Hacon, Inc. v. Chandeysson Elec. Co.

Decision Date23 March 1971
Docket NumberNo. 33853,33853
Citation466 S.W.2d 157
PartiesHACON, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHANDEYSSON ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and Westinghouse Electric Corporation, a corporation, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Keefe, Schlafly, Griesedieck & Ferrell, Robert F. Schlafly, Fortis M. Lawder, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

Evans & Dixon, Ralph C. Kleinschmidt, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.

WEIER, Commissioner.

On appeal, plaintiff seeks a determination that Section 537.100, RSMo 1969, V. A.M.S., 1 the statute of limitation applicable to wrongful death actions, 2 does not apply to the suit of an employer against a third party for the amount the employer has paid to or on behalf of the widow on account of the death of its employee, as required by The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act. It is our decision that Section 537.100 does apply and since no action was brought within one year after death of the employee, the action of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's cause of action, commenced more than one year after date of death, must be sustained.

Marion Wilson Roberson, the employee, received injury in an electrical fire and explosion on July 5, 1962, which resulted in his death on July 19, 1962. The fire and explosion were allegedly occasioned by the malfunction of a defective motor-generator set, designed and manufactured by defendant Chandeysson Electric Company, which was started and stopped by a motor-starter unit manufactured by defendant Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The motorstarter unit contained current-limiting fuses, also designed and manufactured by Westinghouse, whose purpose was to interrupt the flow of electric current when the amount thereof equalled or exceeded the capacity of the fuses. Plaintiff-employer filed its amended petition in two counts. Count I alleged negligence of the defendant in designing and manufacturing the defective motor-generator set, including the motor-starter and fuses, and in failing to adequately inspect, test and warn of the dangers therein. Court II alleged a breach of duty in selling and furnishing a defective product for plaintiff's use. The element of damage was limited to the sum of $11,479.14, which the plaintiff was required by The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act to pay to Mr. Roberson's widow as a result of his death. Defendant's answer affirmatively pleaded Section 537.100 as the effective statute of limitation here applicable.

By stipulation of the parties it was agreed that the facts pleaded would be admitted as true for this submission and that plaintiff was entitled to the amount of the money damages on either theory of liability pleaded, unless the one-year statute of limitation in a wrongful death case, then in effect, was applicable.

The trial court made certain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff did not quarrel with the findings of fact which followed the pleadings and stipulation of facts, but it differed with the court on its conclusion of law that plaintiff had brought this action as the subrogee of the widow and, since it stands in her shoes, it is barred by the statute of limitation. When the court rendered judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiff appealed.

Mr. Roberson, the employee, died July 19, 1962. The petition instituting this cause of action was filed August 8, 1963. Obviously, if the one-year statute applied, then it barred the successful prosecution of this suit. However, if the cause of action was not based on the rights of subrogation but rather was an independent action which plaintiff-employer was entitled to bring and recover for negligence or under the rule of strict liability in tort, directly against the third parties responsible, it would have been governed by the five-year statute of limitation, Section 516.120, and hence would have been filed within time.

Plaintiff-employer contends that it was not limited in its right to recover damages solely as subrogee of the widow under Section 287.150 of The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act, but that it also had a right to bring a separate independent action to recover its direct and separate consequential damages resulting from the breach by defendants of their duty to exercise reasonable care to plaintiff-employer (Count I) and by furnishing a defective product to it (Count II).

In support of this theory, plaintiff-employer argues that the subrogation provision of The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act is not exclusive or in lieu of its right to bring this independent action. It maintains that no provision of the law prohibits the bringing of such an action and since the one-year period had expired without the filing of an action by the widow, minor children or others mentioned in Section 537.080, there was no question of possible duplicate recovery and it was therefore free to pursue its own legal right to satisfy its loss.

Defendants, on the other hand, contend that in Missouri the employer's sole and exclusive right to indemnification against a third party on account of the death of an employee is limited to subrogation of the rights of the widow, minor children or others entitled to damages under Section 537.080, and hence was bound by the one-year statute of limitation applicable to such actions at the time Mr. Roberson died.

We are bound by the basic premise that there is no common law...

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3 cases
  • Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Rental Storage & Transit Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 4, 1975
    ...be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued. In support of this argument, Industry cites Hacon, Inc. v. Chandeysson Electric Co., 466 S.W.2d 157 (Mo.App.1971), in which the court held that a third-party-responsible action brought by an employer under § 287.150 was barred ......
  • Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Royse, 1:99CV81.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • September 27, 2000
    ...is limited to what compensation has been paid or is payable under the workers' compensation law. See Hacon, Inc. v. Chandeysson Elec. Co., 466 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo.Ct.App. 1971). The employee and employer in effect have a contractual arrangement. See State ex. rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. ......
  • Denny's Inc. v. Avesta Enterprises, Ltd.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 1994
    ...no right to recover against the third party, then the employer has no right of subrogation or "indemnity." Hacon, Inc. v. Chandeysson Electric Co., 466 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo.App.1971). Furthermore, the statute of limitations that applies to the employee's cause of action also applies to the e......

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