municipal Officials, amicus curiae.

George Shebitz & Associates P.C. (George Shebitz, Nahal Motamed and Julia Cohen, of counsel), New York City, for Kiryas Joel Parent Teacher Association, amicus curiae.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and MERCURE, WHITE, CASEY and SPAIN, JJ.

MERCURE, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kahn, J.), entered April 20, 1995 in Albany County, which, inter alia, granted a cross motion by defendant Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

I

The Village of Kiryas Joel (hereinafter Village) in Orange County is a religious enclave of Satmar Hassidim, practitioners of a strict form of Judaism. The boundaries of the Village were intentionally drawn in such a way as to exclude all but Satmars. Living a purposely insular existence, the Satmars have adopted distinctive dress, have no radios or televisions and eschew spoken and written English in favor of Yiddish, their principal language. They also practice separation of the sexes outside of the home and, as part of an effort to avoid acculturation and to provide the Satmar boys and girls with education and training appropriate to their distinctive lifestyle, generally send their children to separate private religious schools, the United Talmudic Academy for boys and Bais Rochel for girls. The problem of educating their handicapped children, however, has thrust the Satmars into the mainstream of New York's political and judicial affairs.

The Village is situated entirely within the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District. In 1984, as an accommodation to the distinct needs of the Satmars' handicapped children, who are affected not only by their physical or mental problems but also by their language and social and cultural background, Monroe-Woodbury's board of education agreed to provide various services and programs at a "neutral site" within the Village, at an annex to Bais Rochel, under the auspices of the United Talmudic Academy (see, Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 178-180, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767). These arrangements were terminated a year later, however, in reaction to the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 and Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 87 L.Ed.2d 267. Although some of the handicapped Satmar children thereafter attended special education classes at the Monroe-Woodbury public schools, all but a few simply went without special educational services (see, Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, supra, at 181, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767). The irreconcilable views of the Satmars, taking the position that the school district was required to provide special services for their handicapped children within their private religious schools, and of the school district, believing that it could furnish services only in its public schools, led to an initial round of litigation commenced by the school district in November 1985. Ultimately, that action worked its way to the Court of Appeals, which in 1988 rejected both points of view, concluding that, although the school district may legally provide services to the Satmar children outside the regular classes and programs of its public schools, it is not compelled by law to offer such services at a neutral site or in the classes and programs of the Satmars' nonpublic schools (id., at 189-90, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767).

The following year, in "an effort to resolve a longstanding conflict between the Monroe-Woodbury School District and the village of Kiryas Joel, whose population are all members of the same religious sect" (Governor's Approval Mem, 1989 N.Y. Legis. Ann., at 324), the Legislature enacted chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 (hereinafter the prior law), which created a separate public school district in and for the Village and established a board of education, composed of five members elected by the voters of the Village. Although enjoying plenary legal authority over the elementary and secondary education of all school-aged children in the Village, the Kiryas Joel Village School District in fact ran only a special education program for handicapped children, with a mere 13 Village residents attending on a full-time basis.

Plaintiffs in the present action, Louis Grumet and Albert W. Hawk, brought an action seeking a judgment declaring the prior law unconstitutional. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the determination of the In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor provided New York with some guidelines for crafting acceptable legislation, stating:

                State courts that the legislative enactment was violative of the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil.  School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546, affg. 81 N.Y.2d 518, 601 N.Y.S.2d 61, 618 N.E.2d 94 [hereinafter Kiryas Joel I ].  The court opined that, although the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens, the prior law "crosse[d] the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment" (id., at 710, 114 S.Ct. at 2494).   Notably, "[t]he fact that this school district was created by a special and unusual Act of the legislature * * * gives reason for concern whether the benefit received by the Satmar community is one that the legislature will provide equally to other religious (and nonreligious) groups * * * [t]he fundamental source of constitutional concern [being] that the legislature itself may fail to exercise governmental authority in a religiously neutral way" (id., at 702-703, 114 S.Ct. at 2491).  "Because the religious community of Kiryas Joel did not receive its new governmental authority simply as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law, [the court had] no assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a school district of its own will receive one * * * " (id., at 703, 114 S.Ct. at 2491)
                

There is nothing improper about a legislative intention to accommodate a religious group, so long as it is implemented through generally applicable legislation. New York may, for instance, allow all villages to operate their own school districts. If it does not want to act so broadly, it may set forth neutral criteria that a village must meet to have a school district of its own; these criteria can then be applied by a state agency, and the decision would then be reviewable by the judiciary. A district created under a generally applicable scheme would be acceptable even though it coincides with a village which was consciously created by its voters as an enclave for their religious group. I do not think the court's opinion holds the contrary (id., at 717, 114 S.Ct. at 2498 [O'Connor, J., concurring] [emphasis supplied].

A mere 11 days after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Kiryas Joel I, the Legislature and then-Governor defendant Mario Cuomo accepted Justice O'Connor's invitation by simultaneously passing and signing into law chapter 279 of the Laws of 1994 and chapter 241 of the Laws of 1994 (hereinafter the current law). The Laws of 1994 (ch. 279) repealed the prior law, but allowed the Kiryas Joel Village School District to continue until the State court issued a mandate implementing Kiryas Joel I or until the school district was reconstituted (see, L 1994, ch 279, § 3). The current law amended Education Law article 31 by adding provisions that would allow municipalities existing on the effective date to establish their own union free school districts without the need for special legislation if they exhibit the following demographic features: (1) the municipality is situated wholly within a single central or union free school district, but its boundaries are not coterminous with the boundaries of the school district, (2) the enrollment of the municipality equals at least 2,000 children and is no greater than 60% of the enrollment of the existing school district, (3) the new school district will have an actual valuation per total wealth pupil unit at least equal to the State-wide average, (4) the enrollment of the existing school district will be at least 2,000 students exclusive of the residents of the qualifying municipality, and (5) the actual valuation per total wealth pupil unit of the existing school district will not increase or decrease by more than 10% following organization of the new school district (L 1994, ch 241, § 1; Education Law § 1504[3] ). In accordance with the provisions of the current law, Monroe-Woodbury and the residents of the Village each voted to approve the Village's establishment of its own school district.

Plaintiffs then commenced the present action, seeking a declaration that the current law is unconstitutional upon the essential theory that it constitutes a de facto reenactment of the prior law. On ...