Guy v. Guy, 98-CA-00276-SCT.

Decision Date22 April 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-CA-00276-SCT.,98-CA-00276-SCT.
Citation736 So.2d 1042
PartiesAudra Marian GUY v. Robert Sidney GUY, Jr.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Martin A. Kilpatrick, Greenville, Attorney for Appellant.

William R. Striebeck, Greenville, Attorney for Appellee.

BEFORE PITTMAN, P.J., BANKS AND MILLS, JJ.

PITTMAN, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 1. Robert Sidney Guy, Jr. (hereinafter Rob) and Audra Marian Guy (hereinafter Audra) were married May 14, 1994. They were separated on April 12, 1997. No children were born to the couple. The couple was awarded a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences on November 20, 1997.

¶ 2. In the final judgment of divorce, the chancellor attempted to distribute equitably the couple's marital assets. In doing so, he valued Audra's nursing degree, which she had obtained during the marriage, at $35,000. The Chancellor credited that $35,000 value amount to Audra's portion of the marital assets.

¶ 3. The chancellor assigned the value of $35,000 to Audra's nursing degree as a result of Rob testifying that this was the amount he spent on Audra's expenses and support while she pursued and completed her nursing degree during the couple's brief marriage.

¶ 4. Audra filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or, alternatively, for Relief from Judgment which the Chancellor denied on February 2, 1998. Thereafter, Audra timely perfected this appeal.

¶ 5. Audra raises the following assignments of error on this appeal:

I. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN INCLUDING AUDRA'S NURSING DEGREE AS A "MARITAL ASSET."
II. THE COST OF AUDRA'S NURING DEGREE CANNOT BE REIMBURSED TO ROB AS LUMP-SUM ALIMONY.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE MANNER OF VALUING THE NURSING DEGREE.

DISCUSSION OF THE LAW

¶ 6. These issues will be addressed together. The novel question presented in this appeal is whether a professional degree is marital property. This is a question of first impression before this Court. This is a question of law which will be reviewed de novo by this Court. Mauney v. State ex rel. Moore, 707 So.2d 1093, 1095 (Miss., 1998); Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So.2d 567, 569 (Miss., 1997) (citing Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 678 So.2d 983, 987 (Miss., 1996); Seymour v. Brunswick Corp., 655 So.2d 892, 895, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,228 (Miss., 1995)).

¶ 7. Although there is no Mississippi case directly on point, the seminal Mississippi case regarding equitable division of marital property is Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss., 1994), where we held,

[T]his Court suggests the Chancery courts consider the following guidelines, where applicable, when attempting to effect an equitable division of marital property:
1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows:
. . . .
c. Contribution to education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse to accumulating the assets.
. . . .

Id. While Ferguson certainly did not list a professional degree as marital property to be equitably divided, it did list the contribution made by the supporting spouse to the attainment of that degree by the other spouse to be at least considered when equitably dividing the marital assets. Id.

¶ 8. We also look to our sister states whose courts have specifically addressed this issue. As with most legal issues, the jurisdictions are split. Nevertheless, there is a clear majority and minority position as to whether professional degrees are to be considered marital property. Eighteen jurisdictions have held that a spouse's degree was not a marital asset.1 The minority approach, followed by some courts in three jurisdictions (most notably New York) is that a professional degree is marital property.2

¶ 9. The reason that most states have determined that professional degrees are not marital property is best articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978), where that Court stated:

An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encompassed even by the broad views of the concept of `property.' It does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.

574 P.2d at 77.

¶ 10. We join the majority of states and hold that professional degrees are not marital property. In the present case, Audra's nursing degree is not marital property. Her nursing license is not a chattel which can be divided or assigned. Rob may not share in it. The nursing degree and license may only be issued to a qualified holder. We do not intend "property" in the sense of "marital property" to include intellectual or technical mental enhancement gained during the course of a marriage. However, the analysis does not end here because

[T]here is ... clear agreement that the contributing spouse should be entitled to some form of compensation for the financial efforts and support provided to the student spouse in the expectation that the marital unit would prosper in the future as a direct result of the couple's previous sacrifices.

In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App.3d 234, 470 N.E.2d 551, 557, 83 Ill. Dec. 425 (1 Dist., 1984) (citations omitted).

