Guinness v. State

• Decision Date: 26 June 1952
• Docket Number: No. 31668,31668
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: GUINNESS et al. v. STATE et al.

Page 677

40 Wn.2d 677

246 P.2d 433

GUINNESS et al. v. STATE et al.

No. 31668.

Supreme Court of Washington, en Banc.

June 26, 1952.

Smith Troy,

William C. Klein, Olympia, for appellants.

Summers, Bucey and Howard, G. H. Bucey, Seattle, for respondents.

FINLEY, Justice.

Arthur Ernest Guinness, a non-resident of our country, domiciled in Great Britain, died there on March 22, 1949. He owned the luxury yacht 'Fantome.' At the time of his death, it was moored at Seattle, Washington, where it had been left continuously for a number years. By his will, probated in Great Britain, the yacht passed to respondents, as trustees for the benefit of (1) the wife, (2) the children of Mr. Guinness, and (3) certain other persons. The state of Washington asserted and is pressing a claim for the collection of inheritance tax relative to the yacht.

The yacht, as mentioned above, for several years has been and is now located within the jurisdiction of the state of Washington. The tax claim is based upon the succession or passing of ownership of the yacht from the deceased to the trustees under the aforementioned will and an interpretation by our Inheritance Tax Division of Rem.Supp.1945, § 11201, which, in part, reads as follows:

'All property within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest therein, whether belonging to the inhabitants of this state or not, and whether tangible or intangible, which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this or any other state * * * shall, for the use of the state, be subject to a tax * * *.'

It is respondents' position that the statute should not be interpreted and applied to impose an inheritance tax upon the particular devolution of ownership of the yacht 'Fantome.' It is pointed out that the ownership change resulted from a will (a) executed, and (b) probated in Great Britain. Respondents contend that our legislature used the language, 'which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance of this or any other state', as a restriction or phrase of limitation respecting the scope of application of the Washington inheritance tax. Their reasoning is that the word state was not used in its generic or broader sense in the above quotation from Rem.Supp.1945, § 11201; that the term state, as there used, referred to and included only the states of this country, and did not mean a country or nation such as Great Britain. Therefore, the final result of respondents' contentions, and their interpretation of the Washington statute, could be spelled out about as follows: Property located in the state of Washington and passing by (1) a will, or (2) the statutes of inheritance of Great Britain (that country not being a state in the narrower sense), would not be subject to the state of Washington inheritance tax.

We do not agree with respondents' contentions. Their formulation focuses attention too closely upon the phrase, 'of this or any other state', and places too much emphasis upon the word state and a narrow definition of it, resulting in restrictive application of Rem.Supp.1945, § 11201. This disregards other language and portions of the statute, and is contrary to the sound and practical principle of statutory interpretation that legislative intent, will, or purpose, is to be ascertained from the statutory text as a whole, interpreted in terms of the general object and purpose of the act. Cherry Point Fish Company v. Nelson, 25 Wash. 558, 66 P. 55; In re Horse Heaven Irrigation District, 11 Wash.2d 218, 118 P.2d 972; Cory v. Nethery, 19 Wash.2d 326, 142 P.2d 488.

It is our view that the term state, as used in the statute, must be given a broader interpretation than that contended for by the respondents. The statute should be read in its entirety. But even when taken piecemeal, the language is broad and inclusive in scope. The draftsmen of the statute used the phrase, 'all property within the jurisdiction of this state, and any interest therein'. This phraseology is broad, far-reaching, and all-inclusive. It is followed by equally broad and inclusive language to the effect that property will be subject to the tax, 'whether belonging to the inhabitants of this state or not, and whether tangible or intangible'.

In using the crucial phrase, 'which shall pass by will or by the statutes of inheritance', the legislators may well have had the thought in mind and were only trying to say that, upon the death of the owner, when a change of ownership is effected thereby, property located within the jurisdiction of the state of Washington shall be subject to an inheritance tax in this state. Logically, the choice of the language actually used could have been influenced by the fact that upon the death of an owner his property would pass in one of two ways--either (a) by will, or (b) by the laws of inheritance of some sovereignty. Thus, the legislation merely mentioned the two ways in which property of a deceased passes, with no other significance intended.

