Gualtieri v. Bogle

• Decision Date: 05 August 2022
• Docket Number: 2D21-2900
• Citation: 343 So.3d 1267
• Parties: Bob GUALTIERI, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida; and Christopher G. Lyons, individually and in his official capacity as a deputy of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Appellants, v. Randall BOGLE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

343 So.3d 1267

Bob GUALTIERI, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida; and Christopher G. Lyons, individually and in his official capacity as a deputy of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Appellants,
v.
Randall BOGLE, Appellee.

No. 2D21-2900

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 5, 2022

Jason G. Gordillo of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Largo, for Appellants.

Daniel Hartpence of Clark Law, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

STARGEL, Judge.

Bob Gualtieri, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Pinellas County, Florida, and Christopher G. Lyons, individually and in his official capacity as a deputy of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office (Appellants), appeal from a nonfinal order denying their motion to dismiss a negligence action brought by Randall Bogle. We have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(F)(ii), which addresses orders denying entitlement to immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes (2016), and rule 9.130(a)(3)(F)(iii), which addresses orders denying entitlement to sovereign immunity.¹ Because we agree with Appellants that dismissal was warranted as to two of the three counts alleged in the operative complaint, we reverse in part.

On the evening of October 14, 2016, Deputy Lyons was on duty in his patrol vehicle when he allegedly observed Bogle speeding on his motorcycle. Deputy Lyons followed him into an intersection where Bogle claims he was standing with his motorcycle. According to Bogle, Deputy Lyons approached without warning, grabbed his left arm, and attempted to pull him from the motorcycle. This action allegedly

343 So.3d 1271

caused the motorcycle to fall on top of Bogle and resulted in a slice and burn to his right leg. However, Deputy Lyons included in the arrest report that he ordered Bogle to get off the motorcycle and Bogle responded by tensing and bracing his arms instead of immediately getting off the motorcycle. Deputy Lyons arrested Bogle for two misdemeanor traffic offenses: reckless driving and driving without a valid driver's license.

Based on these events, Bogle filed an action for damages against Deputy Lyons and the Sheriff. Following Deputy Lyons’ answer and affirmative defenses and the Sheriff's motion to dismiss, Bogle successfully moved to amend his initial complaint. Bogle's second amended complaint asserts three causes of action: battery against Deputy Lyons (count one); battery against the Sheriff based on the actions of Deputy Lyons (count two); and negligent training against the Sheriff (count three). Appellants moved to dismiss Bogle's second amended complaint, raising the issue of sovereign immunity as to each count and requesting dismissal with prejudice. Bogle filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss. A case management conference was held on August 18, 2021, during which the trial court denied Appellants' motion to dismiss. The court then rendered an unelaborated order denying the motion to dismiss, and this appeal ensued.

I. Standard of Review

The question of whether a party is entitled to sovereign immunity is subject to de novo review. Lee Mem'l Health Sys. v. Hilderbrand , 304 So. 3d 58, 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020). "However, when ruling on a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, courts are required to treat as true the complaint's allegations, ‘including those that incorporate attachments, and to look no further than the amended complaint and its attachments.’ " Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Moore , No. 2D21-2685, 2022 WL 1751166, at *1 (Fla. 2d DCA June 1, 2022) ; see also Baycon Indus., Inc. v. Shea , 714 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ("A motion to dismiss is not a substitute for a motion for summary judgment, and in ruling on a motion to dismiss a complaint the trial court is confined to consideration of the allegations found within the four corners of the complaint.").

II. Count One for Battery Against Deputy Lyons

Count one raises a state-law battery claim against Deputy Lyons in both his individual capacity and in his official capacity. To the extent count one seeks to hold Deputy Lyons liable in his official capacity, "[a] suit against a defendant in his official capacity is, in actuality, a suit against the governmental entity which employs him." Stephens v. Geoghegan , 702 So. 2d 517, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). This being the case, "there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly." De Armas v. Ross , 680 So. 2d 1130, 1131-32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting Busby v. City of Orlando , 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) ). Thus, this portion of count one is redundant to Bogle's battery claim against the Sheriff in count two, discussed infra .

Turning to the individual-capacity aspect of count one, Deputy Lyons’ claim for immunity derives from section 768.28(9)(a), which provides:

No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions shall be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage

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