Guzman v. Nba Auto., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 September 2021
• Docket Number: B303655
• Parties: Gloria GUZMAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NBA AUTOMOTIVE, INC., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

68 Cal.App.5th 1109

284 Cal.Rptr.3d 39

Gloria GUZMAN, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.NBA AUTOMOTIVE, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

B303655

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Filed September 17, 2021

McCreary and Duncan J. McCreary for Defendant and Appellant.

Lyon Law, Geoffrey C. Lyon, Long Beach; and Henry Harmeling IV for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SEGAL, J.

INTRODUCTION

Gloria Guzman timely filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Housing and Employment (DFEH) after her employer, NBA Automotive, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City (NBA Automotive),¹ terminated her employment. DFEH issued Guzman a right-to-sue letter, and Guzman filed this action against NBA Automotive, alleging wrongful termination and various causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act ( Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq. ) (FEHA).² A jury found in favor of Guzman and awarded her monetary damages, and the trial court entered judgment in her favor.

NBA Automotive appeals from the judgment, challenging the trial court's orders denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. NBA Automotive argues Guzman failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under FEHA because her administrative complaint, though it named something very close ("Hooman Chevrolet") to NBA Automotive's correct fictitious business name ("Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City"), it incorrectly identified "Hooman Enterprises, Inc.," rather than "NBA Automotive, Inc.," as the corporation doing business as Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City. Because Guzman's administrative complaint sufficiently identified her employer, she exhausted her administrative remedies within the statutory limitations period. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Guzman Files an Administrative Complaint

On September 8, 2017 Guzman filed an administrative complaint with DFEH asserting various employment claims, including discrimination, harassment, retaliation, failure to engage in the interactive process, denial of family or medical leave, and denial of reasonable accommodations. The caption of the complaint named "Hooman Enterprises, Inc." as the respondent, and in the first sentence, under the heading "Additional Complaint Details," Guzman alleged she "was employed by Defendant Hooman Enterprises Inc. DBA Hooman Chevrolet (Employer)" from February 2002 to May 2017 in, among several locations, Culver City. Guzman also named her supervisors, including "owner Hooman Nissani." Guzman requested, and DFEH issued the same day, a right-to-sue letter.³ DFEH sent Hooman Enterprises, Inc. a copy of Guzman's administrative complaint and the right-to-sue letter.

B. Guzman Files This Action

On September 14, 2017 Guzman filed this action, naming as defendants "Hooman Enterprises Inc. DBA Hooman Chevrolet; and DOES 1 to 10." The operative first amended complaint alleged 12 causes of action, including for wrongful termination, retaliation ( § 12940, subd. (h) ), disability discrimination ( § 12940, subd. (a) ), age discrimination ( § 12940, subd. (a) ), failure to make reasonable accommodations ( § 12940, subd. (m) ), and failure to engage in the interactive process ( § 12940, subd. (n) ). On January 23, 2018 NBA Automotive, using the name "Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City," filed an answer to Guzman's first amended complaint.

C. Guzman Learns the Legal Name of Her Employer and Amends Her Complaint in This Action and Her Administrative Complaint

Guzman stated (and NBA Automotive did not dispute) that in October 2018 she learned the legal name of NBA Automotive and asked the court to amend the complaint in this action to substitute the "true name" of the defendant, "NBA Automotive, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City," in place of the "incorrect name" of "Hooman Enterprises, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet." On January 3, 2019 the trial court signed the order amending the complaint. On April 25, 2019 Guzman filed an amended administrative complaint with DFEH naming "NBA Automotive, Inc." as the respondent and stating in the body of the complaint that her employer was "NBA Automotive, Inc., DBA Hooman Chevrolet." DFEH accepted the amended complaint and deemed it "to have the same filing date of the original complaint."

D. A Jury Returns a Split Verdict in Favor of Guzman, and NBA Automotive Files Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for a New Trial

After a four-day trial, the jury found in favor of Guzman on her causes of action for wrongful termination and retaliation, awarded her $245,892 in damages, and found in favor of NBA Automotive on her causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, and age discrimination.⁴ NBA Automotive moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that "there was an error in law and insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict" because the "evidence set forth during trial did not establish that all of the necessary elements of the causes of action were present." Specifically, NBA Automotive argued Guzman did not comply with section 12960, subdivisions (b) and (d), because she did not file her administrative complaint "within one year of the last allegedly illegal act identifying her employer." NBA Automotive moved for a new trial on the same grounds, arguing Guzman's "failure [to] file a DFEH Complaint against NBA [Automotive] should have resulted in [Guzman] not prevailing on the causes of action for wrongful termination and retaliation because [she] failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under ... § 12960(b) [and] (d)."

The trial court denied both motions. The court ruled Guzman exhausted her administrative remedies because DFEH "confirmed that the amendment to the DFEH complaint naming the proper defendant applied retroactively to the initial September 8, 2017 filing date." The court also ruled NBA Automotive "was described as a perpetrator of discriminatory acts, [it] would have been put on notice of the charges, and [it] would have had an opportunity to participate, had DFEH investigated." NBA Automotive timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

NBA Automotive contends the trial court "erred in law" in denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial because Guzman failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, as required by section 12960, subdivisions (b) and (d).⁵ NBA Automotive argues Guzman did not exhaust her administrative remedies because her administrative complaint "identified Hooman Enterprises, Inc.," rather than "NBA Automotive, Inc. dba Hooman Chevrolet of Culver City," as her employer. Because NBA Automotive's expansive view of the exhaustion requirement under FEHA is incorrect, the trial court did not err in denying the motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.

A. Standards of Review

" ‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support. [Citation.] [¶] ... As in the trial court, the standard of review [on appeal] is whether any substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury's conclusion.’ " ( Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 770, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170 ; see Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc . (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 192, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 460, 370 P.3d 1022 ; Morgan v. J-M Mfg. Co. , Inc. , (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1085, 275 Cal.Rptr.3d 349.) But where the "sole question before us ... is one of law" and the "jury ... was not asked to resolve any factual questions bearing on the question," we "address the issue under a de novo standard of review." ( Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 18 P.3d 29 ; see Brown v. City of Sacramento (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 587, 598, 249 Cal.Rptr.3d 801 ["to the extent a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict raises legal issues such as the application of law to undisputed facts ..., we review the trial court's ruling on the motion de novo"]; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1138, 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 [same].)

We generally review orders granting or denying a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 859, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 ; Denton v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 779, 794, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 610.) But "any determination underlying any order is scrutinized under the test appropriate to such determination." ( Aguilar , at p. 859, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 ; accord, Tun v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 309, 323, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 753.) Here, because whether Guzman exhausted her administrative remedies is a question of law (see Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1023, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 172 ), we review the trial court's ruling de novo. (See Aguilar , at p. 860, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493 [superior court's order granting a new trial "was predicated, specifically, on its determination that ... it made an error in law," which "is itself scrutinized de novo"]; Estill v. County of Shasta (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 702, 708, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 ["[b]ecause the trial court granted [the plaintiff] a new trial based on a question of law, we review the order de novo"].)

B. The Exhaustion Requirement Under FEHA

"In enacting the FEHA, California's Legislature sought to safeguard the rights of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination on account of various characteristics, including race, national origin, physical disability, and medical condition." ( Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co . (2014) 59 Cal.4th 407, 420, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 689, 327 P.3d 797 ; see § 12920 ; Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services,...