Hafner v. Hafner

• Decision Date: 15 August 1952
• Docket Number: No. 35659,35659
• Citation: 237 Minn. 424,54 N.W.2d 854
• Parties: HAFNER v. HAFNER.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 854

54 N.W.2d 854

237 Minn. 424

HAFNER v. HAFNER.

No. 35659.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 15, 1952.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A motion is proper procedure to institute proceedings for the vacation of a consent decree.

2. In this case, the trial court properly allowed the amendment of a notice of motion to modify a decree, since the questions set out in the amendment were introduced into the case by the factual allegations of defendant's answer and since it is a general rule in this state that pleadings may be amended liberally.

3. A divorce decree providing for a division of property based on a stipulation of the parties is in the nature of a consent decree as to that part providing for the division of the property, and such part of the decree may be modified on proof of fraud or mistake.

4. Whether the giving of consent to a stipulation for the division of property in a divorce proceeding was due to a mistake of fact is a question of fact for the trial court; and, in the instant case, there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain such a finding by the trial court.

5. In discussions leading to a stipulation in a divorce proceeding, even though there is bitterness between the husband and wife, there nevertheless may be a confidential relationship between them, and by the facts in this case the trail court is sustained in its alternate finding that the husband's failure to disclose certain facts was such fraud as to be ground for modifying that part of the divorce decree which was based on the stipulation.

Joseph P. Johnson, St. Paul, for appellant.

Robins Davis & Lyons, St. Paul, for respondent.

LORING, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the lower court modifying a prior divorce decree. The original decree, filed January 6, 1947, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, provided that the husband (defendant) must convey to the wife--

'that certain duplex located at 639--641 North Dale Street, in the City of Saint Paul, described as follows, to-wit:

'The north fifty (N50) feet of Lots Twenty-nine (29) and Thirty (30), * * *.'

and that the wife must convey to the husband all her interest in--

'that certain filling station property at 631 North Dale Street, in the City of Saint Paul, described as follows, to-wit:

'Lots Twenty-nine (29) and Thirty (30) (except the north fifty (N50) feet thereof) * * *.'

Also, pursuant to stipulation, the decree provided that the wife should pay to the husband $4,000 in cash and that she should get the household furniture, et cetera. The parties have a son, whose custody was given to the wife.

During the spring of 1947, following the divorce decree, surveyors came onto the property above described and made a survey. They put stakes on a part of the property which the wife considered hers according to the decree. The surveyors refused to tell the wife why they were there and who had sent them. She called her attorney, but, because she was unable to tell him who the men were, he gave her no advice. (It later developed that they were sent by the husband.) During the same summer, the wife overheard the filling station operator talking about using some of the land now in dispute. She talked to her son about it, and they concluded that the operator was not serious about it. Nevertheless, she told the operator that if he caused her any trouble she would sue him. Later that summer, the wife saw the husband picking flowers on the land she considered hers, and she said that when she threatened to call the police he left. The wife thereafter conferred with her attorney, who wrote the husband a letter. She was not annoyed again until May 1950.

At that time, the wife discovered that part of a fence on the property had been removed and that the filling station operator was enlarging his driveway and encroaching on that part of the tract which she considered her property. She then had the property purveyed and afterward moved the court to amend the divorce decree so that it should read the north 60 feet instead of the north 50 feet of lots 29 and 30. The motion was based on the ground of mistake in fact. Her accompanying affidavit states:

'* * * At the time we made the settlement, it was clearly understood by all the parties, that Mr. Hafner was to receive only the filling station property, and the description as given to me of the duplex property was based upon the assurance that the legal description conformed to the use and occupancy of those premises by the defendant, myself and our son.'

In her affidavit, the wife requested that if the decree not be modified the whole case be reopened.

