Guezmir v. Guezmir
| Decision Date | 20 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | A11-1988 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of: Jean Marie Guezmir, petitioner, Respondent, v. Kemais Guezmir, Appellant. |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Wright S. Walling, Stacia W. Driver, Walling, Berg & Debele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Jennifer M. Moore, Moore Family Law, P.A., Plymouth, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Stauber, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this marital-dissolution dispute, appellant-husband argues that the district court erred in (1) failing to enforce the parties' settlement agreement regarding distribution of gains and losses from a deferred-compensation plan and (2) failing to find that respondent-wife's use of the parties' frequent flyer miles for the children's vacationconstituted dissipation of marital assets. By notice of related appeal, respondent challenges the district court's denial of her request for conduct-based attorney fees. We affirm.
Respondent filed a petition to dissolve the parties' thirteen-year marriage in September 2008. The parties have two minor children; however, they settled custody and child-support issues early in the process and reserved property and debt issues for later resolution.
On April 19, 2010, the parties placed on the record what they purported to be a full and final settlement regarding property division. The settlement was based on the recommendations and property valuations of one Mr. Harjes, a financial neutral upon whose qualifications the parties had previously agreed. With regard to respondent's deferred compensation plan (the EDCP), a market-based account, the parties agreed that the account had a value of $425,058 as of the valuation date of October 6, 2008. The parties agreed that appellant would receive the equivalent of a share of the plan in the amount of $212,529, that his share would be treated as maintenance for income tax purposes, and that the parties would submit to Mr. Harjes the issue of structuring the payments.1 The parties also referenced treating the plan as through it were divided by aqualified domestic relations order (QDRO).2 However, the parties did not expressly agree to a division of gains and losses on appellant's portion of the account, nor to any interest payments to appellant for his deferred receipt of the agreed-upon amount.
The district court subsequently entered a partial stipulated judgment and decree. It found that the parties had agreed that appellant would be awarded a $212,529 share in the EDCP account, to be paid in the form of temporary spousal maintenance. However, it found that the parties did not agree on the timing of the payments, nor on whether they were subject to "earnings, losses, or some other interest factor." The court therefore reserved jurisdiction over the issue of "additional interest or other payments" on appellant's share of the plan.
Following entry of the partial findings of fact, both parties filed cross-motions to enforce the property settlement. The parties disputed whether gains and losses within the deferred compensation plan after the valuation date were subject to equal division. After several evidentiary hearings and further motions, the district court issued an orderawarding appellant his share of the plan valued at $212,529, characterized as temporary spousal maintenance, and payable in annual installments of $42,590 for a six-year period. These payments reflect appellant's agreed-upon "share" plus interest (at the statutory rate) totaling $43,011.3
The partial judgment and decree awarded each party his or her own frequent-flyer miles, without attributing any valuation to those miles. In his post-decree motions, appellant argued that respondent's use of a portion of the miles during the dissolution proceedings constituted dissipation of a marital asset. At the evidentiary hearing, respondent testified that in March 2010, she used the parties' miles to take the parties' two children on vacation to Florida using the frequent-flyer miles for herself and the children. In the spring of 2011, she again used frequent-flyer miles to take the children on vacation, but this time used the miles only to pay for the children's fare and not for her own. She testified that she did not consult appellant about using the miles. At the date of the hearing, only about 15,000 miles remained in the account.
In its order following the hearings, the district court stated that it "partially agree[d]" that respondent's use of the miles constituted dissipation of a marital asset. It awarded appellant $2,240 as reimbursement for the miles used for respondent's flights, but did not compensate appellant for the miles used for the children's flights.
Respondent initially requested attorney fees in the summons and petition for dissolution, and she reiterated her request for conduct-based attorney fees throughout the proceeding. In her written submission following the settlement hearing, respondent requested conduct-based attorney fees based on (1) appellant's motion for temporary relief requesting alimony; (2) appellant's refusal to participate in therapy during the proceedings; (3) appellant's motions seeking temporary custody; and (4) appellant's motion to enforce the settlement regarding the deferred compensation plan. The district court declined to award attorney fees, finding that respondent's submission failed to establish a factual basis for the specific conduct justifying an award of fees.
This appeal follows.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in failing to enforce the parties' settlement regarding distribution of gains and losses of the parties' shares in the deferred-compensation account. In the partial judgment and decree, the district court found that the parties did not reach an agreement on whether appellant's share would be "subject to earnings, losses, or some other interest factor." In essence, it found that the parties did not reach a meeting of the minds on the gains/losses issue.
Property settlements in dissolution cases are "accorded the sanctity of binding contracts." Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotationomitted). They are therefore subject to the laws regarding contracts. Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). A contract requires mutual assent or a "meeting of the minds," as measured by an objective standard. SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Whether the parties reached an objective meeting of the minds on the essential elements of a contract is a question of fact, which this court reviews under the clear-error standard. Morrisette v. Harrison Int'l Corp., 486 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. 1992) (); Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 ().
Here, the record supports the district court's determination that the parties did not reach an agreement regarding whether appellant's share in the deferred compensation plan would be subject to gains and losses. At the settlement hearing, the parties agreed to value appellant's share at $212,529 as of the valuation date of October 6, 2008. Respondent's counsel repeatedly referred to each party as receiving an "equal value" in the account. In context, it appears that she was referring to an equal value as of the valuation date. Appellant's counsel then raised the question of how gains and losses would be calculated. She expressly noted that this issue was complicated and would "have to be resolved with the help of Mr. Harjes." Respondent's counsel replied that she agreed to allow Mr. Harjes's input into structuring the payments, "as long as the value stays the same." It is evident from this colloquy that respondent's counsel never agreedto a division of gains and losses, but only to Mr. Harjes's assistance in structuring the payment of appellant's $212,529 share, calculated as agreed as of the valuation date.
Appellant argues that because respondent expressly agreed to structure the payments "as though a QDRO were used," this necessitates that the court equally divide gains and losses after the valuation date. But the record permits multiple inferences from respondent's reference to a QDRO. Immediately after the discussion of the agreed-upon attempt to replicate a QDRO, respondent's counsel went on to clarify that "[i]n other words," each party would receive $212,529, in pretax value, "at the time of distribution from the EDCP." The parties expressly agreed that the payments would be treated as temporary spousal maintenance. It thus appears that the parties were referring to a QDRO as a model for the payment structure, and were not referring to the specific attributes of a QDRO applicable to the division of gains and losses or to an alternate valuation of appellant's share.
At no time did respondent expressly agree to a division of gains and losses. The settlement record reflects only her agreement to an equal division of the plan's value, as fixed on the date of valuation. Thus, the record supports the district court's finding that the parties did not reach an agreement that the parties would share gains and losses after the valuation date.
Appellant alternatively argues that even if the parties did not reach an agreement regarding division of gains and losses, the district court abused its discretion in failing to adequately compensate him for the delayed receipt of his share. He argues that...
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