GRUNDY v. SKOLNICK
| Decision Date | 31 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:07-cv-00694-RLH-LRL |
| Parties | RICKY LEE GRUNDY, Plaintiff, v. HOWARD SKOLNICK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
(Motion for Summary Judgment-#108; Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint-#118)
Before the Court is Defendants Jack Palmer, Cole Morrow, Jeffrey Froschauer (sued as Jeff Froschauer), Donald Helling (sued as Don Helling), Ronald Corda, Theodore D'Amico (sued as Ted D'Amico), Donna Jenkins, and James G. Cox's (named as Greg Cox or ADO Cox) Motion for Summary Judgment (#108, filed Dec. 2, 2010). Plaintiff Ricky Lee Grundy did not respond.
Also before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (#118, filed Jan. 25, 2011). Defendants did not respond.
This case involves a now ex-prisoner, Plaintiff Ricky Lee Grundy, who was incarcerated with the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC"). Plaintiff alleges that various NDOC officers and administrators violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during his incarceration. The procedural background of this case is convoluted and complicated and it is unnecessary for the Court to explain most of the history of this case to handle this motion. However, the Court will explain some of the most recent history of this case.
Before the Court are Plaintiff's latest request to amend his complaint and Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed two separate motions to extend time (##116, 119) to file a response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed the first motion to extend time (#116) twelve days after the deadline to file a response had already passed. Nonetheless, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion. (#117, Order.) Plaintiff then filed a second motion seeking an extension so that he could file a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (#119.) The Court rejected that deficient reason for an extension and informed Plaintiff that the Court would "reject any request to file a second amended complaint" because of unfair prejudice to the Defendants. (#120.) Nonetheless, the Court did grant Plaintiff another short extension to file his response considering that the deadline had already passed again. (Id.) Plaintiff then appealed the Court's order granting Plaintiff an extension of time based upon the Court's statement that it would not entertain any further motions to amend. (#122, Notice of Appeal.) On March 23, 2011, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff's appeal. (#125, Order.) Notwithstanding two extensions totaling approximately two months time and an appeal, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' motion. The Court has now reviewed the outstanding motions and for the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion and grants Defendants' motion.
In this case, Plaintiff has repeatedly amended and attempted to amend his complaint futilely. As noted in this Court's prior Order (Dkt. #101, Sept. 20, 2010) denying amendment, this case is more than three years old and Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to "get it right." Amendment now would "only compound a case that has already become unnecessarily complex and multiplied," which would unfairly prejudice the Defendants. (Id.) Also, in the Court's January 26, 2011 Order (Dkt. #120), the Court informed Plaintiff that it would not entertain any further motions to amend the complaint. Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion to amend.
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court. Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits "show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is "material" if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment is not appropriate. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1171 (1996). "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). "In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party "may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists," Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Bank of America v. Orr, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a mechanism for the private enforcement of substantive rights conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff "must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
Even though Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion, the Court will examine the evidence to determine whether Defendants have met their burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact as though Plaintiff had responded. The Court will address Plaintiff's claims in the order of alleged constitutional violation. The Court will then address each Defendant separately under that constitutional theory. However, the Defendants do not dispute that they are state actors and so the Court will not address that particular issue.
"A prisoner retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 409 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). A prisoner plaintiff must also show that the alleged retaliation was in fact retaliatory and did not advance a legitimate penological interest. Id.; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, prison authorities may legitimately restrict a prisoner's associational rights "because of the institutional need to maintain order." Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court must "evaluate [Plaintiff's] rights and the prison authorities alleged actions in light of [Plaintiff's] prisoner status." Id. Therefore, the Court must analyze challenges to First Amendment restrictions "in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the correctional institution in the preservation of internal order and discipline, maintenance of institutional security, and rehabilitation of prisoners." Id.
Pursuant to this Court's Screening Order (#63), Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states First Amendment claims against Defendants Palmer, Morrow, Froshauer, and Helling. The Court will address each of these Defendants in turn.
Plaintiff alleges that Palmer said that he would do his best to take away Plaintiff's rights as well as keep Plaintiff from accessing the courts because of Plaintiff's involvement with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"). However, Palmer was the warden at Lovelock Correctional Center ("Lovelock")—which does not have a prison chapter of the NAACP. (Dkt. #108, Mot. Ex. A-2, Palmer Aff. ¶ 3.)1 Plaintiff's First Amendment claims related to the NAACP did not arise until Plaintiff was incarcerated at Northern Nevada Correctional Center ("NNCC") and Southern Desert Correctional Center ("Southern Desert")—prisons where Palmer did not work during the period of Plaintiff's specific complaints. (Id.) Further, Palmer testified that he did not make the statements Plaintiff alleges. (See generally, Ex. A-2, Palmer Aff.)...
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