Gullatt v. Dirkse, CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00473-EPG
| Decision Date | 21 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:20-cv-00473-EPG |
| Parties | JOHN JACOB GULLATT, III, Plaintiff, v. JEFF DIRKSE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO:
(1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; OR
(2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE WISHES TO STAND ON THE COMPLAINT, SUBJECT TO THE COURT ISSUING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DISTRICT JUDGE CONSISTENT WITH THIS ORDER
John Jacob Gullatt, III ("Plaintiff") is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint, filed April 2, 2020, alleges claims against various law enforcement officers concerning searches at his residence. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff's complaint is now before this Court for screening.
The Court finds that the complaint fails to state any cognizable claims that can proceed at this time, in light of the ongoing state court proceedings. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complaint if he believes additional factual allegations will state a claim or explain why this court can proceed at this time notwithstanding the state court action. In the alternative, Plaintiff may notify the Court that he wishes to stand on his complaint, in which case the Court will issue findings and recommendations to a district judge recommending dismissal of the action consistent with this order.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in any case in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must conduct a review of the complaint to determine whether it "state[s] a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seek[s] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. An action is frivolous if it is "of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact" and malicious if it was filed with the "intention or desire to harm another." Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 678.
In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) ().
In February 2019, Plaintiff's son Jaden Gullatt's probation officer, Brooke Smith ("Smith"), exercised a probation search on Plaintiff's residence at 905 Hawthorne, Modesto, CA 95350. The searchable places in his home were his son's bedroom and common areas. Smith insisted that Plaintiff's wife ("Wife") open the Plaintiff's and her locked bedroom door so she could "clear" the area. "We" informed Smith that everyone living at the residence were in the living room. Smith threatened to kick the door down. Then Wife reluctantly opened the room, even though Plaintiff was not on any type of parole or probation. Smith placed Plaintiff in handcuffs until she left, making Plaintiff late for work.
Smith asked to whom the safes in the bedroom belonged, and Wife explained that they were hers. Smith asked Wife to open the safe. Wife refused, stating that they were not searchable, and the key to the safe was at Plaintiff's mother's residence. Smith became irate and "began threatening that we were being uncooperative," and promised that she would get into the safes with a warrant.
On April 9, 2019, Deputy Cristopher Gallo ("Gallo") and his subordinate deputy officers acting at his direction, Deputies Brock Dias, Miguel Villasenor, and Daniel Hutsell ("Dias," "Villasenor," and "Hutsell," respectively), each Stanislaus County Sheriff deputies, served a warrant at Plaintiff's residence. The warrant was to be served on Plaintiff's son Jaden Gullatt for a past arrest. Defendant Jeff Dirske is also sued as sheriff.
In the warrant application, Gallo claimed that Jaden Gullatt's probation officer had informed him that Plaintiff's 14-year-old daughter, Jayda Gullatt, informed the probation officer Smith that there were guns located in a safe in Plaintiff's room. This was not true: there were no guns there. And Plaintiff's daughter signed a sworn affidavit stating that she never spoke with any probation officer concerning that matter.
Plaintiff's room was broken into, his wife's inherited heirlooms were cut open and destroyed. Plaintiff was arrested and detained for items that his wife swore were hers and inherited from her late father.
Plaintiff complains about Smith's false statement to Gallo, the illegal search anddestruction of property, false arrest, false imprisonment, and retaliation. He seeks, among other things, the Court order "that any items found in me & my wifes room (locked safes) be inadmissible to that warrant."
The Civil Rights Act, under which this action was filed, provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, "within the meaning of § 1983, 'if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 'series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms." Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation "closely resembles the standard'foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause." Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mack Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978).
Federal courts "may not interfere with pending state criminal or civil proceedings." Aiona v. Judiciary of State of Haw., 17 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994). This doctrine, called "Younger abstention," is rooted in the "desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (). Thus, "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, interests of comity and federalism instruct federal courts to abstain from exercising our jurisdiction in certain circumstances when asked to enjoin ongoing state enforcement proceedings." Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2019) (alterations, internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Trump v. Vance, No. 19-635, --- S....
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