Hageman v. Vanderdoes

Decision Date19 February 1914
Docket NumberCivil 1349
Citation15 Ariz. 312,138 P. 1053
PartiesLAURABEL HAGEMAN, Plaintiff in Error, v. HELEN VANDERDOES, Defendant in Error
CourtArizona Supreme Court

WRIT OF ERROR from the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. J. C. Phillips, Judge. Affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS BY THE COURT.

The defendant in error commenced this action against the plaintiff in error to recover damages alleged to have resulted from a malicious assault made upon plaintiff by the defendant Laurabel Hageman on the twelfth day of June, 1912. The plaintiff demands exemplary damages in the sum of $10,000 and special damages in the sum of $5,000. The right to recover general damages is based upon the malicious assault and battery, and mental anguish, suffering, shame and dishonor, and the right to recover special damages is based upon the loss of employment arising from the notoriousness of such assault.

Upon the motion of the defendant, it appearing that defendant is a married woman, the wife of George Hageman, the court ordered that George Hageman be brought in as co-defendant; and in pursuance to such order plaintiff filed a second amended complaint alleging: "That the defendants are husband and wife and the defendant George Hageman has been made a party to the action for that reason, by an order of court entered in said cause. . . ."

The defendants made separate answers. The defendant Laurabel Hageman denied that she, without provocation or in an unlawful, violent, gross or outrageous manner, or with malice, made the assault on plaintiff in the presence of other persons, or at all, and denied that any act on her part or any language used by her caused plaintiff great mental anguish, suffering, shame, or dishonor, to plaintiff's damage in any sum, or at all, denied that plaintiff's loss of employment resulted from any act of defendant, and denied that plaintiff has suffered any damages in that respect, and denied that defendant is a woman of great wealth, or of any wealth at all.

As an affirmative defense, this defendant alleges that her husband the defendant George Hageman, was the controlling stockholder of the George Hageman Company, a corporation, and as such was and is in the sole control and management of the corporation's business affairs; that her husband employed the plaintiff as a clerk in the business office of the corporation for about three years and until June 12, 1912 that defendant's husband and plaintiff became infatuated and unduly familiar with each other, which relation between said parties caused friction between the defendants, husband and wife, and caused this defendant's husband to neglect and ill treat this defendant; that this defendant by telephone informed plaintiff of this defendant's unhappiness caused by the infatuation and familiarity existing between plaintiff and defendant's said husband and requested plaintiff to leave the employ of her (defendant's) said husband, but that plaintiff refused so to do; and that defendant on the twelfth day of June, 1912 went to the office, where plaintiff was employed, for the purpose of personally informing the plaintiff of defendant's said unhappiness caused by defendant's husband's neglect and ill treatment by reason of plaintiff remaining in the employ of, and associating with, defendant's husband, and to persuade plaintiff to leave her said employment and sever her association with said husband. Arriving at said office on said date defendant did then and there in a quiet and kind manner inform the plaintiff of her unhappiness occasioned by plaintiff remaining in the employ of defendant's husband and plaintiff's association with such husband, but plaintiff refused to leave such employment, and refused to sever her associations with defendant's husband "Whereupon defendant requested plaintiff to leave the office and at the same time gently took hold of plaintiff's arm to lead her from the said office, . . . and that thereupon plaintiff violently and angrily struck and hit defendant, . . . and defendant, in order to prevent injury to her from the assault thus made upon her by plaintiff, put her hands on plaintiff and pushed her away from defendant, with no unnecessary force or violence, which is the same act complained of by plaintiff in her said complaint." Defendant further alleges that on the date of the said transaction a divorce action was pending between these defendants, brought by the husband defendant, which upon trial thereafter was dismissed.

Then, as an additional grounds of defense, plaintiff in error sets forth a conspiracy entered into between plaintiff and the husband defendant against the wife, whereby said plaintiff and husband defendant "conspired and combined together to compel this defendant (plaintiff in error) to consent and accede to a divorce being obtained against her by her said husband by instituting and prosecuting vexatious, harassing and expensive litigation against her, in order that her said husband could marry the plaintiff herein; and that in pursuance of said conspiracy and combination the plaintiff brought this action against this defendant, and that about the same time the defendant's said husband . . ." caused other actions to be brought against this defendant. That "this action of plaintiff against this defendant is being prosecuted by the plaintiff against her with the assistance, advice and connivance of her said husband in pursuance of said conspiracy, and that this action of plaintiff is not being prosecuted in good faith, and is sham. And in further pursuance of said conspiracy and combination, as aforesaid, defendant's husband has caused other suits and litigation to be commenced against this defendant." A denial of all allegations of the complaint other than admitted is added.

