Guerra v. State

• Decision Date: 18 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. PD–0318–13.,PD–0318–13.
• Citation: 432 S.W.3d 905
• Parties: Juan Jose GUERRA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

432 S.W.3d 905

Juan Jose GUERRA, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas.

No. PD–0318–13.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 18, 2014.

Terrence W. Kirk, Attorney at Law, Austin, TX, E. Jason Leach, Odessa, TX, for Appellant.

Carolyn D. Thurmond, Assistant District Attorney, Midland, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, TX, for the State.

OPINION

JOHNSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., WOMACK, KEASLER, HERVEY, and ALCALÁ, JJ., joined.

A jury convicted appellant of the offense of unlawful use of a criminal instrument with the intent to commit the offense of aggravated kidnapping or aggravated sexual assault and assessed punishment of twenty years' confinement. The jury also found that appellant personally used or exhibited a deadly weapon, specifically a firearm, during the commission of the offense. On direct appeal, appellant claimed that the trial court erred when it denied his motions to suppress evidence that was obtained from the initial stop of his vehicle and his subsequent detention. The court of appeals overruled that claim and ultimately affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Guerra v. State, 396 S.W.3d 233 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2013). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review, and we now affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. Background

During the evening hours of April 28, 2010, while returning from dinner, a husband, who was employed as a federal border-patrol agent, and his wife, who was employed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), observed appellant driving slowly and then stopping near the federal facility where the wife worked. There was testimony “that a female agent had recently been followed after she had left the office.” Guerra v. State, 396 S.W.3d at 238. In part because of that recent event, the couple became suspicious of appellant. A cheer, dance, and gymnastics building was also in the area, and appellant was seen “observing some children in the area of” that building. Id. at 237. As the vehicle's suspicious movements continued, the wife got out of their vehicle, walked to the federal facility, and sought the assistance of a federal agent who was working late. That agent, Stone, then got into his own vehicle, activated his emergency lights, and pursued appellant's vehicle after it left a nearby parking lot. Id. at 238. Appellant stopped his vehicle when it reached the end of an alley. Id. Stone observed the prongs of a stun gun sticking out of appellant's shirt pocket and questioned appellant, who admitted to having a pocket knife and a gun on his person. After Stone took custody of those weapons, he conducted a pat-down search of appellant, and appellant then admitted that he had a second gun in his car. Id. at 238.

When Stone looked inside appellant's vehicle and found the second gun, he also saw a group of zip ties, zip ties joined to form a set of plastic handcuffs, a jacket with a holster for concealing a gun and with strips of duct tape stuck on it, and bungee cords attached to cloth padding, which appeared to be gags. He also found a plastic bag that contained personal lubricant, a condom, and a Viagra-labeled pill bottle. Id. at 238–39. Stone called for a Midland police officer because he suspected that a kidnapping, rape, or murder was about to be committed. Id. He acknowledged that he was not a Texas peace officer, he had not seen appellant commit either a felony or breach of the peace, and he did not secure a search warrant before searching appellant's vehicle. Id.

Appellant filed two pretrial motions to suppress evidence, the first of which was directed at evidence obtained after his initial detention. The trial court granted the first motion as to appellant's statement given to an officer in the back of the police car and a portion of the video recording of appellant's statement given to the same officer at the Midland Police Department. The trial court denied that motion as to all other challenged evidence and statements taken on that day. The second motion to suppress was directed at evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequent search, with a warrant, of appellant's apartment in Big Spring. The trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to that search warrant.

II. Court of Appeals Opinion

On direct appeal, appellant asserted that the trial court erred when it denied his motions to suppress evidence obtained from the initial stop of his vehicle and his subsequent detention. He claimed that Stone had no basis for arresting or temporarily detaining him. Appellant argued that Stone was not a peace officer as defined by Texas statutory law, thus his authority to arrest was limited to “the law of this state as to felony offenses only.” The state acknowledged that Stone was not a Texas peace officer. Guerra v. State, 396 S.W.3d at 242.

Appellant contended that the record did not support a finding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in, or soon would be engaging in, criminal activity that constituted a felony under the laws of this state. The stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion involving a felony, and therefore all evidence obtained as a result of that stop should be suppressed. Appellant also challenged the evidence seized from his apartment pursuant to a search warrant, “the probable cause for which was drawn from the events of the traffic stop.” He maintained that, “[b]ut for the illegal stop of his vehicle, the warrant would not have been obtained.”

Construing Articles ¹ 2.122 and 14.03 together, the court of appeals concluded that Stone, although not a peace officer, had the authority to arrest or temporarily detain appellant if appellant was found in suspicious circumstances that reasonably showed that he was guilty of a felony, or threatened to commit, or was about to commit, a felony. Id. After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the trial court's extensive fact findings—which appellant did not specifically challenge—the court of appeals concluded that the evidence constituted a sufficient basis for Stone to form a reasonable belief that appellant was found in suspicious circumstances that showed he was threatening or about to commit a felony offense. Id. at 242–43. Thus, the court of appeals held that Stone had the authority to arrest or temporarily detain appellant and overruled appellant's point of error. Id. at 243.

III. Appellant's Ground for Review

We granted appellant's sole ground for review, which asserts that the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's denial of appellant's suppression motion when it held that Articles 2.122 and 14.03 can be construed together, in direct contravention of the statutory language “shall not be deemed peace officers,” thus allowing Stone to stop and detain appellant. Thus, we are called upon to review the court of appeals's decision that Stone, a federal agent and not a Texas peace officer, was authorized to temporarily detain or arrest appellant.

Appellant asserts Article 14.03 applies only to arrests and that neither Article 2.122 or Article 14.03, even construed together, allow a federal agent to stop and detain him; neither provision authorizes a federal agent to detain a citizen, rather, “a federal agent only has the power to arrest if there is probable cause, which the State concedes was lacking here.” ² He also asserts that, even if Article 2.122 permits a detention, Stone did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him.

The state asserts that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's suppression motions. It argues that a special investigator, as defined under Article 2.122, shall have the powers of arrest, search, and seizure under state law as to felonies and that Stone, a special agent for the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, i.e., a special investigator, had authority pursuant to Article 2.122 to stop and detain appellant for an investigation and that reasonable suspicion existed for the detention.

IV. Argument

Appellant asserts that his detention was not authorized under Article 14.03, which gives peace officers authority to “arrest” citizens, not to “detain” them. He contends that nothing in the language of that statute supports his temporary detention, nor does it support an arrest based on a finding of less than probable cause. He contends that there is no finding or argument that probable cause existed for Stone to arrest him.³ Appellant points out that, at the suppression hearing, Stone admitted that appellant had not committed a felony in his presence and that Stone is not a peace officer as defined by Texas law— Article 2.122 specifically excludes United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Officers from that category—and that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. Thus, courts should apply the plain meaning of its words. Appellant asserts that Article 2.122 did not authorize the temporary detention of appellant by Stone, and that even if it did, Stone lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him.

Appellant asserts that he was harmed by the trial court's denial of his suppression motions because the evidence that was obtained constitutes fruit of the poisonous tree, the use of which is forbidden. He notes that the doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree serves to exclude both direct and indirect products of Fourth Amendment violations. He reasons that, “[b]ut for the illegal stop of his vehicle, the warrant would not have been obtained.” Appellant's brief at 12–13. He contends that there is no evidence against him except for that derived from the improper stop of his vehicle and the resulting search under warrant, and therefore it cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's ruling on his suppression motionsdid not contribute to his conviction or punishment.

The state...