Gutierrez v. State
| Decision Date | 25 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-1633-05.,PD-1633-05. |
| Citation | 221 S.W.3d 680 |
| Parties | Ernest M. GUTIERREZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
David V. Stith, Corpus Christi, for Appellant.
Cynthia A. Morales, Asst. District Attorney, Corpus Christi, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., austin, for State.
PRICE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, KEASLER, HERVEY, HOLCOMB and COCHRAN joined.
We granted review in this case to examine whether the Thirteenth Court of Appeals erred in deciding that a police officer's warrantless intrusion into the appellant's home was allowable under the theory of exigent circumstances and probable cause. We conclude the court of appeals did err in its analysis. However, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on grounds that the police entry and search was justified by the appellant's consent.
THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On March 7, 2002, Detective Douglas Rush of the Corpus Christi Police Department was informed by a detective in Plano that a laptop computer had been stolen.1 The Plano detective informed Rush that the computer was equipped with an anti-theft program which, when activated, would provide the address and phone number of the location where the computer was last used to access the internet. The Plano detective relayed to Rush that the computer had been used at 3129 Eisenhower in Corpus Christi the previous night.
On this information, Rush and Detective Felix Gonzalez proceeded to the Eisenhower address, which is the appellant's home. Prior to the detectives' arrival, the appellant was smoking marijuana inside his house. When the officers arrived at the address,2 the appellant heard car doors close, saw the approaching officers out of his window, put out his marijuana cigarette and met the detectives on his porch, closing his front door behind him. Rush asked the appellant about the stolen computer. The appellant initially denied having the computer, but recanted and then admitted the computer was inside his house.3 While the conversation between Rush and the appellant was taking place, Gonzalez smelled marijuana and observed that the appellant had bloodshot eyes and was very nervous.
The appellant told the officers he would go into the house and bring the computer out to the officers. Rush explained that he could not let the appellant go into the house alone, as a matter of officer safety and police policy. Rush filled out a consent to search form on the appellant's porch, and explained the form to the appellant.4 The detective asked the appellant if he and Gonzalez could enter the home. The appellant agreed, opened his door, and reentered his home. Though the consent form was still unsigned, the detectives followed the appellant into his home.5 After the appellant and the detectives entered the threshold of the house, the appellant signed the consent to search form.
Once inside, the appellant retrieved the computer and gave it to Rush. Both detectives noticed the odor of burnt marijuana and a marijuana cigarette in plain view on a table in the living room. The detectives continued a cursory visual search and found cash, a police scanner, and several plastic baggies. The detectives called for assistance from narcotics officers. Upon their arrival, the narcotics officers conducted a thorough warrantless search of the appellant's house. This search resulted in the discovery of cocaine, cash, a pistol and ammunition, digital scales, and other drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, the appellant gave two statements regarding his possession of marijuana, cocaine, and the computer.
The appellant was indicted for possession with the intent to deliver 400 grams or more of cocaine. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, and the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the appellant argued that consent was not freely and voluntarily given and all evidence subsequently found in the appellant's home was the fruit of the poisonous tree. After listening to the testimony of several witnesses, including the appellant, the trial court denied the motion. At trial, the legality of the search, specifically whether the appellant gave valid consent, was again litigated. The issue was submitted to the jury, and the jury ultimately convicted the appellant.
On appeal, the appellant alleged the consent obtained by the detectives, both prior to and after entry, was not voluntarily given. The State refuted the appellant's contention that consent was not voluntarily obtained, and further argued that, under a theory of probable cause and exigent circumstances, the warrantless entry into the appellant's home and the ensuing search did not violate the protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In a memorandum opinion, the court of appeals adopted the State's latter position, holding that, "[w]ithout determining appellant's arguments regarding the voluntariness of his consent, we conclude the police had ample probable cause and exigent circumstances to enter the home."6 We granted the appellant's petition for discretionary review to examine the issue of whether the warrantless intrusion by the police into his home was justified by the existence of probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances.
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment grants individuals "the right . . . to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."7 In determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure, the actions of police are judged by balancing the individual's privacy interest against the Government's interest in law enforcement.8 The balancing test is utilized to ensure that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights are not subjected to "arbitrary invasions at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field."9
There is a strong preference for searches to be administered pursuant to a warrant.10 In fact, the search of a residence without a judicially authorized warrant is presumptively unreasonable.11 However, this does not mean all searches must necessarily be conducted under the authority of a warrant. For example, if police have probable cause coupled with an exigent circumstance, or they have obtained voluntary consent, or they conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest, the Fourth Amendment will tolerate a warrantless search.12 Yet, the warrant requirement is not lightly set aside, and the State shoulders the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies.13
To validate a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, the State must satisfy a two-step process.14 First, there must be probable cause to enter or search a specific location.15 In the context of warrantless searches, probable cause exists "when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the instrumentality . . . or evidence of a crime will be found."16 Second, an exigency that requires an immediate entry to a particular place without a warrant must exist.17 We have identified three categories of exigent circumstances that justify a warrantless intrusion by police officers: 1) providing aid or assistance to persons whom law enforcement reasonably believes are in need of assistance; 2) protecting police officers from persons whom they reasonably believe to be present, armed, and dangerous; and 3) preventing the destruction of evidence or contraband.18 If the State does not adequately establish both probable cause and exigent circumstances, then a warrantless entry will not withstand judicial scrutiny.19
Here, the court of appeals found that probable cause and an exigent circumstance were both present when the police confronted the appellant on his porch. In finding sufficient probable cause, the court of appeals noted that the officers were aware that the appellant had possession of the stolen computer and marijuana, that he initially lied to them about his possession of the laptop, and that he had bloodshot eyes and was increasingly nervous.20 The court of appeals then observed:
Where police have evidence of mari[j]uana and stolen property in a home, we cannot conclude they are required to stand by and allow that person to enter the home alone . . . . A reasonable police officer could believe that appellant was attempting to destroy the mari[j]uana or the computer or both, or even flee from the officers or engage in some action that might threaten officer safety.21
We agree with this observation, insofar as it goes. Assuming the police indeed had probable cause, the exigency of the situation called for a measured police response to maintain the status quo. We disagree, however, that the exigency perceived by the court of appeals was such as reasonably to authorize a full-blown search of the appellant's home. The detectives' response of conducting a warrantless search of the entire home far exceeded the scope of the particular exigent circumstance they faced. When confronted with an urgency that requires immediate police action and does not allow for the procurement of a warrant, law enforcement is authorized to take reasonable steps to secure the status quo. But this exception to the warrant requirement does not grant police the unfettered discretion to take any course of action, however disproportionate it may be to the perceived exigency.22
Because we reject the court of appeals's reliance upon exigent circumstances, we must next address the issue of consent. An exception to the warrant requirement, consent is valid when it is voluntarily given.23 The validity of a consensual search is a question of fact, and the State bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that consent was obtained voluntarily.24 This burden includes proving that consent was not the result of duress or coercion.25 To determine whether this burden is met, we examine the totality of the...
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