Guy v. Guy, 98-CA-00276-SCT.
Decision Date | 22 April 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-CA-00276-SCT.,98-CA-00276-SCT. |
Citation | 736 So.2d 1042 |
Parties | Audra Marian GUY v. Robert Sidney GUY, Jr. |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Martin A. Kilpatrick, Greenville, Attorney for Appellant.
William R. Striebeck, Greenville, Attorney for Appellee.
BEFORE PITTMAN, P.J., BANKS AND MILLS, JJ.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. Robert Sidney Guy, Jr. (hereinafter Rob) and Audra Marian Guy (hereinafter Audra) were married May 14, 1994. They were separated on April 12, 1997. No children were born to the couple. The couple was awarded a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences on November 20, 1997.
¶ 2. In the final judgment of divorce, the chancellor attempted to distribute equitably the couple's marital assets. In doing so, he valued Audra's nursing degree, which she had obtained during the marriage, at $35,000. The Chancellor credited that $35,000 value amount to Audra's portion of the marital assets.
¶ 3. The chancellor assigned the value of $35,000 to Audra's nursing degree as a result of Rob testifying that this was the amount he spent on Audra's expenses and support while she pursued and completed her nursing degree during the couple's brief marriage.
¶ 4. Audra filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or, alternatively, for Relief from Judgment which the Chancellor denied on February 2, 1998. Thereafter, Audra timely perfected this appeal.
¶ 5. Audra raises the following assignments of error on this appeal:
DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
¶ 6. These issues will be addressed together. The novel question presented in this appeal is whether a professional degree is marital property. This is a question of first impression before this Court. This is a question of law which will be reviewed de novo by this Court. Mauney v. State ex rel. Moore, 707 So.2d 1093, 1095 (Miss., 1998); Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So.2d 567, 569 (Miss., 1997) (citing Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 678 So.2d 983, 987 (Miss., 1996); Seymour v. Brunswick Corp., 655 So.2d 892, 895, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,228 (Miss., 1995)).
Id. While Ferguson certainly did not list a professional degree as marital property to be equitably divided, it did list the contribution made by the supporting spouse to the attainment of that degree by the other spouse to be at least considered when equitably dividing the marital assets. Id.
¶ 8. We also look to our sister states whose courts have specifically addressed this issue. As with most legal issues, the jurisdictions are split. Nevertheless, there is a clear majority and minority position as to whether professional degrees are to be considered marital property. Eighteen jurisdictions have held that a spouse's degree was not a marital asset.1 The minority approach, followed by some courts in three jurisdictions (most notably New York) is that a professional degree is marital property.2
¶ 9. The reason that most states have determined that professional degrees are not marital property is best articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), where that Court stated:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even by the broad views of the concept of `property.' It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.
In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App.3d 234, 470 N.E.2d 551, 557, 83 Ill. Dec. 425 (1 Dist., 1984) (citations omitted).
¶ 11. We recognize the potential inequity of a situation such as the present one, where one spouse works full-time to put the other spouse through school where they obtain a college degree. After obtaining this degree at the expense and sacrifice of the supporting spouse, the supported spouse leaves the supporting spouse with nothing more than the knowledge that they aided their now ex-spouse in increasing his/her future earning capacity. This sentiment is echoed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). There the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
¶ 12. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has similarly observed:
While we agree ... that marriage is not a business enterprise in which strict accountings are to be had for moneys spent by one spouse for the benefit of the other, it appears to us that this case does not involve strict accountings, but gross accountings. Supporting spouses in these cases feel entitled to reimbursement, we believe, not because they have sacrificed to support the other spouse, but because they are, to use a strong word, `jettisoned' as soon as the need for their sacrifice, albeit in part a legal obligation, comes to an end. In retrospect, perhaps unintentionally, the supporting spouse in such a case can be said to have been `used.' At least this is the perception of the supporting spouse, and we believe that this perception is not totally without foundation in all cases ... [T]he supporting spouse in a case such as this should be awarded equitable reimbursement to the extent that his or her contribution to the education, training or increased earning capacity of the other spouse exceeds the bare minimum legally obligated support....
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...an issue of first impression. ¶ 9. This Court first addressed the subject of professional degrees as marital property in Guy v. Guy, 736 So.2d 1042 (Miss.1999). There we concluded that a professional degree acquired by one spouse during a marriage is not marital property. This Court, howeve......
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...Daniels v. Daniels, 418 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. App. 1988); Thomas v. Thomas, 417 N.W.2d 563 (Mich. App. 1987). Mississippi: Guy v. Guy, 736 So.2d 1042 (Miss. 1999). Missouri: Sullivan v. Sullivan, 159 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. App. 2005). Montana: In re Marriage of Lee, 282 Mont. 410, 938 P.2d 650 (1997).......