Hacker v. Superior Court of Tulare County

• Decision Date: 20 December 1968
• Citation: 73 Cal.Rptr. 907,268 Cal.App.2d 387
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Harold Dwayne HACKER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF TULARE COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Page 907

73 Cal.Rptr. 907

268 Cal.App.2d 387

Harold Dwayne HACKER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF TULARE COUNTY, Respondent The PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Dec. 20, 1968.

Soares, Simpson & Rowson, & William Silveria, Tulare, for petitioner.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., by Nelson P. Kempsky, Daniel J. Kremer, David R. Cunningham and James T. McNally, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for real party in interest.

No appearance for respondent.

STONE, Associate Justice.

Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain the Superior Court of Tulare County from proceeding in the case of People v. Hacker. The petition was brought pursuant to Penal Code, section 999a after the court had denied a motion under Penal Code section 995 to set aside an information charging petitioner with violation of Health & Safety Code, section 11500, possession of a narcotic.

The principal ground for his motion below and his petition to this court is that the narcotic which he is alleged to have possessed, and which was admitted in evidence over objection at the preliminary hearing, was seized illegally. He also asserts insufficiency of the evidence.

Following commitment to the Department of Corrections and placement at the California Rehabilitation Center at Corona, petitioner was released in an 'outpatient status' under the supervision of field agent Leigh Byrne. As an outpatient he was obligated to obey the terms and conditions imposed by the Rehabilitation Center. It was agent Byrne's duty as supervisor to see that petitioner complied and if he had not, petitioner's outpatient status could be suspended by Byrne. On July 16, 1967, Byrne obtained a specimen of urine from petitioner, who was residing at his mother's home in Visalia. A laboratory test of the urine revealed a positive narcotics usage, so on July 22 Byrne ordered Detective Domier of the Visalia Police Department to 'pick up' petitioner. He did so under the authority of Welfare & Institutions Code, section 3151, which provides that:

'* * * A single member of the authority may by written or oral order suspend the release in outpatient status of such a person and cause him to be retaken, until the next meeting of the authority.

'It is hereby made the duty of all peace officers to execute any such order in like manner as ordinary criminal process.'

Detective Domier and a sergeant from the Visalia Police Department went to the address given, and were informed that petitioner could be located at another address. At the place designated, the sergeant checked the rear exit of the apartment and Detective Domier knocked on the front door. Petitioner answered, admitted Domier, and was placed under arrest, searched and handcuffed. The sergeant then entered the apartment and the officers searched the premises. Two rubber contraceptives were discovered in the kitchen, containing a powder which Detective Domier said was 'In my opinion I felt that it was heroin.' The material was sent to a state chemist, who confirmed Domier's suspicions.

Petitioner first points out that the court must distinguish between an outpatient whose status derives from an involuntary commitment under Welfare & Institutions Code, section 3050 et seq., and a parolee. His point is that a felon committed to the Department of Corrections loses his civil rights, which are not restored by parole status; on the other hand, a commitment under section 3050 et seq. is nonpenal in character. (In re De La O, 59 Cal.2d 128, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793, 98 A.L.R.2d 715; In re Trummer, 60 Cal.2d 658, 36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177.) In short, petitioner asserts that his civil rights were not impaired by his status as an outpatient, but his distinction between a parolee and an outpatient is not completely accurate.

While commitment proceedings are nonpenal in character, an outpatient does not enjoy full civil status. His place of abode, his place of employment and other activities are subject to approval and periodic review by his field agent. Further, when requested he must submit to narcotic use tests, such as the Nalline test used here. There is a calculated risk in the rehabilitation process that requires not only some impingement of an outpatient's civil rights, but close surveillance. To this extent there are criminal aspects to outpatient status (People v. Moore, 69 A.C. 701, 708--709, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800, 446 P.2d 800) which parallel the status of a parolee.

However, we do not deem it necessary to justify the search in this instance by relying upon the doctrine of constructive custody that has been utilized to justify a search of premises occupied by a parolee. (People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal.App.2d 143, 40 Cal.Rptr. 100; People v. Gastelum, 237 Cal.App.2d 205, 46 Cal.Rptr. 743; People v. Perez, 243 Cal.App.2d 528, 52 Cal.Rptr. 514; People v. Contreras, 263 A.C.A. 315, 69 Cal.Rptr. 548.) 'A search without a warrant is proper where it is incident to a lawful arrest based on reasonable cause to believe that the accused has committed a felony. * * * Reasonable or probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary care and prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the accused is guilty. The test is not whether the facts on which the officer relies are sufficient to convict, but only whether the person should stand trial.' (People v. Torres, 56 Cal.2d 864, 866, 17 Cal.Rptr. 495, 496, 366 P.2d 823, 824.) The arresting officer was informed that a test of petitioner's urine revealed a narcotic substance. When petitioner came to the door at 1:30 in the afternoon in response to the officer's knock, he was shirtless and the officer felt 'that Mr. Hacker was under the influence of something.' When Hacker was told that the officer was going to search the premises, he became nervous. The officer knew, of course, from petitioner's outpatient status that he had been a narcotics user, and that he had recently failed his Nalline test. To a reasonable man this would indicate that petitioner was again using narcotics in violation of his outpatient status. These facts gave the officer probable cause to arrest petitioner for possession of narcotics and, incident to the arrest, to search the premises.

Under like facts the court, in People v. Clark, 263 A.C.A. 89, at pages 94--95, 69 Cal.Rptr. 218, at page 222, observed:

'In People v. Carrillo, 64 Cal.2d 387, 50 Cal.Rptr. 185, 412 P.2d 377, the court dealt with a prison parolee who had a prior narcotic conviction and had missed a Malline test. The court held that these two factors gave his parole agent probable cause to arrest him for present possession of narcotics. We do not believe that from the point of view of probable cause, it makes a difference whether, after the first conviction, a defendant had been sent to prison or to Corona. Thus the facts that defendant was an outpatient after a prior narcotics conviction, had...