Gruner v. Lane County
Decision Date | 24 May 1989 |
Citation | 96 Or.App. 694,773 P.2d 815 |
Parties | Billy GRUNER, Crystal Gruner, d/b/a Pleasant Hill Ranch, and Robert Jeremiah, d/b/a B.J. Equipment Company, Appellants, v. LANE COUNTY, Respondent. 16-87-10179; CA A49120. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Clayton C. Patrick, Salem, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was William D. Brandt, Salem.
David B. Williams, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and WARREN and ROSSMAN, JJ.
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal with prejudice of their claim for relief for inverse condemnation. Or. Const., Art. I, § 18. 1 The sole issue is whether their first amended complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a claim. We affirm.
Plaintiffs Gruner, as lessor, and plaintiff Jeremiah, as lessee, of a rock quarry, brought this action against the county to recover damages for an alleged taking of plaintiffs' property by adoption of a county ordinance reducing the load limit from 40 tons to 17 tons on two county roads that provide access to the quarry. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges:
In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, we assume the truth of plaintiffs' allegations and of any facts that might conceivably be adduced as proof of those allegations. Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 405, 591 P.2d 719 (1979). Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefits of all intendments and inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the facts pleaded. Lincoln Loan v. State Highway Commission, 274 Or. 49, 52, 545 P.2d 105 (1976).
The parties cite different standards for what constitutes a compensable taking by inverse condemnation. County contends that the appropriate criteria for whether a compensable taking has occurred in this case is found in cases of inverse condemnation in the land use planning or zoning context. In those cases, the land owner is not entitled to compensation for inverse condemnation unless: 1) the owner is precluded from all economically feasible private uses pending eventual taking for public use; or 2) the designation results in such governmental intrusion as to inflict virtually irreversible damage. Suess Builders Company v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 258, 656 P.2d 306 (1982); Fifth Ave. Corp. v. Washington County, 282 Or. 591, 614, 581 P.2d 50 (1978).
Plaintiffs rely on the standard used when a taking occurs as a result of trespass or nuisance--"any destruction, restriction, or interruption of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property of a person for a public purpose" constitutes a compensable taking within the meaning of Article I, section 18. Lincoln Loan v. State Highway Commission, supra, 274 Or. at 52-53, 545 P.2d 105. They contend, citing our opinion in Douglas County v. Briggs, 34 Or.App. 409, 578 P.2d 1261 (1978), aff'd on other grounds, 286 Or. 151, 593 P.2d 1115 (1979), that, by reducing the load limit on the two roads providing access to the rock quarry, the county has deprived them of their common law right of access and, consequently, the right to use their property.
Plaintiffs are correct that an owner of land abutting a street has a common law right of access to his property from the road. Oregon Investment Co. v. Schrunk, 242 Or. 63, 408 P.2d 89 (1965); Boese v. City of Salem, 40 Or.App. 381, 595 P.2d 822, rev. den., 287 Or. 507 (1979). However, that right is qualified by the state's inherent power. To protect the public safety, convenience and welfare, a governing body may qualify or restrict an abutting landowner's right of ingress and egress. Oregon Investment Co. v. Schrunk, supra, 242 Or. at 67, 408 P.2d 89; Boese v. City of Salem, supra, 40 Or.App. at 383, 595 P.2d 822; Douglas County v. Briggs, supra, 34 Or.App. at 409, 578 P.2d 1261. "Such restrictions do not constitute a taking so long as an adequate means of access remains available to the abutting property owner." 34 Or.App. at 414, 578 P.2d 1261. 2 Inconvenience, reduction in profits or depreciation in the value of property that occurs as a result of a legitimate exercise of the state's police power is damnum absque injuria and not a compensable taking. Oregon Investment Co. v. Schrunk, supra; City of Salem v. Merritt Truax, 70 Or.App. 138, 688 P.2d 120 (1984); Boese v. City of Salem, supra.
County argues that, because plaintiffs are not precluded from hauling loads of 17 tons or less, they have not been denied all access and, therefore, their claim is merely for consequential damages for reduction in economic expectations and is not a claim for a...
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