She said that she understood that the description of the property she was getting would take it up to the fence, but the survey showed that the 50-foot line is more than ten feet short of the fence. The two lots, 29 and 30, are on the northwest corner of Lafond avenue and Dale street. They were originally laid out on Lafond avenue, but the buildings were placed so as to face Dale street. For this reason, the back yard of the duplex is only approximately ten feet wide. The distance from the duplex to the 50-foot line is only about 17 feet. There is a fence west of the duplex which extends south, then turns in a generally easterly direction out to the street, separating the filling station from the rest of the property. As stated above, the fence did not run along the 50-foot line where the fence separates the filling station from the duplex. Rather, it runs along a line somewhere between 60 and 65 feet south of the north border of the property. Within the general area north of the fence, trees were planted and a clothes pole was placed.

Before the parties were married, the husband and his father were joint owners of both lots. After the marriage, conveyances were made whereby the north 50 feet was owned jointly by the husband and the wife, and the rest was owned jointly by the husband and his father. A duplex was erected within the north 50 feet, and a filling station was erected on the corner. The wife had seen the conveyance to her, in which the duplex property was described as the north 50 feet. She had seen a tax statement with the same description. However, the wife testified that she thought the 50-foot description included the property up to the fence, and all of the yard up to the fence was used by the occupants of the duplex. The husband agreed that the yard was used by the occupants of the duplex and admitted that any one looking at the property would reasonably assume that it extended to the fence.

At the time of the divorce proceedings the wife and the husband were not speaking. The wife admits that she mistrusted the husband, but she says that she would not have entered into the stipulation if she had known that the legal description did not cover the property up to the fence. The parties and their attorneys held a conference prior to the execution of the stipulation, but the husband at no time told any one that the 50-foot line did not go up to the fence. The husband now says that he knew all the time that the 50-foot line did not go up to the fence.

When the wife filed her motion to amend the decree, the husband, by his attorney, made a 'special appearance' to object to the jurisdiction of the court to hear the matter on any grounds at all. Before any testimony was taken, the wife moved to amend her notice, stating--

'We will also proceed on the further ground that there was mutual mistake of fact and overreaching by defendant, and that in addition thereto, if defendant claims there was no mistake on his part, that he practiced a fraud upon plaintiff in entering into the terms of the stipulation.'

The trial court allowed the amendment over objections by the husband. The court held that it had jurisdiction to modify the decree and found that the former decree failed to express the intent of the parties and the court, which intent was that the wife be given the north 60 feet, that is, the property then being used for the duplex. In the judgment appealed from, the court amended the decree so as to give the wife the north 60 feet and awarded her attorneys' fees.

1. While the various jurisdictions are in conflict on the question, in Minnesota a Motion is proper procedure to institute proceedings to amend a former decree in cases such as the instant one. ¹

2. The question of fraud and overreaching was introduced into the case by the factual allegations of the husband's answer to the motion; therefore, he was not prejudiced by any lack of notice. Because of this and, since it is a general rule in this state that pleadings may be amended liberally, it was not error to allow the amendment of the notice of motion to include fraud and overreaching.

3. This court, seemingly, has never decided the question whether a divorce decree which divides property pursuant to a stipulation is a consent decree as to the property division. Where the decree is different from the stipulation as to property, it may be the decree which is controlling. ² Similarly, if jurisdiction has been retained, the decree may be modified as to the property division in spite of the stipulation. ³ Nevertheless, this court has recognized that a divorce decree pursuant to a stipulation as to property rights is more than just a decree. Hagen v. Hagen, 212 Minn. 488, 4 N.W.2d 100. ⁴

In Warren, v. Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 133 N.W. 1009 (cited in footnote 3, supra), we took cognizance that a judgment for alimony, as a matter of fact, may be based on a stipulation. It is only realistic to recognize that such decrees are in the nature of consent judgments as to that part entered pursuant to stipulation. ⁵

It is within the inherent power of the court to set aside consent decrees, like judgments by confession, for fraud, mistake, or absence of real consent. Elsen v. State Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Minn. 315 17 N.W.2d 652. ⁶ While a consent decree acquires the status of a...