Hacker v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 56939
| Decision Date | 12 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 56939,56939 |
| Parties | Gary HACKER, Petitioner, v. ST. PETERSBURG KENNEL CLUB et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Ted L. Wells, Tampa, for petitioner.
John W. Cash, Tampa, for respondents.
This case comes before the Court on petition for certiorari review of orders of the Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) and of the Judge of Industrial Claims (JIC) denying the petitioner's claim for workmen's compensation. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. (1972).
Gary Hacker, petitioner, was in the course of his employment as a gateman for the St. Petersburg Kennel Club on April 12, 1978, when he fell, hitting his head on a terrazzo floor. He sustained a concussion and other head injuries requiring hospitalization. It was speculated that club patrons had tracked in water from outside and that Hacker slipped on the wet floor. However, no evidence whatsoever has been uncovered as to how the injury occurred. Admittedly, Hacker is unable to recall what happened from about an hour and a half before the fall until he awoke in the hospital.
A workmen's compensation claim was filed seeking temporary total benefits, all necessary medical costs, permanent total or partial benefits and attorneys' fees. The employer and the carrier filed a notice to controvert on May 22, 1978, contending that Hacker's fall and injury did not arise out of and was not in the course of his employment.
On October 18, 1978, the JIC denied the claim, holding that the fall was totally idiopathic and not causally related to Hacker's employment. On April 27, 1979, the IRC affirmed the order of the JIC. This petition followed.
The issue for resolution by this Court is:
Whether the JIC erred in denying the claim, ruling that the claimant's fall was totally idiopathic, and failing to apply Section 440.26, Florida Statutes (1977)?
In order for an employee to recover for an injury suffered on the job, Florida's workmen's compensation law requires that three separate elements be present. The employee must have 1) met with an accident, 2) which occurred in the course of his employment, and also 3) which arose out of his employment. § 440.26, Fla.Stat. (1977); see also Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. McCook, 355 So.2d 1166, 1167-68 (Fla.1978).
There is no problem with the first two elements in the instant case. Clearly, petitioner was the victim of an accident which took place while he was acting in his capacity as a gateman at the kennel club. However, with regard to the third element necessary to petitioner's claim the JIC found "(t)hat the claimant's fall was totally idiopathic, without cause or relationship to his employment." Hacker v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, et al., claim no. 476-46-7458 (Judge of Industrial Claims 11-2-78). With regard to that finding, we hold that both the JIC and IRC were in error.
Under different circumstances the vitality of Hacker's claim would be easy to determine. Had it been clear that the injury resulted from a slip on wet terrazzo, his claim would be compensable. On the other hand, had the evidence shown that he was injured when hitting the floor after a fainting spell due solely to a physical condition unrelated to his job, the claim would be denied. However, in this instance the record is devoid of evidence explaining how Hacker's injury occurred. Recognizing that not all on-the-job injuries occur under ideal evidentiary conditions, the legislature had the foresight to provide a presumption resolving doubtful cases in favor of the claimant. On a larger scale, this presumption is one facet of a general policy in the workmen's compensation area that, in marginal cases, a result favoring the claimant is preferred. See Sanford v. A. P. Clark Motors, 45 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla.1950). The presumption itself provides:
In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary:
(1) That the claim comes within the...
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...Cal.2d 676, 263 P.2d 4 (1953) (fall in course of employment arises out of employment despite idiopathic seizure); Hacker v. St. Petersburg Kennel Club, 396 So.2d 161 (Fla.1981) (employer has burden of proof to show idiopathic cause if an unexplained fall occurs while the employee is at his ......
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