Grumet v. Pataki

• Decision Date: 09 July 1998
• Parties: , 128 Ed. Law Rep. 801, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 6940 Louis GRUMET et al., Respondents, v. George PATAKI, as Governor of the State of New York, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 662

675 N.Y.S.2d 662

244 A.D.2d 31, 128 Ed. Law Rep. 801,

1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 6940

Louis GRUMET et al., Respondents, v. George PATAKI, as Governor of the State of New York, et al.,

Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

July 9, 1998.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General (Julie S. Mereson of counsel), Albany, for George Pataki and others, appellants.

George Shebitz & Associates, New York City, and Miller, Cassidy, Larocca & Lewin LLP (Nathan Lewin of counsel), Washington, DC, for The Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Union Free School District, appellant.

Ingerman Smith LLP (Lawrence W. Reich of counsel), Northport, for Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, appellant.

Jay Worona, New York State School Board Association, Albany, for Louis Grumet and others, respondents.

Marc D. Stern, American Jewish Congress, New York City, for American Jewish Congress, amicus curiae.

Eric W. Treene, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, amicus curiae.

Dennis Rapps, The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, New York City, for The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, amicus curiae.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., MERCURE, PETERS, SPAIN and CARPINELLO, JJ.

SPAIN, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Teresi, J.), entered April 6, 1998 in Albany County, which granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and declared the Laws of 1997 (ch. 390) unconstitutional.

The legislation challenged in this action, chapter 390 of the Laws of 1997, is the most recent in a series of attempts by the Legislature to create a constitutionally valid educational program which meets the special education needs of the disabled students residing in the Village of Kiryas Joel, Orange County. The Village, which lies entirely within the boundaries of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, is a community established by members of the Satmar Hasidic sect. When created, the Village boundaries were drawn to include only property owned and inhabited by Satmars, devoutly religious people whose lifestyle is shaped by their religious beliefs. The facts of this case have been more fully described in prior State and U.S. Supreme Court decisions (see e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 [hereinafter Kiryas Joel I ]; Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340 [hereinafter Kiryas Joel II ]; Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d 174, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767).

At the core of this continuing controversy is a dispute over special education services between Monroe-Woodbury and the residents of the Village, whose children attend private religious schools within the Village. Because these parochial schools were not equipped to adequately educate the handicapped children of the Village, the Satmars initially relied on Monroe-Woodbury to provide these services and programs in an annex to one of the religious schools in the Village. After the U.S. Supreme Court found such programs unconstitutional in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 87 L.Ed.2d 290, and Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 3248, 87 L.Ed.2d 267, Monroe-Woodbury ceased offering on-site instruction. Thereafter, Monroe-Woodbury provided special education to the Village's handicapped children at its public school buildings located outside the Village. Eventually, most of the Village parents removed their children from the Monroe-Woodbury program because of, inter alia, the cultural and alleged emotional trauma experienced by these special needs children when exposed to the public school integrated classes (see, Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. School Dist. v. Wieder, supra, at 181, 531 N.Y.S.2d 889, 527 N.E.2d 767).

Ultimately, the Legislature attempted to end this conflict by enacting chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 (hereinafter chapter 748), which provided for the creation of a union free school district coterminous with the Village, designated as the Kiryas Joel Village School District (see, L.1989, ch. 748[1] ). The new school district ran only a special education program, providing services for approximately 40 disabled children from the Village and over 150 additional Hasidic children residing in neighboring districts. All three levels of New York courts, i.e., Supreme Court (Kahn, J.), this court and the Court of Appeals, found chapter 748 unconstitutional (Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist., 81 N.Y.2d 518, 601 N.Y.S.2d 61, 618 N.E.2d 94, affg. 187 A.D.2d 16, 592 N.Y.S.2d 123, affg. sub nom. Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 151 Misc.2d 60, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004). On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that chapter 748 violated the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (see, Kiryas Joel I, supra).

