Guider v. Smith
| Decision Date | 19 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,80578 and 80804,Docket Nos. 80577,1 |
| Citation | 431 N.W.2d 810,431 Mich. 559 |
| Parties | Terrance L. GUIDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald SMITH, Defendant-Appellant, and City of Detroit, a Municipal Corporation, jointly and severally, Defendant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
This Court granted leave to consider the issue whether the judgment against the individual defendant should be reversed on the basis of the doctrine of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
This appeal requires the Court to address 1) the substantive law of qualified immunity, and 2) the procedural problems which arise in framing and resolving claims of immunity in civil rights actions against police officers. We hold that the judgment against the defendant should not be reversed on the basis of the defense of qualified immunity.
The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was not entitled to a qualified immunity jury instruction. The trial court's instructions were responsive to the defendant's actual theory of the case. In addition, the defendant failed to preserve the trial court's denial of the motion for directed verdict on qualified immunity grounds, having contended that the use of force was not excessive, rather than that qualified immunity required judgment for the defendant as a matter of law.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against the defendant. While we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, we do so on different grounds and reject the analysis of the Court of Appeals.
Defendant Ronald Smith was a Detroit police officer assigned to a four-member cruiser unit of the Thirteenth Precinct. On April 20, 1978, defendant Smith's cruiser unit responded to a police radio run: a "priority one" call to "1145 Hague, two black males, B & E, rear door." The cruiser drove into the alley adjacent to 1125 Hague.
The officers saw two men coming down the steps of the house carrying items of personal property. The two men were Jeffrey Neely and the plaintiff, Terrance Guider. When the plaintiff and Neely saw the police car, they dropped the items they were carrying and began to run through the back yard. The defendant jumped out of the car and ordered the two men to stop, yelling, "Halt, police." Officer Sparrow, the driver of the police car, also yelled, "Stop, police," as he got out of the car.
As the defendant got to the back yard, he saw Neely running straight ahead and the plaintiff going over the fence. The defendant pursued the plaintiff to the front of the house and again yelled, "Halt, police." He continued to pursue the fleeing plaintiff, who was running toward the freeway, and for the third time, yelled, "Halt, police." The plaintiff kept running and, concluding that all possibilities of capture were exhausted, defendant Smith then fired one shot at the plaintiff. The bullet struck the plaintiff in the back of the neck causing serious injuries.
The defendant did not testify that he believed the plaintiff was armed, only that the plaintiff would have escaped if he had reached the freeway. The plaintiff claimed that, at the time of the incident, he thought he was carrying Neely's belongings from a house that Neely claimed to share with a girl friend. The plaintiff was arraigned on May 16, 1978, and eventually placed in a youthful offender diversion program.
On August 11, 1980, the plaintiff filed a complaint in Wayne Circuit Court against Detroit police officer Ronald Smith. 1 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated his federal civil rights and sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The plaintiff contended that defendant Smith's use of force was excessive and unnecessary to make the arrest of the plaintiff and thus amounted to a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.
In response to the complaint, the defendant raised the defense of immunity. A jury trial commenced on September 12, 1983. At the close of plaintiff's proofs, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that no constitutional violation occurred and, alternatively, that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, reasoning that disputed issues of fact remained whether defendant violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. 2 The defendant's request for jury instruction regarding a good-faith defense was also denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded $472,000 in compensatory damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, 3 also reasoning that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding qualified immunity. However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant was not entitled to a qualified immunity instruction because he failed to testify that he believed that the shooting was a legal act at the time of the incident. We granted leave to appeal to consider the sole issue whether the judgment against the individual defendant should be reversed on the basis of the doctrine of qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. 4
The proper test regarding claims of qualified or "good faith" immunity under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 actions can be found in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 5 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In Harlow, the United States Supreme Court altered the substantive law of qualified immunity and established a procedural goal for implementing the defense. Note, Quick termination of insubstantial civil rights claims: Qualified immunity and procedural fairness, 38 Vand L R 1543, 1547 (1985). The Court held that a government official performing discretionary functions is entitled to immunity from damages "insofar as [his] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 818, 102 S.Ct. at p. 2738.
To understand the effect of Harlow, it is necessary to examine the development of the qualified immunity doctrine in civil rights litigation. Prior to Harlow, under Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), police officers were entitled to raise an affirmative defense of good faith and probable cause to claims of unconstitutional arrests. This qualified immunity defense to liability, for purposes of Sec. 1983 claims, was the equivalent of those previously recognized defenses which could be raised at trial under common law. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, Sec. 895D, pp. 411-420. Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), Sec. 132, pp. 1056-1060. The defense thus assumed a violation of plaintiff's rights which was excusable.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), the Court further developed the notion of a qualified, or "good faith" immunity as a defense to liability. The Scheuer Court addressed the issue whether the trial court had properly dismissed claims against certain executive officials on the basis that the officials were absolutely immune from suit. The Court rejected the claim of absolute immunity in favor of a qualified immunity standard and held that the qualified immunity defense depended upon a finding of reasonable grounds for a good-faith belief of the public official in the action taken, formed at the time of the incident in question in light of all the circumstances. Id., 416 U.S. at pp. 247-248, 94 S.Ct. at pp. 1691-92. Thus, the Court concluded that dismissal was improper because the lower courts had erroneously accepted as a fact the good faith of the executive, and "[t]here was no evidence before the courts from which such a finding of good faith could be properly made...." Id., at p. 250, 94 S.Ct. at p. 1693.
In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), the Court dealt with the immunity issue in the context of a jury trial, again rejecting the defendant's claims of absolute immunity in favor of qualified immunity. The Court held that the appropriate standard to use in deciding whether an official was entitled to qualified immunity encompasses both subjective and objective factors. Id., 420 U.S. at p. 321, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1000. The Court concluded that an officer would not be entitled to immunity if
"he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student." Id., at p. 322, 95 S.Ct. at p. 1001.
While the Court rejected absolute immunity from liability for executive officials in Pierson, Scheuer, and Wood, supra, the Court also suggested that damage suits, alleging constitutional violations need not proceed to trial, but could be terminated by motion on the basis of qualified immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). Thus, the Court emphasized that a "firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits." Id.
However, despite this admonition, in actual practice subjective good faith prevented early disposition of litigation because trial courts frequently deemed the subjective component of the defense a question of fact that required resolution by a jury. Balcerzak, Qualified immunity for government officials: The problem of unconstitutional purpose in civil rights litigation, 95 Yale L J 126, 132 (1985).
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