Guardianship of Matt, In re

• Decision Date: 03 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 39362,39362
• Citation: 75 Wn.2d 123,449 P.2d 413
• Parties: In the Matter of the GUARDIANSHIP OF Anna M. MATT, Incompetent. Noreen WATSON, Guardian of the person and the Estate of Anna M. Matt, Incompetent, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON MUTUAL SAVINGS BANK; and Eldon Anderson, Guardian ad Litem, Defendants, Ethlen Preston, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 123

75 Wn.2d 123

449 P.2d 413

In the Matter of the GUARDIANSHIP OF Anna M. MATT, Incompetent.

Noreen WATSON, Guardian of the person and the Estate of Anna

M. Matt, Incompetent, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON MUTUAL SAVINGS BANK; and Eldon Anderson, Guardian

ad Litem, Defendants,

Ethlen Preston, Respondent.

No. 39362.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

Jan. 3, 1969.

Eugene J. Craig, Seattle, for appellant.

Olwell, Boyle & Hattrup, Lee Olwell, Seattle, for respondent.

HAMILTON, Judge.

Anna Matt was 85 years old in 1965. She was a widow and had no children or other relatives. For several years she had relied on assistance from her close friends in business and everyday affairs. Noreen Watson and her husband, Anna Matt's neighbors, had in recent years rendered the bulk of this assistance. Ethlen Preston, whom Anna Matt considered as a daughter, after an absence of several years, returned to Seattle in early 1965, and began to also assist Mrs. Matt. In October, 1965, Mrs. Preston and Mrs. Matt went to the Washington Mutual Savings Bank, where Mrs. Matt had on deposit in her own name in excess of $10,400. While there, she and Mrs. Preston executed a signature card which added Mrs. Preston's name to the account. This card reads, in part: 'Funds in this account are to be paid to either or the survivor of us.' Mrs. Matt gave Mrs. Preston the passbook to the account which she still retains.

On January 20, 1966, Mrs. Matt was judicially declared to be incompetent. Mrs. Watson was appointed guardian of her person and estate. In the process of gathering the assets of the estate, Mrs. Watson learned of the joint bank account. Mrs. Watson and her attorney found Mrs. Preston unwilling to turn over the passbook or to assume payment of the hospital and living expenses of Mrs. Matt. Mrs. Preston had not withdrawn any money from the account.

Mrs. Watson, as guardian, instituted this action on behalf of her ward, Mrs. Matt, to recover the funds in the joint account. The bank was made a party defendant. However, the bank disclaimed any interest in the outcome and counsel appearing for the bank presented no evidence and asked no questions of any of the witnesses produced by the other parties. It is clear that the dispute is solely between the guardian and Mrs. Preston.

There was evidence presented which, if accepted as true, would establish that Mrs. Matt believed that somebody was after her money and that she, Mrs. Matt, would be unable to resist; that Mrs. Matt added Mrs. Preston's name to the account in the mistaken belief that Mrs. Preston would also have to sign any request for withdrawals; and that the purpose of adding Mrs. Preston's name to the account was to aid Mrs. Matt in safeguarding her property. There is also evidence in the record which, if believed, would establish that Mrs. Matt added Mrs. Preston's name to the account under an agreement with Mrs. Preston that Mrs. Preston would use the money to support and care for Mrs. Matt, if necessary, and that Mrs. Preston would receive the balance when Mrs. Matt died.

It is clear, however, from statements made by the trial judge during the taking of evidence, from statements in his oral opinion, and from his findings, conclusions, and orders, that the trial judge did not consider this evidence and did not resolve the factual issues thus raised with respect to the parties' intentions in opening this joint account. Rather the trial court, relying on RCW 32.12.030(3), considered the signature card to be conclusive evidence of the intention of Mrs. Matt and Mrs. Preston and held that they intended to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The trial court also found that Mrs. Matt was not the victim of fraud or undue influence with respect to this transaction. Accordingly, the trial court denied the guardian the relief she sought but did, however, provide that on a showing of necessity the court would approve withdrawals from the account. However, the court also required that the guardian reimburse any amounts withdrawn from the account with other assets in Mrs. Matt's estate when such became available. The bank was restrained from honoring any requests for withdrawals from the account without the court's approval. The guardian appeals from these judgments and orders. Mrs. Preston is the respondent. The bank is not a party to the appeal.

