Hafner v. Delano

• Citation: 520 N.W.2d 587
• Decision Date: 10 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 18434,18434
• Parties: Richard HAFNER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lynn DELANO, Individually and as Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Charities and Corrections; South Dakota Department of Charities and Corrections (Armfield), Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Steve Jacobson, Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Edward Ligtenberg, Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Richard Ziegler, Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Defendants and Appellees, and Dr. James Oakland, Individually and as Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Daniel Blue, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the State of South Dakota State Penitentiary; David Hoversten, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Larry B. Vanderwoude, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Michael Olson, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Defendants.
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

Page 587

520 N.W.2d 587

Richard HAFNER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lynn DELANO, Individually and as Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Charities and Corrections; South Dakota Department of Charities and Corrections [sic] South Dakota Department of Corrections; Walter Leapley Individually and as Warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Beverly Armstrong, R.N., [sic] (Armfield) Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Steve Jacobson, Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Edward Ligtenberg Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Richard Ziegler, Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Defendants and Appellees and Dr. James Oakland, Individually and as Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Daniel Blue, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the State of South Dakota State Penitentiary; David Hoversten, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Larry B. Vanderwoude, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary; Michael Olson, M.D., Individually and as an Agent of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Defendants.

No. 18434.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued March 21, 1994.

Decided Aug. 10, 1994.

Steve Jorgensen, Sioux Falls, for plaintiff and appellant.

Richard J. Helsper and Eric N. Rasmussen of Erickson, Helsper & Rasmussen Brookings, for defendants and appellees.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

Hafner appeals summary judgment granted to prison officials and personnel he sued, claiming that while he was incarcerated in the South Dakota State Penitentiary they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment rights. We affirm.

FACTS

Richard Hafner was sentenced to the South Dakota Penitentiary in March, 1989, after pleading guilty to the second-degree rape of his fifteen-year-old niece. On or about May 25, 1989, Hafner was attacked by three unnamed inmates. ¹ The inmates forced him to his knees, one held Hafner's hands in the air while another kicked him in the back.

Hafner requested medical attention from the penitentiary's health services a few days later and was seen by Nurse Armfield. Hafner told her he had injured his shoulder while playing volleyball. Nurse Armfield examined the shoulder, wrapped it with an ace bandage and gave him a heating pad.

The doctor who examined Hafner on June 23, 1989, found tenderness in the shoulder area, ordered X-rays and referred Hafner to an orthopedic specialist who found a mass in the shoulder. On July 3, 1989, in a same-day surgical procedure, a surgeon drained a hematoma in the shoulder. Hafner was returned to the penitentiary where he claims no personnel checked on his condition, no pain medication was given to him, no meals were brought to his cell, no ice was provided to him, and he was given no post-operative hygienic instructions. He also claims his surgical dressing was not changed in a timely manner.

In September, 1989, Hafner was transferred to the Springfield Correctional Facility to participate in a vocational training program. He complained that the vocational laboratory work caused pain in his shoulder when he lifted his tool box. He asserts personnel then refused to release him from the program, thereby causing additional injury to his shoulder.

In January, 1990, Hafner requested protective custody and was transferred back to the penitentiary. In April, 1990, an orthopedic specialist diagnosed Hafner's injury as a torn teres major muscle rather than muscle strain.

Hafner was paroled on January 20, 1991. On April 24, 1991, he filed suit against five doctors, the South Dakota Department of Corrections (Department), and various prison officials and personnel (hereinafter Defendants) alleging both medical malpractice and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution through deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Hafner named Defendants in both their personal and official capacities.

Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On February 9, 1993, the trial court deferred ruling on the motions and set June 1, 1993, as the deadline for naming expert medical witnesses. When Hafner had not named an expert witness by the deadline, the trial court again delayed ruling on Defendants' motions. On June 4, 1993, the trial court entered summary judgment for all non-doctor Defendants. On June 23, 1993, when Hafner still had not named an expert medical witness, the court granted summary judgment for the Defendant doctors.

Hafner appealed the June 4, 1993, order but failed to file an appeal from the June 23, 1993, order. On November 12, 1993, and December 10, 1993, this Court issued orders granting motions to dismiss Hafner's appeal as to the doctors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must determine whether the moving party has demonstrated there is no genuine issue of material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221, 223 (S.D.1988); Groseth Int'l, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 164 (S.D.1987); Wilson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 212, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968). A party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Harn v. Continental Lumber Co., 506 N.W.2d 91, 94 (S.D.1993); SDCL 15-6-56(c).

The evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party and reasonable doubts should be resolved against the moving party. Groseth, 410 N.W.2d at 164 (citing Wilson, 83 S.D. at 212, 157 N.W.2d at 21; Trapp v. Madera Pacific, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 558 (S.D.1986)). The nonmoving party, however, must present specific facts showing that a genuine, material issue for trial exists. Affirmance is proper if any basis exists which would support the trial court's ruling. Breen, 433 N.W.2d at 223 (citing Blote v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 422 N.W.2d 834, 837 (S.D.1988); Uken v. Sloat, 296 N.W.2d 540, 542 (S.D.1980)).

DECISION

I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS OFFICIALS OR AGENTS OF THE STATE.

A. South Dakota Department Of Corrections.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to Department. Under clear and binding federal precedent, "a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45, 53 (1989). "Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties." Id. at 66, 109 S.Ct. at 2309, 105 L.Ed.2d at 55. Department was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

B. Defendants Sued In Their Official Capacities.

Hafner sued Lynne Delano as the Secretary of Department, Walter Leapley as the Warden of the South Dakota Penitentiary and Edgar Ligtenberg as an Associate Warden. Again, clear and binding precedent establishes that state officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" within the ambit of § 1983. The United States Supreme Court held:

[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. We see no reason to adopt a different rule in the present context, particularly when such a rule would allow petitioner to circumvent congressional intent by a mere pleading device. We hold that neither the State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983.

Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. at 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d at 58 (citations omitted); Zar v. S.D. Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 976 F.2d 459, 464 (8th Cir.1992) ("to the extent that the individual defendants were sued in their official capacities and that the Board itself was sued, the defendants are not "persons" with the meaning of § 1983).

Insofar as Delano, Leapley, and Ligtenberg were sued in their official capacities, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

C. Defendants Sued As Agents Of The State.

It has been clearly established for over a decade that the theory of respondeat superior is not applicable in § 1983 actions. "[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Brown v. Wallace, 957 F.2d 564 (8th Cir.1992) (the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions); Darrow v. Schumacher, 495 N.W.2d 511, 516 (S.D.1993). Therefore, insofar as Defendants Armfield, Jacobson, Ligtenberg and Ziegler were sued as agents of the state, they were properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law.

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.

A state official may be held personally liable under § 1983 for actions taken in his or her official capacity which violate constitutional rights. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). "Through § 1983, Congress sought, 'to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position.' " Hafer, 502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 363, 116 L.Ed.2d at 311 (citations omitted). However, to prevail on an individual liability § 1983 claim for actions in an official capacity, a plaintiff must show either that the defendant personally participated in the alleged deprivation of...