Haar v. Hanrahan

• Decision Date: 01 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1287,82-1287
• Citation: 708 F.2d 1547
• Parties: Stephen Thomas HAAR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael HANRAHAN, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1547

708 F.2d 1547

Stephen Thomas HAAR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael HANRAHAN, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 82-1287.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

June 1, 1983.

John L. Walker of Teel & Walker, P.A., Albuquerque, N.M., for petitioner-appellant.

Stephen A. Slusher, Asst. Dist. Atty., Albuquerque, N.M., for respondent-appellee.

Before McKAY, BREITENSTEIN and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.

McKAY, Circuit Judge.

Stephen Haar appeals from an order of the federal district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition asserts that New Mexico refused him a jury trial in violation of his federal constitutional rights.

I

Mr. Haar was charged with two offenses, aggravated battery ¹ and criminal damage to property, ² both arising out of the same incident. The aggravated battery charge carried a maximum penalty of one year's imprisonment ³ while the criminal damage to property charge carried a maximum sentence of six months. ⁴ The case was tried in the magistrate court of Bernalillo County New Mexico, where the defendant was provided a jury trial pursuant to the local court rules. ⁵ The jury acquitted Mr. Haar of the aggravated battery charge but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of simple battery, a crime that carried a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment. ⁶ The jury also found him guilty of criminal damage to property. The magistrate imposed two consecutive sentences of ninety days' imprisonment for the crimes.

New Mexico law provides that a criminal defendant who is convicted in the magistrate court is entitled to appeal through a trial de novo in the district court. ⁷ Mr. Haar exercised this right to retrial and requested that his case again be heard by a jury. The district court denied this request and reconvicted Mr. Haar of simple battery and criminal damage to property, sentencing him to two concurrent terms of six months' imprisonment.

Mr. Haar sought review of the district court conviction in the New Mexico Court of Appeals. State v. Haar, 94 N.M. 539, 612 P.2d 1350 (Ct.App.1980). He claimed that the sixth amendment of the Constitution, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, entitled him to a jury in the district court's trial de novo. The court of appeals rejected this claim. It determined that under the retrial provisions of New Mexico law, the defendant could not receive a sentence in the district court's proceedings in excess of that imposed by the magistrate. 94 N.M. 540-41, 612 P.2d at 1351-52. It apparently reasoned that since the defendant was subjected to no greater jeopardy in the de novo proceedings than in the magistrate court, he was not entitled to be tried by a jury again. 94 N.M. at 540, 612 P.2d at 1351. In reaching this result, the court noted that the two concurrent six-month sentences imposed by the district court represented an impermissible enhancement of the two consecutive ninety-day sentences imposed by the magistrate. 94 N.M. at 542, 611 P.2d at 1353. The court of appeals therefore remanded the case for a reduction in sentence, and the district court resentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of ninety days. The defendant's petitions for a writ of certiorari to the New Mexico Supreme Court and to the United States Supreme Court were both denied. Haar v. State, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980); Haar v. State, 449 U.S. 1063, 101 S.Ct. 787, 66 L.Ed.2d 606 (1980).

II

In the habeas petition before us, Mr. Haar reasserts his claim that he was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial in the district court. He argues that since he faced conviction in the district court for two crimes arising out of the same transaction, and since the aggregate of the potential sentences exceeded six months, he was entitled to a jury trial. In responding to this argument, we examine the Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to a jury trial.

A

The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ...." U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), the Supreme Court concluded that "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and accordingly held that "the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which--were they to be tried in a federal court--would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." 391 U.S. at 149, 88 S.Ct. at 1447 (footnote omitted). ⁸

In Duncan, the Court noted that "there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial requirement here applied to the States." 391 U.S. at 159, 88 S.Ct. at 1452 (footnote omitted). The Court cited a number of its past decisions that limited the constitutional right of jury trial to prosecutions involving crimes that would have been considered serious infractions at the time of adoption of the Constitution. ⁹ It then explained that "the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment." 391 U.S. at 159, 88 S.Ct. at 1452. The Court noted that "[t]he penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.' " 391 U.S. at 160, 88 S.Ct. at 1453 (quotingDistrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628, 57 S.Ct. 660, 663, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937)). In this regard, the Supreme Court stated,

In determining whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial, we are counseled by District of Columbia v. Clawans, supra, to refer to objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the Nation.

319 U.S. at 161, 88 S.Ct. at 1453. Thus, the Court apparently adopted an approach suggested in a law review article by the future Justice Frankfurter, evaluating the right to a jury trial primarily on the basis of the opprobrium that society attaches to the crime charged, as measured in part by the potential penalty that might be imposed. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv.L.Rev. 917 (1926). ¹⁰

In Duncan, the Supreme Court recognized that it was necessary to draw a line in the spectrum of crime, separating petty offenses from serious infractions. 391 U.S. at 160-61, 88 S.Ct. at 1453. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), the Court drew that line. A majority concluded that any crime in which a defendant faced a prison sentence in excess of six months constituted a "serious offense." 399 U.S. at 69, 90 S.Ct. at 1888. ¹¹

The plurality opinion of Justice White reiterated the Court's reliance on "objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense, ... the most relevant such criteria being the severity of the maximum authorized penalty." 399 U.S. at 68, 90 S.Ct. at 1888. The plurality noted that virtually every court in the nation provides a jury trial for crimes that entail a potential penalty of greater than six months, and therefore concluded, "This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us with the only objective criterion by which a line could ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty alone--between offenses that are and that are not regarded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." 399 U.S. at 72-73, 90 S.Ct. at 1890 (footnote omitted).

In drawing the line at six months, the plurality noted that the division "attach[es] different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line, actually differ very little." 399 U.S. at 73, 90 S.Ct. at 1890. The plurality then stated,

Indeed, the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or "petty" matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation. Where the accused cannot possibly face more than six months' imprisonment, we have held that these disadvantages, onerous though they may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications. We cannot, however, conclude that these administrative conveniences, in light of the practices that now exist in every one of the 50 States as well as in the federal courts, can similarly justify denying an accused the important right to trial by jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment.

399 U.S. at 73-74, 90 S.Ct. at 1890-91 (footnote omitted). Thus, while the plurality examined objective criteria in resolving the reach of the constitutional right to a jury trial, it also recognized that the actual penalty that will be imposed is of primary importance to the defendant. The plurality left unclear, however, the relevance of this "subjective" factor to the constitutional calculus of the right to a jury trial. ¹²

B

Both Duncan and Baldwin examined the constitutional right to a jury trial that arises when a defendant is charged with a single offense. The instant case involves the right to a jury trial when a defendant is charged with multiple, but admittedly petty, offenses arising out of the same transaction. ¹³ The Supreme Court has not resolved the scope of the right to a jury trial under these circumstances. ¹⁴ However, the Tenth Circuit examined this issue in United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380 (10th Cir.1973).

Potvin involved two defendants who each faced two petty offense charges arising out of the same incident. The petty offenses carried possible sentences of six months each. The defendants demanded and were denied a jury trial, and upon conviction, they appealed to this court. We stated that "the defendants...