Gunn v. Principal Cas. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-CA-0922,90-CA-0922
• Citation: 605 So.2d 741
• Parties: Philip GUNN v. PRINCIPAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 741

605 So.2d 741

Philip GUNN v. PRINCIPAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 90-CA-0922.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 3, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1992.

Michael F. Myers, Steen Reynolds Dalehite & Currie, Jackson, for appellant.

Douglas R. Duke, Shell Buford Bufkin Callicutt & Perry, Jackson, for appellee.

En Banc.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

I.

Today's appeal requires that we consider whether Plaintiff's father, mother and sister, none of whom prior to their deaths resided in the household with Plaintiff, were nevertheless "insureds" within the We affirm.

uninsured motorist (UM) coverage of a policy Plaintiff held with the Defendant insurer. The Circuit Court held the father, mother and sister were not "relatives" within the meaning and contemplation of the policy and, therefore, that they were not "insureds," and entered judgment for Defendant.

II.

This civil action has its genesis in a weekend family reunion which the fates marked for unspeakable tragedy. Philip Gunn, Plaintiff below and Appellant here, was a student at the University of Mississippi School of Law nearing the close of the school year. His parents, Dewey Anthony Gunn and Linda B. Gunn, were in Oxford to visit their son, and with them was Philip's sister, Jana L. Gunn. On May 15, 1988, Jana Gunn was driving her father's 1985 Buick LaSabre automobile, in which his mother Linda and father Dewey were riding, when they were struck violently by Howard Eugene Hewlett, a negligent and uninsured motorist. The accident proved fatal to Dewey, Linda and Jana.

In the wake of these untoward events, Philip Gunn first asserted a claim on the uninsured motorist coverage of his father's automobile insurance policy and has recovered $200,000.00. The present record intimates Gunn may have brought "an action against General Motors Corporation and/or others based on the fact that the gas tank exploded after the collision," but we are given no further details, nor is the matter of consequence.

In the Spring of 1988, Philip Gunn owned a 1977 Chevrolet Caprice Classic, and, in connection therewith, Gunn held an automobile insurance policy with and through Principal Casualty Insurance Company, Defendant below and Appellee here. This policy included the customary uninsured motorist coverage, but provided for limits of liability in the amount of $50,000.00 per accident, a coverage in excess of that statutorily required. Gunn's 1977 Chevy was in no way involved in the fatal accident.

On January 25, 1990, Gunn commenced the present civil action by filing his complaint in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, First Judicial District, and claimed damages for the uninsured motorist-caused deaths of his father, mother and sister. He named Principal Casualty as the Defendant, exhibited the UM coverage on his policy, and demanded judgment in the amount of $50,000.00, together with interest and cost. Principal Casualty answered and denied coverage on grounds that the deceaseds--Dewey Gunn, Linda Gunn and Jana Gunn--were not insureds within the policy, for the reason they did not reside in the household of Philip Gunn, a fact all concede.

The matter came before the Circuit Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 27, 1990, the Circuit Court held:

As a matter of law that the policy definition of the term "relatives" controls excluding coverage for relatives who do not live in the home of the named insured.

The Court denied Gunn's cross-motion for summary judgment but then granted Principal Casualty's motion and entered judgment summarily, dismissing finally Gunn's complaint with prejudice.

Gunn now appeals to this Court.

III.

The question before us is whether the legal word "relative" and, (hence, the legal word "insured") within the UM coverage of Gunn's policy on his 1977 Chevrolet Caprice includes his father, mother and sister when they are not residing in the same household with him.

