Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun
| Decision Date | 26 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. S 90-1637. |
| Citation | 841 F. Supp. 717 |
| Parties | Paula HAAVISTOLA v. COMMUNITY FIRE COMPANY OF RISING SUN, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
George A. Nilson, Piper & Marbury, Susan Goering, American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Thomas Page Lloyd, Piper and Marbury, Awilda R. Marquez, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, MD, Deborah A. Jeon, American Civil Liberties Union, Cambridge, MD, Bruce T. Carton, Law Office, Columbia, MD, for plaintiffs.
Roger N. Powell, Law Office, Pikesville, MD, Anthony Victor Teelucksingh, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, Larry M. Wolf, Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, Richard D. Bennett, U.S. Atty., Baltimore, MD, Thomas P. Bernier, White and Karceski, Towson, MD, Joseph J. Mahoney, Law Office, Elkton, MD, for defendants.
This case is once again before the Court, this time on the defendants' motion for attorney's fees and costs. The fee motion will be denied, for reasons that will briefly be stated below. In that it is clear under the law of this Circuit that no fees can be awarded, the plaintiff need not file an opposition memorandum.
A federal statute — 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) — authorizes an award of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" in civil rights suits such as the present one. There is no question that the defendants are the prevailing parties on all federal claims, and that the state claims are no longer viable. The Court is of the opinion that, were the statute in question to be read and applied according to its plain language, the defendants would clearly be entitled to collect a fee from the plaintiff, and the Court would not hesitate to award the whole fee claimed by the defendants, believing that it represents a claim for reasonable rates for hours reasonably expended on the work detailed.
As it happens, of course, the statute has been given a gloss that allows an award of fees to a prevailing defendant only where the plaintiff's claims are objectively frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless from the outset, or become so during the course of litigation. See Lotz Realty Co. v. United States Dep't. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 717 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir.1983) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)). The district court's determinations in this regard are reviewed on an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir.1988).
In this case, this Court is convinced that the plaintiff's federal claims were, from the outset, baseless under federal law, in that the defendants were not, and never have been, amenable to suit under either Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thus making one element of each of plaintiff's federal claims unprovable as a matter of law. Indeed, this Court so concluded in its opinion — reversed on appeal — granting summary judgment on those claims in favor of the defendants. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 812 F.Supp. 1379 (D.Md.1993). The Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, leaves no doubt that the appellate Court entirely disagreed. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir.1993). In that the plaintiff largely produced at trial the same sort of evidence that convinced the Fourth Circuit to disagree with this Court and to hold that the plaintiff had set forth triable federal claims, this Court harbors no doubt whatever that the Fourth Circuit would instantly perceive a plain abuse of this Court's discretion in a finding made, after trial, that the plaintiff's claims were sufficiently baseless from the outset, or became so, as to warrant the imposition of fees under § 1988. Therefore, this Court is constrained to deny the defendants' request for attorney's fees.
It might be added that, if there were some relaxation of the Christiansburg rule in favor of an eleemosynary defendant, the Court would not...
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