It is consistent with the general meaning of the statute that the crucial phrase means, that, upon the death of the owner thereof, all property, located within the jurisdiction of this state, passing by will or by the laws of inheritance of any sovereignty, shall be subject to Washington state inheritance tax.

The basic question in this appeal is whether the state of Washington has the power to impose the inheritance tax herein involved. Literally, an overwhelming weight of authority sustains and upholds the power of the state to impose such succession taxes. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 22 S.Ct. 515, 46 L.Ed. 697.

In considering the problem here involved, a superficially apparent, seemingly significant, practical obstacle, or a reluctance to validate the tax, may arise, if one seeks a moral justification for the tax, by way of some tangible act occurring in this state and beneficially affecting the yacht, the interests of the transferees therein, or the transfer of ownership thereof. The tangible property is located in the state of Washington, but the testator died in England. His will was made and probated in England. Succession, or change in ownership, seems to have resulted because of things or events which happened, at least apparently, outside the state of Washington. One persuasive and satisfactory answer to any practical problem or reluctance respecting validation of the tax is the fact that ownership or possession of the yacht, now located in this state, is effectuated by the law of this jurisdiction and the enforcement of such law by our courts and administrative or police officers. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1392, and Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1393, provide for ancillary proceedings in this state respecting a foreign will; and, under Rader v. Stubblefield, 43 Wash. 334, 86 P. 560, and In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P.2d 615, property in this state, of a non-resident testator, is distributed according to the laws of the domicile of the deceased. If a stranger or interloper should seize the yacht, or claim some right or interest in it in opposition to the heir's rights to ownership and possession, the matter would be settled in the courts of this state. The case at bar is a good example. It is true that our courts would refer to the laws of England in resolving or determining questions respecting ownership--but the determination of such questions would be made by our courts, and they and our police officers would thereupon enforce and protect the ownership rights of the heirs.

In Callahan v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595, 597, 51 N.E. 176, 177, the court resolved any practical problem or reluctance about validating the inheritance tax there involved by emphasizing a Massachusetts statute regulating the succession to property of a non-resident in accordance with the laws of the foreign domicile in which the testator died, and his will was initially probated. The Massachusetts court said:

'In the statute before us the succession to property of nonresidents is expressly taxed as if the property belonged to inhabitants of the commonwealth. The language, 'which shall pass by will or by the laws of the commonwealth regulating intestate succession,' taken in connection with the clauses immediately preceding it, applies to foreign wills, and to property that passes under the statute of this commonwealth which regulates the succession to the property of a nonresident owner after his death, and declares that it shall 'be disposed of according to the laws of the state or country of which he was an inhabitant.' Pub.Sts. c. 138, § 1.'

In Washington state, as mentioned heretofore, we have Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1392, which reads:

'Wills probated in any other state or territory of the United States, or in any foreign country or state, shall be admitted to probate in this state on the production of a copy of such will and of the original record of probate thereof, authenticated by the attestation of the clerk of the court in which such probation was made; or if there be no clerk, by the attestation of the judge thereof, and by the seal of such officers, if they have a seal.'

and, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1393, which reads:

'All provisions of law relating to the carrying into effect of domestic wills after probate thereof shall, so far as applicable, apply to foreign wills admitted to probate in this state.'

Under our decision in Rader v. Stubblefield, supra, the property in this state of a deceased non-resident testator is distributed according to the laws of his domicile. Thus, under our above-mentioned statutes and case law, the end results reached in our state are the same as those reached under the Massachusetts statute, emphasized by the court in Callahan v. Woodbridge, supra.

Inheritance taxation involving facts and circumstances similar or identical to those respecting the 'Fantome' has been upheld in numerous states of this country. The power of a state to tax under such circumstances cannot now be seriously questioned. In ...