Gun Owners of Am. v. Barr

Decision Date21 March 2019
Docket NumberNo. 1:18-cv-1429,1:18-cv-1429
Citation363 F.Supp.3d 823
Parties GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. William P. BARR, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Robert Jeffrey Olson, William J. Olson, P.C., Vienna, VA, Kerry Lee Morgan, Pentiuk Couvreur & Kobiljak, PC, Wyandotte, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Eric J. Soskin, U.S. Department of Justice, Matthew J. Glover, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Washington, DC, Ryan D. Cobb, U.S. Attorney, Grand Rapids, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Paul L. Maloney, United States District Judge

On December 26, 2018, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), a part of the Department of Justice, published a Final Rule re-interpreting undefined terms found in the statutory definition of the word "machinegun." 83 Fed. Reg. 66514 (Dec. 26, 2018). As a result of the new interpretation, devices commonly known as "bump stocks" fall under the statutory definition of "machinegun." Members of the public are not allowed to possess machine guns manufactured after 1986. The Final Rule requires bump stock owners to dispose of their devices by March 26, 2019. After March 26, people who possess a bump stock can be charged with a felony.

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging the Final Rule. Along with their complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 9) asserting a likelihood of success on their asserted violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Because Congress has not spoken on the matter and the statutory terms are ambiguous, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their administrative law claims and their motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied.

I.

After Plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 9), Defendants filed a response (ECF No. 34) and Plaintiffs filed a reply (ECF No. 37). Defendants subsequently filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (ECF No. 38.) On February 25, 2019, Judge Dabney Friedrich of the District Court for the District of Columbia issued a memorandum opinion denying a motion for a preliminary injunction in the first-filed action challenging the Final Rule. See Guedes v. AFT , 356 F.Supp.3d 109 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2019).1 The Court takes judicial notice of Judge Jill Parrish's decision to deny a preliminary injunction in another challenge to the Final Rule, which was filed in the United States District Court in Utah. See Aposhian v. Barr , No. 2:19-cv-37, 2019 WL 1227934 (D. Utah Mar. 19, 2019). The Court held a hearing on this motion in this case on March 6, 2019.

The standards for a preliminary injunction are well-settled. Preliminary injunctions are governed by Rule 65. The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction falls within the district court's discretion. McGirr v. Rehme , 891 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir. 2018). A court considers four factors when deciding whether to issue an injunction: (1) the moving party's chances of success on the merits; (2) the irreparable harm to the moving party without an injunction; (3) the substantial harm to the public were an injunction granted; and (4) whether an injunction would serve the public's interest. Id. (citing S. Glazer's Distrib. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co. , 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) ). Each of the four factors is not a prerequisite for an injunction, rather, courts must balance the factors when deciding whether to issue an injunction. Great Lakes Brewing , 860 F.3d at 849. When the government is a party, the final two factors for a preliminary injunction merge. Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 435, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009) (involving a request for a stay); Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. of the United States , 893 F.3d 153, 178 (3d Cir. 2018) (involving a request for a preliminary injunction).

The Supreme Court has cautioned that a "preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right" and that courts " ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party with the granting or withholding of the requested relief.’ " Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (citation omitted). Where a plaintiff has no likelihood of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction should be denied. Great Lakes Brewing ; see Gonzales v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Examiners , 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Although no one factor is controlling, a finding that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal.").

II.
A.

With the framework for the relief requested in Plaintiffs' motion in mind, the Court considers the historical and statutory backdrop for this dispute.

Prohibition, the "noble experiment," lasted from 1920 to 1933. The criminalization of intoxicating liquors created a lucrative, illegal market for alcoholic beverages. During these years, local gangs evolved and organized into criminal enterprises to exploit the demand for illegal alcohol. As these criminal organizations expanded, so too did the danger those organizations posed to each other and the public. Among the weapons adopted and used by these criminal organizations were rapid-fire, hand-held guns, like the Thompson submachine gun, a weapon that began production in the 1920s and could fire several hundred rounds a minute. In 1929, Tommy guns were used in the infamous St. Valentine's Day Massacre, an incident where members of one Chicago gang dressed like police officers killed seven members of a rival gang. On February 20, 1933, Congress proposed the Twenty-First Amendment, which was adopted by the required number of States on December 5, and the experiment with prohibition ended. The threat to the public from criminal organizations, however, remained.

Congress began to address the threat that rapid-fire weapons pose to the public, an effort that has continued for decades. A year after Prohibition ended, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act (NFA) as an attempt to protect the public from the dangers posed by military-type weapons likely to be used for criminal purposes. See United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co. , 504 U.S. 505, 517, 112 S.Ct. 2102, 119 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992) ("It is of course clear from the face of the Act that the NFA's object was to regulate certain weapons likely to be used for criminal purposes, ...."); United States v. Peterson , 476 F.2d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1973) ("We have concluded from a perusal of the legislative history of the act that Congress was well aware of the rampant destruction of property and dangers to life and limb faced by the public through the use of converted military type weaponry and the street variety of homemade instruments and weapons of crime and violence."). Congress imposed a tax on both the making and the transfer of NFA firearms. Following the assassinations of Senator Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, in 1968 Congress amended the NFA by enacting the Gun Control Act (GCA), which, among other things, expanded the NFA's definition of "machinegun." Finally, in 1986, Congress enacted the Firearm Owners Protection Act (FOPA), which makes it "unlawful for any person to transfer or possess" a newly manufactured machine gun. 18 U.S.C. § 922(c). The FOPA references the NFA's definition of machine gun. Id. § 921(a)(23). When ATF issued its Final Rule in December 2018, Congress defined "machinegun" as

any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed an intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in possession or under the control of a person.

26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).

Congress has identified the Attorney General of the United States as the officer responsible for the administration and enforcement of Chapter 53 of Title 26 of the United States Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7801(2)(A)(i). The definition of "machinegun" is located in Chapter 53. Congress has also authorized the Attorney General to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of Chapter 44 of Title 18, the portion of the United States Code concerning the unlawful acts involving firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 926(a). In turn, the Attorney General has identified the Direction of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives as responsible for administering, enforcing, and exercising the functions and powers of the Attorney General with respect to Title 18 Chapter 44 and Title 26 Chapter 53. 28 U.S.C. § 0.130(A)(1) and (2).

Exercising this delegated authority, ATF has provided both formal and informal guidance concerning firearm devices. In a few instances, ATF has promulgated Final Rules concerning a firearm device. See, e.g. , ATF Rul. 2006-2 (Final Rule determining the Akins Accelerator bump stock was a machine gun). More commonly, ATF issues informal letters. ATF encourages, but does not require, manufacturers to seek informal rulings or classification letters prior to offering devices for sale. See Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Jones , 133 F.Supp.3d 364, 367 n.2 (D.N.H. 2015). Both regulatory actions—Final Rules and informal letters—have been challenged in federal courts. E.g., Akins v. United States , 312 F. App'x 197 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (affirming Final Rule); Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Brandon , 826 F.3d 598 (1st Cir. 2016) (affirming classification letter).

B.

As occurred in the 1930s and then again in the 1960s, a well-publicized shooting provided the impetus for further review of federal restrictions on firearms. On October 1, 2017, a gunman in Las Vegas, Nevada, fired...

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