Thereafter, in response to the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Legislature passed chapter 241 of the Laws of 1994 (hereinafter chapter 241). Chapter 241 listed criteria related to, inter alia, enrollment and valuation by which municipalities were allowed to organize their own school districts (see, Grumet v. Cuomo, 225 A.D.2d 4, 8-9, 647 N.Y.S.2d 565, affd. 90 N.Y.2d 57, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340; see also, Education Law § 1504[3], as added by L.1994, ch. 241[1] ). Notably, chapter 241 was limited in application to municipalities already in existence (see, Kiryas Joel II, supra, at 67, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340). Although Supreme Court (Kahn, J.) found the new law constitutional, both this court and the Court of Appeals declared it unconstitutional (see, id., at 68, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340, affg. 225 A.D.2d 4, 647 N.Y.S.2d 565). The Court of Appeals held that the statute's neutral language could not mask the fact that the law was so narrow that no other school district in the State could be established under its criteria (see, id., at 69, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681 N.E.2d 340).

In yet another effort to remedy the constitutional flaws of the prior legislation, the Legislature passed chapter 390 of the Laws of 1997 (hereinafter chapter 390). Chapter 390 is similar to its predecessor, chapter 241, but includes certain changes aimed at broadening its application. Unlike the prior statute, the new law allows municipalities yet to be formed, which meet its criteria, to form new school districts and does not limit its immediate benefits to only one existing municipality. In August 1997, subsequent to the Governor's approval of the new statute, the Kiryas Joel Union Free School District was created.

Thereafter, claiming status as citizen taxpayers pursuant to the State Finance Law, plaintiffs commenced this action in Albany County against the Governor, the Education Department and its Commissioner, the State Board of Regents, the Comptroller, the District Superintendent of the Orange-Ulster BOCES (hereinafter collectively referred to as the State defendants), the Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Union Free School District (hereinafter Kiryas Joel) and the Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of chapter 390 under both Federal and State Constitutions. In October 1997, Kiryas Joel and Monroe-Woodbury moved for a change of venue from Albany County to Orange County. In December 1997, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that out of 1,545 municipalities State-wide, only two villages qualified. Supreme Court denied the motion for a change of venue and, in a separate decision, granted summary judgment and declared that chapter 390 was unconstitutional. Kiryas Joel and Monroe-Woodbury appeal the denial of a change in venue. The State defendants, Kiryas Joel and Monroe-Woodbury appeal the grant of summary judgment.

We affirm. Initially, we conclude that Supreme Court did not err in denying the applications for a change of venue. It is settled law that "[w]here there are conflicting venue provisions and one or more parties seeks a change of venue, it is given to the discretion of the court to select the proper venue" (Matter of Hurst v. Board of Educ. for Ithaca City School Dist., 242 A.D.2d 130, 132-133, 672 N.Y.S.2d 928; see, Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection of State of N.Y. v. Gateway State Bank, 239 A.D.2d 826, 828, 658 N.Y.S.2d 705, lv. dismissed 91 N.Y.2d 848, 667 N.Y.S.2d 683, 690 N.E.2d 492; see also, CPLR 502). In this case, there are conflicting CPLR provisions. Actions against school boards shall be brought in the county where the school district is located (CPLR 504[2] ); however, State Finance Law § 123-c(1) requires that a citizen taxpayer's challenge be brought either where the disbursement of funds occurred or is likely to occur or where the State official has his or her principal office. CPLR 509 states that venue, unless changed, shall be in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Here, five of the eight named defendants are State agencies or State officials with principal offices in Albany County, and plaintiffs, citizen-taxpayers challenging legislation which provides educational funding to school districts, chose Albany County. In light of the foregoing, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue.

Moving next to the merits, we reject defendants' assertion that chapter 390 is a neutral law which cured the constitutional deficiencies of chapter 241 and conclude that, as did its predecessors, the new statute lacks the neutrality toward religion mandated by the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It is well settled that government action must be neutral and cannot favor one religion over another nor favor a religious adherent over a nonadherent (see, Kiryas Joel I, supra, at 696, 114 S.Ct. at 2487-2488; Kiryas Joel II, supra, at 69, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173, 681...