Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Royse, 1:99CV81.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99CV81.,1:99CV81. |
| Citation | 125 F.Supp.2d 375 |
| Parties | RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC., f/k/a Ryder Dedicated, Plaintiffs, v. Chester G. ROYSE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Richard G. Steele, Partner, Bradshaw and Steele, Cape Girardeau, MO, David E. Larson, Larson and Larson, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. fka Ryder Dedicated Logistics, Inc., plaintiff.
Joe T. Buerkle, Partner, Buerkle and Beeson, Jackson, MO, for Chester G. Royse, defendant.
In this action Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. is seeking to enforce a statutory Workers' Compensation lien pursuant to MO.REV.STAT. § 287.150(3) (1994). Chester Royse, who received Workers' Compensation benefits from Plaintiff, recovered from a third-party after settling a product liability action against that party for work-related injuries. This case has been assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act and is being heard by the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Currently pending is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Document No. 19). Defendant has filed a Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 20). In reply to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff filed Suggestions in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 21). Defendant in turn has filed a Memorandum in Clarification of points raised by Plaintiff in its Reply Brief. (Doc. No. 23).
Summary judgment under Rule 56, Fed. R.Civ.P., may seem a somewhat unusual vehicle for construction of a statute, since usually a motion for summary judgment is fact intensive. The parties could very well have sought declaratory relief under Rule 57. However, Rule 56(a) provides in part, "A party seeking to recover upon a claim ... or to obtain a declaratory judgment may ... move ... for a summary judgment in the party's favor upon all or any part thereof." (emphasis supplied). Summary judgment is the method chosen by the parties following a meeting pursuant to the court's Order Setting Rule 16 Conference (Document # 9) and Federal Rule 26(f), Fed.R.Civ.P. The parties filed a Joint Report to the Court (Document # 11) suggesting the use of summary judgment to seek the court's interpretation of § 287.150, RSMo. (1993), and its application to the case at bar. The court following this suggestion after a Rule 16 conference and in issuing its Interim Scheduling Plan (Document # 14). Whether the declaratory judgment procedure or that of summary judgment is followed, the effect will be the same.
The court is issuing a partial summary judgment because there remain factual issues in the case. The discrepancy between the differing amounts the parties feel is the proper subrogation interest of Plaintiff is addressed in footnote 1 below. This is a minor factual issue on which Plaintiff anticipates the parties will be able to reach agreement when documentation is supplied. In his Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant states "while there are other issues, the parties have agreed to construe the statute first." (Sugg. in Opp., at 3).
In accordance with Local Rule 4.05, Ryder submitted a statement of uncontroverted material facts in support of its motion of summary judgment. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Defendant, the record reveals the following facts. Plaintiff is the successor corporation to Ryder Dedicated Logistics, Inc., the employer of Defendant at the time of his accident. Defendant was injured on April 4, 1995, within the scope of his employment with Plaintiff, by a forklift manufactured by Teledyne Priceton, Inc. ("Teledyne"). Workers' compensation benefits totaling $230,260.91 were paid by the Plaintiff and its insurance carrier, Ryder Services Corporation, to Defendant.
Defendant subsequently filed a products liability action against Teledyne in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri for the injuries he sustained in his work-related accident. This third party suit was settled prior to trial and under the settlement agreement entered into between the parties Mr. Royse and his wife received $535,000. After Defendant's settlement, Plaintiff filed the present action asserting its subrogation rights as a statutory lien holder over the workers' compensation benefits it paid to Defendant. Plaintiff contends in this action that its subrogation interest equals $139,061.31. Defendant argues that the value of Plaintiff's lien is only $128,255.99.1 It is agreed by the parties that the settlement document entered into between Defendant and Teledyne did not contain an express assessment of the comparative fault of Defendant nor did it mention what amount of the settlement was attributable to the included claim of Mrs. Royse for loss of consortium. Defendant has submitted in support of his Motion in Opposition to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion an affidavit of Donald Thomasson, his attorney in the third party action.2 Mr. Thomasson states in his affidavit that the comparative fault in Defendant was taken into account when negotiating the final amount of settlement with Teledyne and that the final settlement amount included a portion allocated to Mrs. Royse's loss of consortium claim.
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff argues the court should treat Defendant's factual contentions in ¶ 1 and 2 of his Suggestions in Opposition as waived because Defendant failed to specifically controvert Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts. Local rule 7-4.01(E) provides, in relevant part, "[e]very memorandum in opposition shall include a statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists ... [t]he opposing party also shall note for all disputed facts the paragraph number from movant's listing of facts." E.D.Mo.L.R. 7-4.01(E). The rule further states that "[a]ll matters set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party." Id.
The court finds that Defendant has not waived the factual contentions found in his Suggestions in Opposition. Defendant in his Suggestions in Opposition incorporated Plaintiff's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and also stated two additional which he contends are uncontroverted.3 While the semantic differences found in the parties' statements of facts regarding the content and scope of the settlement agreement are minute, Defendant has nevertheless complied with requirements of rule 7-4.01. As such, Defendant has not waived the factual contentions found in his Suggestions in Opposition.
The standards governing a motion for summary judgment are well settled. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant a motion for summary judgment if all of the information before the court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P 56(c). The burden initially is on the moving party. See Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir.1997). After the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party must do more than show that there is some doubt as to the facts. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead, the nonmoving party bears the burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is sufficient evidence in its favor to allow the trier of fact to return a verdict for it. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
An employer has a right of subrogation, under § 287.150(3), against a tortfeasor responsible for its employee's injury, death or occupational disease. See Mo. REV.STAT. § 287.150(3) (1994). When an employee obtains a recovery against a third party for his/her work-related injuries, the employee "becomes a trustee of an express trust for the benefit of the employer to the extent of the employer's proportionate share of the recovery." Consolidated Freightways v. Batton, 673 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Mo.Ct.App.1984) (citation omitted). The end result is that an employer's subrogation interest is limited to what compensation has been paid or is payable under the workers' compensation law. See Hacon, Inc. v. Chandeysson Elec. Co., 466 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Mo.Ct.App. 1971). The employee and employer in effect have a contractual arrangement. See State ex. rel. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Haid, 332 Mo. 616, 59 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1933); B. MICHAEL KORTE, 29 MISSOURI PRACTICE § 8.30 (1997).
Prior to the amendment of § 287.150(3), the comparative fault of the employee was irrelevant in determining the value of an employer's subrogation interest on an employer's recovery from a third party tortfeasor. See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Garffie, 939 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Mo.Ct.App. 1997). Courts construing the pre-amendment version of § 287.150(3) held that comparative fault was not an issue when an employer sought to "re-coup compensation payments from a third party tortfeasor." Akers v. Warson Garden Apartments, 961 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Mo.1998) (citing Rogers v. Home Indemnity Co., 851 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1993)).
The General Assembly amended § 287.150(3) in 1993. It now provides:4
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...with plaintiff's interpretation of the comparative fault language in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 287.150.3. In Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Royse, 125 F.Supp.2d 375 ( E.D.Mo.2000), the court dealt with the issue of whether an employer's lien interest should be reduced if the employee's recovery f......
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...of the married couple, due to the conduct of a tortfeasor.” Id.5 The Commission's decision was based upon Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Royse , 125 F.Supp.2d 375 (E.D. Mo. 2000). Ryder involved a third-party settlement in which an employee and his wife received one lump sum check to s......
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