Gunn v. State, 02-39.

• Decision Date: 26 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-39.,02-39.
• Citation: 2003 WY 24,64 P.3d 716
• Parties: Robert GUNN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

64 P.3d 716

2003 WY 24

Robert GUNN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 02-39.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

February 26, 2003.

Kenneth M. Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel, Representing Appellant.

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Rebecca A. Lewis, Special Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

VOIGT, Justice.

[¶ 1] Robert Gunn (Gunn) entered a conditional plea of guilty to an amended charge of indecent liberties with a child, a felony, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (LexisNexis 2001). Gunn appeals the Judgment and Sentence of the district court sentencing him to a term of not less than three years and not more than five years in the state penitentiary. The district court suspended the penitentiary term on the condition that Gunn serve six consecutive weekends in the Natrona County Detention Center and complete four years of supervised probation. We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The issues presented on appeal are:

ISSUE I

Whether statements made by [Gunn] at his home were involuntary and in violation of his Miranda rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United [States] Constitution and Article 1 § 6 and Article 1 § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution?

ISSUE II

Whether statements made by [Gunn] to [a] deputy sheriff at the sheriff's office were involuntary and in violation of [his] rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United [States] Constitution and Article[ ] 1 §§ 6 and 11 of the Wyoming Constitution?

FACTS

[¶ 3] On June 25, 2001, Investigator Davis (Davis) arrived at Gunn's residence and questioned him about an alleged sexual assault in which he was the suspect. Davis did not advise Gunn of his Miranda rights, and Gunn made an incriminating statement. Davis then told Gunn that if he would accompany Davis to the sheriff's department and discuss the alleged crime and his involvement, Davis would thereafter return Gunn to his home. Gunn concedes that his Miranda rights were given to him with respect to the statements made at the sheriff's department.

[¶ 4] An Information filed on June 25, 2001, charged Gunn with two counts of third-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001). The State amended the Information in November 2001 to charge Gunn with unlawfully and knowingly taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a child, who was under the age of sixteen, while Gunn was at least four years older than the victim, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105. Gunn changed his plea to guilty, pursuant to a conditional plea agreement with the State, under which he reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of the motion to suppress his incriminating statements.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 5] The district court denied Gunn's Motion to Suppress. Our standard of review of the denial of such a motion is as follows:

"When we review a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. When the district court has not made specific findings of fact, we will uphold its general ruling if the ruling is supportable by any reasonable view of the evidence. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling because of the district court's ability to assess `the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions' at the hearing on the motion."

Meek v. State, 2002 WY 1, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 1279, 1282 (Wyo.2002) (quoting Frederick v. State, 981 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo.1999)

). Voluntariness, however, is a question of law; thus, it is reviewed de novo. Lewis v. State, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Wyo.2002).

DISCUSSION

STATEMENT AT HOME

[¶ 6] Gunn contends that he was in "custody" when Davis arrived at his home, separated him from his live-in companion, took him outside, and asked him questions that elicited an incriminating response. Gunn claims that Davis did not advise him that he was free to leave or that he had the right not to speak to the officers. Gunn contends that because he was deprived of his freedom in a significant way and was subsequently interrogated without the warnings required by Miranda, the incriminating statement should be suppressed. In addition, Gunn argues that even if Miranda was not required, his statement to police was not voluntary as required by the federal and state constitutions.

[¶ 7] Statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation are admissible into evidence, providing certain advisements are made. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Statements made during custodial interrogation must be excluded upon a showing that the defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1106, 122 S.Ct. 2315, 152 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2002). In Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435, 120 S.Ct. 2326, the United States Supreme Court stated:

Accordingly, we laid down "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." . . . Those guidelines established that the admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation of a suspect would depend on whether the police provided the suspect with four warnings. These warnings (which have come to be known colloquially as "Miranda rights") are: a suspect "has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."

[¶ 8] Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. See also Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 1993)

and Wunder v. State, 705 P.2d 333, 334 (Wyo.1985). Neither general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime nor statements volunteered freely without compelling influences are considered to fall within this definition. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78,

86 S.Ct. 1602.

[¶ 9] The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining whether a suspect is in custody when questioned. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a person who is the "focus" of a criminal investigation is, by that fact, "in custody." The United States Supreme Court made clear that "Miranda implicitly defined `focus,' for its purposes, as `questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" Id. at 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,

86 S.Ct. 1602) (emphasis in original). The proper inquiry is to ask "whether a reasonable man in Appellant's position would have considered himself to be in police custody." Glass, 853 P.2d at 976.

[¶ 10] Several factors are relevant to be considered in determining whether a restraint is "custodial" for Miranda purposes. Among these are: (1) whether a suspect is questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings; (2) the number of police officers present; (3) the degree of physical restraint and whether it is comparable to those associated with a formal arrest; and (4) the duration and character of the interrogation. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed.1999); see also Wunder, 705 P.2d at 335

. The nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the time and place of the interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the time of the interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention would not be temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between questioning and the arrest may be important factors as well. Wunder, 705 P.2d at 335; J.F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). No one factor alone will necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors will be relevant to a given case.

[¶ 11] The giving of Miranda warnings, by itself, does not suffice to render a statement admissible. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6 and 11, require that statements also must be voluntary. Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d at 1068; Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 (Wyo.1999); Doyle v. State, 954 P.2d 969, 971-72 (Wyo.1998).

"To be voluntary, the defendant's statements must result from `free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.' Madrid v. State, 910 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo.1996) Because we presume a defendant's statements to be involuntary, the burden rests on the State to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's statements were voluntary. [State v.] Evans, 944 P.2d [1120] at 1126-27 [(Wyo.1997)]. Once the State has met its burden and rebutted the presumption of involuntariness, the defendant may be required to present evidence demonstrating the involuntariness of his statements. Id. at 1126. If such statements resulted from coercion, then the statements are inadmissible at trial for any purpose because their validity is suspect. Id. at 1125."

Lewis, 2002 WY 92, ¶ 18, 48...