Haas v. Colosi
| Decision Date | 28 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA SA-01-0165., No. 1 CA-SA 01-0160, No. 1 CA-SA 01-0163 |
| Citation | 40 P.3d 1249,202 Ariz. 56 |
| Parties | James J. HAAS, Maricopa County Public Defender, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Robert A. COLOSI, Commissioner of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, The Honorable Rebecca A. Albrecht, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondents, and State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Theresa M. Armendarez, Deputy Public Defender, Mesa, Attorneys for Petitioner.
Janet Napolitano, Arizona Attorney General By Thomas I. McClory, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Amicus Curiae.
¶ 1 In these consolidated special actions, the Maricopa County Public Defender seeks relief from the juvenile court's denials of his motions to withdraw as counsel for three juveniles charged with incorrigibility offenses. The public defender argues that the legislature intended that only indigent juveniles charged with offenses "that may result in detention" are entitled to representation by his office. Assuming that juveniles charged with incorrigibility offenses cannot be detained, the public defender asserts that there is no statutory authority for the juvenile court to appoint him to represent such juveniles. This court previously issued an order accepting jurisdiction, denying relief and indicating that this opinion would follow. For the following reasons, we hold that the juvenile court may appoint the public defender to represent indigent juveniles charged with incorrigibility offenses.
¶ 2 The acceptance of special action jurisdiction is discretionary. State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 198 Ariz. 164, 165, ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 970, 971 (App.2000). We accept special action jurisdiction on this occasion for the following reasons. First, the denials of the public defender's motions to withdraw as counsel are non-appealable, interlocutory orders and thus appellate review is available only by special action. Trebesch v. Superior Court, 175 Ariz. 284, 286, 855 P.2d 798, 800 (App.1993). Second, the issue is likely to arise again because of the large number of referred juveniles alleged to be incorrigible. See JV-111701 v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 147, 149, 786 P.2d 998, 1000 (App.1989)
. Finally, we are addressing a purely legal issue of first impression and statewide importance. Vo v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 198, 836 P.2d 408, 411 (App.1992). Accordingly, we accept jurisdiction.1
¶ 3 We present only the facts necessary to address the legal question presented. The facts in all three juvenile cases that are the subject of these special actions are identical for purposes of the issue presented herein. Each juvenile was charged with an incorrigibility2 offense. The juvenile court appointed the public defender to represent each juvenile in all further proceedings.3 The public defender filed motions to withdraw as counsel, which were denied. The public defender then filed special actions challenging the denials of the motions to withdraw as counsel. The special actions have been consolidated before this court. All three cases present one issue for review: whether the juvenile court has the authority to appoint the public defender to represent an indigent juvenile charged with only an incorrigibility offense.
¶ 4 The statute that sets forth the duties of the public defender, Ariz.Rev.Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 11-584 (2001), provides in part:
¶ 5 A.R.S. § 8-221 (Supp.2001), a statute addressing certain procedures to be followed by the juvenile court, provides:
¶ 6 Our goal in statutory interpretation is to discern the intent of the legislature. Guardianship/Conservatorship of Denton, 190 Ariz. 152, 155, 945 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1997)
. The rules of statutory construction require courts to interpret and give meaning to legislative intent by giving the words used by the legislature their plain and ordinary meaning unless the context requires a different meaning. State v. Averyt, 179 Ariz. 123, 127, 876 P.2d 1158, 1162 (App. 1994). Legislative intent may be discovered by examining the development of a particular statute. Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 167 Ariz. 18, 20, 804 P.2d 747, 749 (1990).
¶ 7 Prior to 1997, the predecessor to A.R.S. § 8-221(A)5 read: "In all proceedings conducted pursuant to this title and the rules of procedure for the juvenile court, a child has the right to be represented by counsel." A.R.S. § 8-225(A) (Supp.1996). In 1997, this subsection was amended to add the language at issue: "In all proceedings involving offenses that are conducted pursuant to this title and that may result in detention, a juvenile has the right to be represented by counsel." 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 220, § 17 (emphasis added). Subsection (A) was again amended in 1998: "In all proceedings involving offenses, dependency or termination of parental rights that are conducted pursuant to this title and that may result in detention, a juvenile has the right to be represented by counsel." 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws., ch. 276, § 3.
¶ 8 The public defender contends that because the legislature amended A.R.S. § 8-221(A)6 in 1997 to add the language, "and that may result in detention," it intended to limit the appointment of the public defender to only those cases involving juveniles charged with offenses punishable by detention. Further, the public defender argues that although A.R.S. § 8-221(H)(1) appears to be inconsistent with subsection (A), subsection (H)(1) must be read in conjunction with—and subject to—the limitation set forth in subsection (A). We disagree with the public defender's argument because it misconstrues the purpose of § 8-221(A) and fails to take into proper account all the pertinent provisions within § 11-584 and § 8-221.
¶ 9 The public defender's proposed interpretation confuses juveniles' right to court-appointed counsel in certain proceedings specified by § 8-221(A) with the public defender's obligation to represent indigent juveniles when appointed by the juvenile court under §§ 11-584(A)(1)(e) and 8-221(H)(1). Section 8-221(A) does not define the scope of the public defender's obligation to represent indigent juveniles when appointed by the court. Rather, §§ 11-584(A)(1)(e) and 8-221(H)(1) are the statutory provisions addressing the public defender's obligation to represent juveniles in incorrigibility proceedings when appointed by the court. Section 8-221(A) affords juveniles an absolute right to counsel in proceedings that may result in detention. Section 8-221(B) provides that the juvenile court shall appoint an attorney to represent indigent juveniles who are entitled to counsel under § 8-221(A). Accordingly, if an indigent juvenile is charged with an offense that may result in detention, the court must appoint counsel—often the public defender—for the juvenile. In contrast, if an indigent juvenile is charged with an incorrigibility offense that will not result in detention, the juvenile has no absolute right to court-appointed counsel; but the juvenile court has the discretionary authority to appoint the public defender to represent the juvenile under §§ 11-584(A)(1)(e) and 8-221(H)(1) when the court deems it advisable to protect the interests of the juvenile. The juvenile court's authority to appoint counsel in this situation exists independently from a juvenile's right to counsel.
¶ 10 Our conclusion is supported by consideration of all the pertinent statutory provisions. See Devenir Assoc. v. City of Phoenix, 169 Ariz. 500, 503, 821 P.2d 161, 164 (1991)
(). Section 11-584(A)(1)(e) provides that the public defender shall, upon order of the court, defend juveniles in delinquency and incorrigibility proceedings. Additionally, under § 8-221(H)(1), the public defender may defend a juvenile in a delinquency or incorrigibility proceeding when requested by the juvenile court. When the legislature added the language, "and that may result in detention" to § 8-221(A), it did not correspondingly delete the provisions in both § 8-221(H)(1) and § 11-584(A)(1)(e) authorizing the appointment of the public defender in incorrigibility proceedings. We conclude that the plain language of these statutes, when considered together, indicates that the public defender may be appointed to represent juveniles in incorrigibility proceedings, even when there is no risk of detention.
¶ 11 By amending § 8-221(A) in 1997 to add the words, "and that may result in detention," the legislature limited an indigent juvenile's right to court-appointed counsel. Because of the...
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