Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 70102-4.,70102-4. |
| Citation | 144 Wn.2d 907,144 Wash.2d 907,32 P.3d 250 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Salvador Delgado GUIJOSA, a single man; Rogelio Hernandez Guijosa, a single man; and Ricardo Hernandez, a minor, through his Guardian ad Litem, Rogelio Hernandez Guijosa, Petitioners, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., a corporation, registered in Washington; David C. Opfer and Jane Doe Opfer, husband and wife, David C. Opfer, individually, and both as a marital community; and Rhonda Liburdi and John Doe Liburdi, wife and husband, Rhonda Liburdi, individually, and both as a marital community, Respondents. |
MacDonald, Hoague & Bayless, Timothy Kent Ford, Seattle, Hoss & Wilson-Hoss, Robert Wilson-Hoss, Shelton, for Petitioners.
D. Michael Reilly, Michael B. King, Steven D. Jensen of Lane Powell Spears Lubersky, L.L.P., Seattle, for Respondents.
Petitioners sought review of the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the trial court's judgment in favor of Wal-Mart as to claims of discrimination, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, battery, and violations of the Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW. At issue is whether the trial court correctly granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law, setting aside the jury's verdict, on the claim of Consumer Protection Act violations. The record does not contain substantial evidence to sustain the jury's verdict that Wal-Mart violated the Consumer Protection Act. Therefore, judgment as a matter of law setting aside the jury's verdict was correctly granted, and we affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling.
On March 16, 1995, Salvador Delgado Guijosa (Delgado), Rogelio Hernandez Guijosa (Guijosa), and Ricardo Hernandez (Hernandez)1 went to the Wal-Mart store in Shelton, Washington to shop for school clothes for Hernandez, who was a high school student.
In the store, the men noticed a display bin of baseball hats priced at $2.50 each. Trial testimony conflicted about whether Delgado and Guijosa were wearing hats when they entered the Wal-Mart store. A store sales associate testified that when the trio approached the bin, only Hernandez was wearing a hat, but that when they walked away from the bin, they each wore a hat. The men testified that all three of them had worn hats into the store. They tried on hats from the bin, and Delgado decided to buy two of them.
After Delgado paid for the two hats at the checkstand and before the men left the store, they were stopped by Rhonda Liburdi (Liburdi), a loss prevention associate for Wal-Mart.2 Liburdi, who had been observing the men since they entered the store, accused them of taking the hats they were wearing without paying for them.
Liburdi asked David Opfer (Opfer), another Wal-Mart employee, to assist her. Liburdi and Opfer escorted the three men to the back office area of the store, and Liburdi took the hats the men had been wearing. Guijosa, the only one of the three who spoke English well, told Liburdi that the hats were theirs and that the hat his brother had been wearing was a type not sold at Wal-Mart.
The parties agree that they had difficulty communicating with one another. Guijosa testified that he tried to explain to Liburdi that he had bought the hat Delgado was wearing some weeks earlier and that he had purchased the hat he was wearing at Wal-Mart the previous day. When Liburdi asked for identification, Guijosa declined and advised the other two men not to provide information except to the police.
Liburdi contacted the Shelton Police Department. Officer Michael Hudnell (Hudnell) responded and spoke with the parties. Liburdi told Hudnell that she had seen Guijosa remove the price tag and place one of the store's hats on his head.3 She stated that the hat worn by Delgado was also taken without being purchased.
Hudnell found the three men cooperative. Based on Liburdi's allegations, Hudnell wrote citations for theft to Delgado and Guijosa. Hernandez was not cited, and his hat was returned to him.4 Liburdi "trespassed" all three men, banishing them from the Wal-Mart store.
Liburdi testified at trial that she had completely forgotten whatever she had done to review the store's videotapes of the alleged shoplifting incident and that the tapes had been recycled. Plaintiffs claim a sign was posted stating it was store policy that such tapes would be used as evidence in criminal prosecutions. However, the sign was not admitted in evidence, and no evidence was presented as to what the sign actually said.
Guijosa located the receipt for the hat he said was purchased the day before the alleged shoplifting incident.5 Following two court appearances, the theft charges against Delgado and Guijosa were dismissed with prejudice.
Delgado, Guijosa, and Hernandez (plaintiffs) then filed a civil complaint against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Liburdi, and Opfer (collectively, Wal-Mart), alleging assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, deprivation of civil rights, and violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA). Wal-Mart denied all claims.
The case was tried in Mason County Superior Court on August 24-28, 1998. The 12-member jury found that Wal-Mart proved by a preponderance of the evidence that they detained the plaintiffs for a reasonable time and on reasonable grounds. Therefore, Wal-Mart was allowed to assert the shopkeeper's privilege under RCW 4.24.220, and the jury found for Wal-Mart on the false imprisonment and battery claims. The jury also found for Wal-Mart on the malicious prosecution claim.
In addition, the jury found that Wal-Mart did not discriminate against the plaintiffs. Finally, it found that Wal-Mart did violate the CPA with respect to Delgado and Guijosa.6
After the verdicts were read, the court sent the jury back to the jury room. Plaintiffs' counsel initially stated that the verdicts regarding the claims of discrimination and violation of the CPA were not inconsistent. Wal-Mart's counsel asserted that the verdicts were inconsistent and argued that the remedy should be a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the CPA claim. Plaintiffs' counsel stated that any objections to the verdict as inconsistent would be waived by a failure to reconcile the verdict before the jury was discharged. After both parties declined the court's offer to allow reargument, the court discharged the jury.
Wal-Mart subsequently filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under CR 50(b), asserting that without a finding of discrimination, there was insufficient evidence to find violations of the CPA.
The trial court granted Wal-Mart's motion, setting aside the jury's verdict on the CPA claim, and commented as follows:
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 13-15; Excerpt of Report of Proceedings (RP) at 670.
In its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, the trial court made findings, including the following:
4. There was no evidence to support a verdict against defendants for Consumer Protection Act violation in the absence of a "per se" violation which would have required a finding of discrimination. Specifically, in the absence of a "per se" violation, there was no evidence to establish "the defendant engaged in an unfair and deceptive act or practice" or "that the act or practice affected the public interest."
5. As a matter of law, neither the evidence presented nor any reasonable inference from the evidence supports the jury's verdict finding a Consumer Protection Act violation by defendants.
Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on all claims.
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in all respects. Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 101 Wash.App. 777, 6 P.3d 583 (2000).
This Court then granted plaintiffs' petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. Guijosa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 142 Wash.2d 1016, 16 P.3d 1263 (2001).
CR 50(a)(1) provides as follows regarding motions for judgment as a matter of law:
If, during a trial by jury, a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find or have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on any claim ... that cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue.
Motions for directed verdict and motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were renamed "motions for judgment as a matter of law" effective September 17, 1993. Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 98 Wash.App. 286, 298 n. 1, 991 P.2d 638 (1999).
"Granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when, viewing the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say, as a...
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