Trummer, In re

Decision Date14 January 1964
Docket NumberCr. 7413
Citation388 P.2d 177,36 Cal.Rptr. 281,60 Cal.2d 658
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 388 P.2d 177 In re George Joseph TRUMMER on Habeas Corpus.

Lynn Carman and Kingston & Carman, Placerville, for petitioner.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., and Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., for repondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

This matter is before us on an order to show cause issued upon an application for writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of George Joseph Trummer (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) who is presently on parole from the California Rehabilitation Center under an order for commitment as a narcotics addict entered by the superior court pursuant to article 2, chapter 11, title 7, of part III of the Penal Code (in particular, § 6451, which deals with commitment to that facility of a person convicted of 'any crime in any superior court').

Petitioner first contends that chapter 11, title 7, part III of the Penal Code is unconstitutional because (a) it imposes criminal penalties for an illness narcotics addiction and (b) it commits petitioner to the custody of the chief penal officer of the state. These and similar contentions were considered in In re De La O (1963) 59 Cal.2d 128, 137(1) 148(11), 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793, where, for the reasons set forth in our opinion in that case, they were rejected as being without merit.

Petitioner also contends that he should be released from parole because he is no longer addicted to narcotics, and the state may not detain a civilly committed addict after he has been 'cured.' As will hereinafter be explained, this contention is without merit.

More serious, however, are petitioner's further contentions that his parole conditions are unreasonable because they are the same as those which are imposed in the case of felony paroles, 1 and that his constitutional rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated because he was denied a jury trial in his commitment proceedings while a jury trial is provided for persons committed to the same program un der different statutes. 2 We have concluded that these last two contentions are meritorious, but, although petitioner is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of his addiction as of the time of his commitment and to modification of his conditions of parole, he is not presently entitled to release from parole.

Petitioner was committed in the following manner: On August 31, 1961, he appeared in superior court and pleaded guilty to an information charging forgery of a narcotics prescription in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11715. Violation of this section may be a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the sentence, if any, imposed. Unless a misdemeanor sentence is entered the offense provisionally stands as a felony, but nevertheless if probation is granted without pronouncement of sentence the probationer retains his ordinary civil rights. (People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 386-387(17), 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102.) After receiving petitioner's plea of guilty, the court suspended the criminal proceedings without entry of judgment and directed the sheriff to file a petition to ascertain whether or not petitioner was a narcotics addict within the meaning of Penal Code section 6451. A hearing was held as provided for by the latter statute, and petitioner was adjudged a narcotics addict and duly committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections. After 10 months of treatment petitioner was paroled from the California Rehabilitation Center. This is his status at the present time.

Release from Parole: Petitioner contends that he is entitled to immediate release from his parole 3 because he is no longer addicted to narcotics, and that the state may not detain him after he has been cured. This contention might have merit if the only objective of the program were to obtain a temporary 'cure' of addiction. However, the purpose is not only to treat and 'cure' addicts, it is also to rehabilitate them. (Pen.Code, § 6400.) Experience with past programs of this nature has shown that a lack of follow-up supervision results in a high rate of relapse. (Final Report of the Special Study Commission on Narcotics (1961), pp. 22-23; Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment (1957) 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 9, 23-24.) The present 'parole' (outpatient) system is designed to overcome this defect by providing the necessary follow-up through counseling, testing for narcotic use, and immediate return for further treatment if a relapse should occur. As pointed out in In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 145(10), 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 500, 378 P.2d 793, 804, 'These rules appear to be designed to meet the particular needs of an addict in the later stages of the process of rehabilitation.'

Thus, although petitioner currently may give every appearance of being 'cured' of his addiction, it is within the constitutional power of the Legislature to require that a person once committed as a narcotics addict remain under supervision for a period sufficient to give reasonable assurance against relapse. The time during which a relapse could occur cannot be determined precisely, and we cannot state that the three-year minimum period of parole (in effect and now designated, out-patient status) here established by the Legislature is an unreasonable one.