¶ 11. We recognize the potential inequity of a situation such as the present one, where one spouse works full-time to put the other spouse through school where they obtain a college degree. After obtaining this degree at the expense and sacrifice of the supporting spouse, the supported spouse leaves the supporting spouse with nothing more than the knowledge that they aided their now ex-spouse in increasing his/her future earning capacity. This sentiment is echoed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). There the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:

[E]very joint undertaking has its bounds of fairness. Where a partner to marriage takes the benefits of his spouse's support in obtaining a professional degree or license with the understanding that future benefits will accrue and inure to both of them, and the marriage is then terminated without the supported spouse giving anything in return, an unfairness has occurred that calls for a remedy.
. . . .
Furthermore, it is realistic to recognize that ... a supporting spouse has contributed more than mere earnings to her husband with the mutual expectation that both of them—she has well as he— will realize and enjoy material improvements in their marriage as a result of his increased earning capacity. Also, the wife has presumably made personal sacrifices, resulting in a reduced or lowered standard of living. Additionally, her husband, by pursuing preparations for a future career, has foregone gainful employment and financial contributions to the marriage that would have been forthcoming had he been employed. He thereby has further reduced the level of support his wife might otherwise have received, as well as the standard of living both of them would have otherwise enjoyed. In effect, through her contributions, the supporting spouse has consented to live at a lower material level while her husband has prepared for another career. She has postponed, as it were, present consumption and a higher standard of living, for the future prospect of greater support and material benefits. The supporting spouse's sacrifices would have been rewarded had the marriage endured and mutual expectations of both of them been fulfilled. The unredressed sacrifices—loss of support and reduction of the standard of living— coupled with the unfairness attendant upon the defeat of the supporting spouse's shared expectation of future advantages, further justify a remedial reward. In this sense, an award that is referable to the spouse's monetary contribution to her partner's education significantly implicates basic considerations of marital support and standard of living—factors that are clearly relevant in the determination and award of conventional alimony.

Id. at 533-34.

¶ 12. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has similarly observed:

While we agree ... that marriage is not a business enterprise in which strict accountings are to be had for moneys spent by one spouse for the benefit of the other, it appears to us that this case does not involve strict accountings, but gross accountings. Supporting spouses in these cases feel entitled to reimbursement, we believe, not because they have sacrificed to support the other spouse, but because they are, to use a strong word, `jettisoned' as soon as the need for their sacrifice, albeit in part a legal obligation, comes to an end. In retrospect, perhaps unintentionally, the supporting spouse in such a case can be said to have been `used.' At least this is the perception of the supporting spouse, and we believe that this perception is not totally without foundation in all cases ... [T]he supporting spouse in a case such as this should be awarded equitable reimbursement to the extent that his or her contribution to the education, training or increased earning capacity of the other spouse exceeds the bare minimum legally obligated support....

Bold v. Bold, 524 Pa. 487, 574 A.2d 552, 556 (1990).

¶ 13. We return to the words of the Supreme Court of New Jersey on this issue,

Marriage should not be a free ticket to professional education and training without subsequent obligations ... One spouse ought not to receive a divorce complaint when the
...

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13 cases
  • Mace v. Mace, No. 2000-CA-01283-SCT.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 30, 2002
    ...an issue of first impression. ¶ 9. This Court first addressed the subject of professional degrees as marital property in Guy v. Guy, 736 So.2d 1042 (Miss.1999). There we concluded that a professional degree acquired by one spouse during a marriage is not marital property. This Court, howeve......
  • Holston v. Holston
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • May 17, 2013
    ...in Smith are comparable to, if not precisely congruent with, those of Alabama law pertaining to periodic alimony. See Guy v. Guy, 736 So.2d 1042, 1046 (Miss.1999); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So.2d 124, 130 (Miss.1995); and Wray v. Wray, 394 So.2d 1341, 1344 (Miss.1981). The second type of alim......
  • West v. West
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • December 2, 2004
    ...the payment. ¶ 20. In Mississippi there are four types of alimony: periodic, lump sum, rehabilitative, and reimbursement. Guy v. Guy, 736 So.2d 1042, 1046 (Miss.1999). We must look to the substance, rather than the label, to determine whether alimony is periodic or lump sum. Hubbard v. Hubb......
  • Smith v. Little
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • December 10, 2002
    ... ...         ¶ 9. Mississippi recognizes four different types of alimony: 1) periodic, 2) lump sum, 3) rehabilitative, and 4) reimbursement. Guy v. Guy, 736 So.2d 1042, 1046 (¶ 15) (Miss.1999); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 656 So.2d 124, 130 (Miss.1995). Periodic alimony is the traditional monthly ... ...
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1 books & journal articles
  • § 9.02 States without Express Statutes
    • United States
    • Invalid date
    ...Daniels v. Daniels, 418 N.W.2d 924 (Mich. App. 1988); Thomas v. Thomas, 417 N.W.2d 563 (Mich. App. 1987). Mississippi: Guy v. Guy, 736 So.2d 1042 (Miss. 1999). Missouri: Sullivan v. Sullivan, 159 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. App. 2005). Montana: In re Marriage of Lee, 282 Mont. 410, 938 P.2d 650 (1997).......

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