In his separate answer, George Hageman avers that on the twelfth day of June, 1912, and for a long time prior thereto, these defendants were living separate and apart and were not maintaining marital relations; that, at the time when the alleged difficulty occurred between plaintiff and his codefendant he was not present; neither did he aid, encourage or participate therein, nor have knowledge thereof. He denied damages, denied the authority of his wife to discharge plaintiff from the employ, and denied that she was forced to leave the employ, and denied that she suffered damage thereby. The defendants were represented by separate counsel, and, when plaintiff rested her case, George Hageman's counsel moved for a nonsuit as far as he was concerned, for the reason the evidence wholly fails to connect him with any liability for the acts complained of. Both the plaintiff and defendant Laurabel Hageman objected to the granting of the motion. The court said in ruling, "I will grant the motion." The plaintiff in error moved that the action against her be dismissed for the reason the court had ruled that her husband be dismissed from the action. Her motion was denied, and an exception reserved. When the evidence was closed, at the request of the attorney for the defendant George Hageman, the court charged the jury to find at all events for the defendant George Hageman, and the verdict of the jury so finds as instructed, viz.: " . . . And under the instructions of the court, we find for the defendant George Hageman."

Judgment was rendered in accordance with the verdict, which judgment and order refusing a new trial the plaintiff in error removes to this court for review, alleging error committed in denying a motion to strike testimony of the value of property, it appearing from the admissions and statements of the witness that such witness was incompetent to testify as to such valuation; that the court erred in dismissing the action as to defendant George Hageman, the husband of plaintiff in error, against the objection of the plaintiff in error, and in refusing to dismiss such action as to this plaintiff in error; that the court erred in directing a verdict for defendant George Hageman, the husband of the plaintiff in error, and at the same time submitting the issues as between plaintiff in error and the defendant in error; and that the court erred in permitting the verdict to stand for the reason the same was grossly excessive in amount, and induced by prejudice and passion on the part of the jury.

Messrs. Alexander & Christy and Messrs. Sloan, Seabury & Westervelt, for Plaintiff in Error.

Mr. Barnett E. Marks, for Defendant in Error.

OPINION

CUNNINGHAM, J.

The plaintiff testified that the defendant Laurabel Hageman owned a large amount of property, giving a general description of the real estate, thus: "She owns the ground where her home is on, ten acres near the Indian school; she owns some land in the Lincoln addition; she owns nearly the whole block where Mr. Hageman has his shop; she owns a house on First avenue and Van Buren; a $2,000 automobile is something too." "Q. Have you any knowledge of the value of this property you have described? A. Yes, sir. Q. What is it? A. Between $200,000 and $300,000." Upon cross-examination the witness was asked "What did you say about $200,000 or $300,000"? after she had been asked if she had not testified that the block was worth that sum, and had denied that she had so testified, to which question she answered: "That I thought she was worth that much approximately. Q. You don't know it, do you? A. No, I don't know the fact certainly." She admitted that she did not know what mortgages were on the property, that she was not in the real estate business, nor was she acquainted with the real estate values in the city. Counsel thereupon moved: "Then I move to strike out all the testimony given with reference to the $300,000 she testified to this defendant being worth." The court stated in ruling on the motion: ...

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  • McDONALD v. SENN
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • March 11, 1949
    ...v. Robson, 1872, 65 Ill. 129, 16 Am.Rep. 578; Boutell v. Shellaberger, 264 Mo. 70, 174 S.W. 384, L.R.A.1915D, 847; Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 138 P. 1053, L.R.A.1915A, 491, Ann.Cas.1915D, 1197; Schuler v. Henry, 42 Colo. 367, 94 P. 360, 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 1009; Norris v. Corkill, 32 ......
  • State v. McCann
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • April 17, 2001
    ...of the time, the rule can be changed by the court when such conditions and circumstances change); see also Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 320-21, 138 P. 1053, 1056 (1914) ¶ 15 We therefore overrule State v. Reagan, 103 Ariz. 287, 440 P.2d 907 (1968) and State v. Renaud, 108 Ariz. 417,......
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    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • December 3, 1970
    ...in Whitson v. State, 65 Ariz. 395, 181 P.2d 822 (1947). Also see Eshom v. Eshom, 18 Ariz. 170, 157 p. 974 (1916) and Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 138 P. 1053 (1914). A.R.S. § 1--201 provides: 'The common law only so far as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physica......
  • State v. McCann
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • July 18, 2000
    ...of the time, the rule can be changed by the court when such conditions and circumstances change); see also Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 320-21, 138 P. 1053, 1056 (1914) ¶ 15 We thus conclude that when the State seeks to use a prior conviction as a sentence enhancer or as an element ......
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