Guarneri v. Schoharie Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Serv.
| Decision Date | 21 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-0991 (TJM/ML) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
| Parties | JOSEPH GUARNERI, Plaintiff, v. SCHOHARIE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICE; COMMISSIONER DONNA BECKER; ACTING COMMISSIONER JULLIE SAMMON; WORKER MELISSA GOODEARU; WORKER KAYLTHIN RUSSEL; OFFICE OF TEMPORARY AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE; CASE WORKER LEANN BRADT, of Rehabilitation Support; and GOVERNOR CUOMO, Defendants. |
JOSEPH GUARNERI Plaintiff, Pro Se.
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent this pro se Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 3) filed by Joseph Guarneri (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. For the reasons discussed below, I grant Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 3), and I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed in its entirety (1) in part with leave to amend, and (2) in part without leave to amend.
Liberally construed, [1] Plaintiff's Complaint asserts that his civil rights were violated by Defendants Schoharie County Department of Social Service, Commissioner Donna Becker Acting Commissioner Jullie Sammon, Worker Melissa Goodearu, Worker Kaylthin Russel, Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Case Worker Leann Bradt of Rehabilitation Support, and Governor Cuomo (collectively “Defendants”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
Plaintiff alleges that at some point in time, he underwent a coronary angiograph and was cared for by Bassett Healthcare in Cooperstown. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he was discharged from Bassett Healthcare on April 29, 2019, with instructions that he take all medications with foods. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on May 8, 2019, the medical instructions-that he take all medications with food-was shown to Defendant Goodreau. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that at some point in time, Defendant Goodreau threatened and coerced Plaintiff to prevent him from taking life threatening medication with food. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he is a diabetic and, as such, requires a diet that includes carbohydrates and a snack at night. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on August 9, 2021, without any advance notice, Defendants stopped his Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his SNAP benefits were reduced from $194.00 per month, to $114.00 per month, to $189.00 per month. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that his benefits were reduced intentionally to kill him. (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “use” a homeless shelter that has been “called out by the state for poor” health and safety conditions. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “sent” him to “Riverside Motel with no medication or food.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that-on an unspecified date-he agreed, in writing, to repay Defendants $7, 830.00-for an unspecified debt. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he paid Defendants $7, 090.00, which, according to Plaintiff, was an overpayment. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he and Social Security were not informed by Defendants that Defendants “stole” the money and Plaintiff will not recover the money that he overpaid. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he filed an action in Schoharie County Supreme Court against Defendant Sammon, which is still pending. (Id.)
Based upon the foregoing allegations, the Complaint appears to assert the following three claims: (1) a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and (3) a claim pursuant to New York state law of negligence. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff requests a jury trial and seeks $500, 000.00 in damages. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff also filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 3.)
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).[2] After reviewing Plaintiff's in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 3), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.[3]
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The requirement that a plaintiff “show” that he or she is entitled to relief means that a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
The Court, however, also has an overarching obligation to determine that a claim is not legally frivolous before permitting a pro se plaintiff's complaint to proceed. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir. 2000) (). “Legal frivolity . . . occurs where ‘the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory [such as] when either the claim lacks an arguable basis in law, or a dispositive defense clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Aguilar v. United States, 99-MC-0304, 99-MC-0408, 1999 WL 1067841, at *2 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 1999) (quoting Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) ().
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that all causes of action be dismissed.
“To state a valid claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Whalen v. Cnty. of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1994)). Thus, § 1983 does not create any independent substantive right, but rather “provides a civil claim for damages” to “redress . . . the deprivation of [federal] rights established elsewhere.” Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999).
The Complaint fails to allege a deprivation of federal rights established elsewhere. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Instead, the Complaint states that it is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) The only other federal statute mentioned is the ADA, which provides an independent cause of action separate from § 1983.
In addition, and in the alternative, the Complaint is replete with allegations that shock but fails to allege actions attributable to state...
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