The question calls for a reading of policy language, but, as all know by now, the meaning we may find is substantially affected by statute--our Uninsured Motorist Act. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 83-11-101 et seq. (Rev.1991). By law, a UM insurer may not contract for coverage less than that statutorily required. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Nester, 459 So.2d 787, 789 (Miss.1984); Talbot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 291 So.2d 699, 701 (Miss.1974). On the other hand, we "Insured" and its component concept, "relative," have no natural law definition in uninsured motorist law. Wickline v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 530 So.2d 708, 714 (Miss.1988). Meaning is a function of contract augmented and informed by statute. We begin with the language of the policy. Page one includes a section which defines words or terms used elsewhere. In relevant part, we find:

have repeatedly recognized that the insurer may provide broader coverage than required by the Act. Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co., 521 So.2d 854, 855 (Miss.1987); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 373 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss.1979). In the end, we integrate the statute into the policy, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Barker, 451 So.2d 731, 732 (Miss.1984); United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Stafford, 253 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1971), and give the legal text so assimilated the most coherent meaning its words may bear. See Webster v. Webster, 566 So.2d 214, 215 (Miss.1990); Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Assn. v. Vaughn, 529 So.2d 540, 542 (Miss.1988); McIntire v. Moore, 512 So.2d 687, 689 (Miss.1987).

As used throughout this policy and shown in bold type:

. . . . .

2. Relative means a person living in your home and related to you by blood, marriage or adoption. It includes a ward or foster child.

We then turn to the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, Endorsement No. 9902, and, under "INSURING AGREEMENT," find it provided:

"Insured person" as used in this endorsement means:

1. You or a relative.

The word "relative" does not appear in bold face, and Gunn seizes the point, as will presently appear.

As a general proposition, we seek common and ordinary meanings for words upon which rights turn. Wilson v. Wilson, 547 So.2d 803, 805 (Miss.1989); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Slayden, 227 Miss. 285, 289, 85 So.2d 916, 917 (1956); cf. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 1-3-65 (1972). Gunn says the word "relative" as a matter of common and ordinary usage includes one's father, mother and sister and, accordingly, that each of these is an "insured" within his policy. But words such as "relative" may, by law, be restricted in scope or given a meaning other than or different from common and ordinary usage, see Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 817, 820 (Miss.1991); Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Moselle Fuel Co., 568 So.2d 720, 723 (Miss.1990); McLaurin v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission, 435 So.2d 1170, 1171-72 (Miss.1983). Gunn concedes the premise, admitting that Principal Casualty could have restricted the definition of "relative" in the policy to persons residing in his home or household, arguing only that it has not done so. Gunn's precise point is that the policy definition of "relative" applies, according to the express terms of the policy, "as used throughout the policy and shown in bold type." Resort to the language of the policy makes clear that, in the UM endorsement, the word "relative" does not appear in bold type.

Principal Casualty argues that this failure of the UM endorsement to include "relative" in bold type is simply a mistake, an innocent inadvertence. No doubt, privately-made legal instruments--contracts, wills, insurance policies, etc.--are subject to reformation in the event of mistake, but the fact of the mistake must be shown by proof. Discovery papers in the record before us reflect that, had the case gone to trial, Principal Casualty contemplated calling as witnesses three members of its Underwriting Department said to have "specific knowledge regarding endorsement 2700." Still, no such knowledge or evidence is before us. We think it likely the mistake theory is correct. ¹ On the other Responding further, Principal Casualty tells us that giving "relative" its common and ordinary meaning would lead to "absurd" results in that this would provide "that all of the insured's relatives, named or unnamed, known or unknown, wherever domiciled, and however related, would be insured." ² The argument is itself absurd. That there may be doubt on the periphery of the meaning of legal words in no way impedes use of the word to cover cases within its core--here, Gunn's father, mother and sister. Sensible courts pretermit the outer limits until they necessarily appear.

hand, UM endorsement 2700 contains other terms which are in bold type, and no reason appears on the face of the document why the term "relative" could not have been so emboldened.

That in a technical sense the policy language precludes our deciding in today's summary judgment context that relative is limited to those who live in the insured's household or home does not necessarily lead us back to the common and ordinary meaning of the word. The policy is written against the backdrop of a statute, which we deem incorporated and make a part of the insuring contract. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Barker, 451 So.2d at 732; Stevens v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 345 So.2d 1041, 1043 (Miss.1977). A UM policy may afford coverage broader than the statute mandates, but we think it not unreasonable to hold, where this is to be done, it should be accomplished through language of modest clarity.

We say all of this against the backdrop of a statutory definition of the term "insured." Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 83-11-103(b) (Rev.1991), in relevant part defines "insured" as including:

The named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either,....

Because Philip Gunn's father, mother and sister were not "resident of...