The statute applicable to joint accounts in mutual savings banks is RCW 32.12.030(3), which reads:

(3) After any deposit shall be made by any person in the names of such depositor and one or more other persons and in form to be paid to any of them or the survivor of them, such deposit and any additions thereto made by any of such persons after the making thereof, Shall become the property of such persons as joint tenants, and the same, together with all dividends thereon, shall be held for the exclusive use of such persons and may be paid to any of them during their lifetimes or to the survivor or survivors and such payment and the receipt or acquittance of the one to whom such payment is made shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge to such savings bank for all payments made on account of such deposit prior to the receipt by such savings bank of notice in writing not to pay such deposit in accordance with the terms thereof. The making of the deposit in such form shall, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, be conclusive evidence, in any action or proceeding to which either such savings bank or the surviving depositor is a party, of the intention of all depositors to vest title to such deposit and the additions thereto in the survivor or survivors. (Italics ours.)

Five of appellant's 18 assignments of error raise the crucial issue in this appeal: To what extent does RCW 32.12.030(3) govern the rights of codepositors inter se to the joint account during their lifetimes? In view of our decision on this issue, it is unnecessary to consider others raised by appellant.

Appellant contends that the first sentence of this statute raises a Rebuttable presumption of intent to create in the codepositors present joint tenancy interests in the account during their lifetimes; that the 'conclusive evidence' provision of the last sentence governs codepositors' rights inter se only on the death of one of them. In support of her position, appellant cites Winner v. Carroll, 169 Wash. 208, 13 P.2d 450 (1932); and Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506, 66 A.L.R. 870 (1929). Appellant thus contends that the trial court erred in considering the signature card as conclusive evidence of the parties' intent, in not considering other evidence, and in failing to make an independent finding of the parties' actual intent. Respondent replies that the statements in Winner v. Carroll, supra, on which appellant relies are dicta, and in any event the 'conclusive evidence' provision also applies when the savings bank is a party to the action. Pointing out that the bank is a party to this action, respondent asserts that the court below did not err in refusing to consider the parties' actual intent an issue in the dispute.

In Winner v. Carroll, supra, we said, 169 Wash. at 218, 13 P.2d at 454:

Construing the provisions of the Mutual Savings Bank Act of 1915 (Rem.Comp.Stat., § 3348, subd. 2 (now RCW 32.12.030(3)), it is our conclusion that a deposit of the nature involved in this case presumptively creates an estate in joint tenancy with the attendant right of survivorship; that the presumption may be rebutted during the lifetime of both depositors, but that upon the death of either depositor the presumption, in the absence of fraud or undue influence, becomes conclusive in any action or proceeding to which the bank or the surviving depositor is a party.

This was, as respondent points out, unnecessary to the decision in that case. However, the California and New York courts reached the same conclusion with respect to identical statutes. See Paterson v. Comastri, 39 Cal.2d 66, at 71, 244 P.2d 902, at 905 (1952), wherein it is stated:

This section * * * has been construed * * * to set up two presumptions: First, that a deposit in the names of the depositor and another person 'in form to be paid to' either or the survivor of them, becomes the property of such persons as joint tenants. This first presumption is not conclusive, and may be overcome by proof that the owner-depositor, when making the deposit, had no intention to create a true joint tenancy. The second presumption, that in the absence of fraud or undue influence, it was the intention of the depositors to vest title in the survivor, is conclusive. In order that the conclusive presumption may be applicable, however, there must be survivorship, * * *.

And, see Moskowitz v. Marrow, supra, on which we relied in the Winner case. Four other states have identical or nearly identical statutes to RCW 32.12.030(3): Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Nevada. Of these, the Connecticut court is apparently the only one which has been called upon to consider the issue before us. That court reached the same conclusion as we did in Winner, supra, Grodzicki v. Grodzicki, 154 Conn. 456, at 463, 226 A.2d 656, at 659 (1967) The language of the statute does not determine the respective rights of the parties inter vivos. The presumption created by the second sentence * * * of the statute has no application to an action between the parties when all of them are alive.

The reasons for adopting such a construction have been best stated by Cardozo, C.J., concurring in Moskowitz v. Marrow, supra, 251 N.Y. at 397, 167 N.E. at 511:

The sentence is as significant for what it omits as for what it says. There is no statement that the form is to be taken as conclusive evidence in any action or proceeding to which Either depositor is a party. It is to be conclusive evidence only in an action or proceeding in which the bank or the Surviving depositor is a party. * * * The plain...