Conditions of Parole: Petitioner rightfully contends that certain conditions of his parole are unreasonable and unlawful insofar as he is thereby deprived of his civil rights. Petitioner's Agreement of Parole provides in part: '12. Civil Rights: Your civil rights have been suspended by law. You may not marry, engage in business nor sign certain contracts unless your Parole Agent recommends, and the Adult Authority approves restoring such Civil Rights to you. There are some Civil Rights affecting your everyday life which the Adult Authority has restored to you. BUT, you may not exercise these without first getting written approval from your Parole Agent. You should talk to your Parole Agent about your Civil Rights to be sure you do not violate this condition of your parole.' The Attorney General acknowledges that petitioner's Agreement of Parole contains exactly the same conditions as the agreement used in the parole of a felon. As the Attorney General further concedes, the purported deprivation of petitioner's civil rights is improper. Although the Adult Authority may restrict the civil rights restored to a paroled felon (as provided in Pen.Code, § 2600) petitioner is not under sentence as a felon and hence cannot be deprived of such rights. (People v. Banks (1959) supra, 53 Cal.2d 370, 386-387(14, 15, 16, 17), 1 Cal.Rptr. 660, 348 P.2d 102.) Furthermore, deprivation of his civil rights in the circumstances here would be a form of punishing petitioner, and such punishment of a narcotics addict who has been civilly committed for treatment would constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Robinson v. California (1961) 370 U.S. 660, 666-667, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758; In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 136, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793.) 4 The remaining conditions of petitioner's parole agreement appear to be reasonably supportable as necessary for adequate supervision over his rehabilitation.

Right to Trial by Jury: In In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 150(14), 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 500, 378 P.2d 793, 804, we pointed out that 'The commitment procedures set up by the subject statute (here, Pen.Code, § 6451) are in the nature of special civil proceedings unknown to the common law, and hence there is no right to jury trial unless it is given by the statute.' Petitioner claims, however, that by affording a jury trial on the issue of addiction to certain categories of persons committed while denying it to others, the program violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This contention is meritorious. Recently, the Legislature sought to further clarify its purpose in establishing the program by declaring in Penal Code section 6399 that 'It is the intent of the Legislature that persons addicted to narcotics, or who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of becoming addicted, shall be treated for such condition and its underlying causes, and that such treatment shall be carried out for nonpunitive purposes not only for the protection of the addict, or the person in imminent danger of addiction, against himself, but also for the prevention of contamination of others and the protection of the public. * * * The enactment of the preceding provisions of this section shall not be construed to be evidence that the intent of the Legislature was otherwise before such enactment.' (Stats.1963, ch. 1706, § 1.) This declaration is consistent with earlier declarations of legislative purpose (Pen.Code, § 6400) and with our interpretation of such declarations, (In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 148-149(12), 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793).

The Legislature has implemented its purpose by extending the opportunity for treatment to everyone who needs it; there is a provision for voluntary commitment (Pen.Code, § 6500), as well as the above discussed provisions for involuntary commitment. Thus, no matter which method of commitment is used, the purpose of the program is the same; and except for possible variations in length of commitment, the program is so designed that all persons will receive the same treatment. Yet, despite this uniformity of purpose and treatment, at the time of petitioner's commitment a difference existed among the procedural safeguards governing the various types of commitments. Under Penal Code section 6450 a person convicted of any crime in a municipal or justice court may be certified to the superior court, where after hearing and examination, the judge may commit such person to the program. However, 'If a person committed pursuant to this...

To continue reading

Request your trial
41 cases
  • People v. ArcIGA
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 26 Junio 1986 meet the particular needs of an addict in the later stages of the process of rehabilitation." ' (In re Trummer, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 661 [36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177].)" (People v. Myers (1972) 6 Cal.3d 811, 817 [100 Cal.Rptr. 612, 494 P.2d STANDARD OF REVIEW Section 3053 provides i......
  • United States v. Maroney
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • 11 Enero 1966
    ...of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 332, 347-48 (1965); cf. In re Trummer, 60 Cal. 2d 658, 36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177 (1964); United States ex rel. Carroll v. McNeill, 294 F.2d 117 (2 Cir.1961), vacated as moot, 369 U.S. 149, 82 S.Ct. 685, 7......
  • Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 30 Noviembre 1995
    ......v. Industrial Acc. Com., [supra,] 184 Cal. 26, 41 [192 P. 1021], [discussed ante, p. 118 of 47 Cal.Rptr.2d, p. 1258 of 905 P.2d]; ..; but see In re Trummer (1964) 60 Cal.2d 658, 664 [36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177] [extending statutory right of jury trial on issue of addiction to all persons similarly situated, but asserting court generally lacks authority to so 'rewrite' statutes]." (Hayes v. Superior Court, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 224, 98 Cal.Rptr. ......
  • People v. Jasso
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 4 Diciembre 1969 character. (In re De La O (1963) supra, 59 Cal.2d 128, 156, 28 Cal.Rptr. 489, 378 P.2d 793, 98 A.L.R.2d 705; In re Trummer (1964) 60 Cal.2d 658, 36 Cal.Rptr. 281, 388 P.2d 177.) A parolee is a sentenced felon and in law is deemed 'civilly dead' for certain purposes under section 2600 of ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT