Hahn v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 29 June 1935
• Parties: HAHN v. HOME LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

84 S.W.2d 361

169 Tenn. 232

HAHN v. HOME LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

June 29, 1935

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; James B. Newman, Judge.

Suit by Edda H. Hahn against the Home Life Insurance Company of New York. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

A. J Griffith and Norman Farrell, both of Nashville, for appellant.

Walter Stokes, of Nashville, for appellee.

DE HAVEN, Justice.

On August 31, 1926, the defendant issued its policy of insurance on the life of William H. Haley for $1,000, and named complainant beneficiary. Attached to the policy was a double indemnity rider providing for the payment of an additional $1,000 "upon receipt *** of due proof of the death of the insured and that such death occurred while the said policy and this contract were in full force and effect and resulted solely from bodily injuries caused by external means of an accidental or violent nature, and that death occurred within ninety days after such injury and as a direct result thereof exclusive of all other causes;

"Provided however, and this contract is made upon the express condition, that the Company shall incur no liability hereunder if the death of the insured 2shall result from poison or from self destruction, whether sane or insane, or from aeronautics, or from riot, or insurrection, or any act incident thereto, or from any violation of law by the insured."

The insured died on June 1, 1933, from ptomaine poisoning. Due proof of his death was made. Defendant paid the face of the policy ($1,000), but refused to pay the additional sum of $1,000, as for accidental death, and assigned as its reason for such refusal that the death of the insured resulted from poison. Upon this denial of responsibility by the company the beneficiary filed her bill herein. The grounds upon which the defense rested were (1) that the death of the insured did not result solely from bodily injury caused by external means of an accidental or violent nature, and (2) that as the insured died from ptomaine poisoning, exclusive of all other causes, recovery cannot be had for double indemnity because it is provided in the contract that the company shall incur no liability if the death of the insured shall result from poison.

The parties stipulated in the court below that the insured "died solely of ptomaine poisoning as a result of ignorantly eating sausage a day or so before his death, which food he supposed to be good, but which was in fact bad or tainted."

The chancellor found in favor of complainant and rendered a judgment against defendant for $1,000, plus interest. The cause is now before this court on the appeal of the defendant.

The two questions presented by the assignments of error are (1) whether the death of the insured was caused by external means of an accidental or violent nature, and (2) whether the death of the insured was the result of "poison," within the meaning of the contract.

As shown by a stipulation filed in the cause, "ptomaine poisoning or 'meat poisoning' is the result of the ingestion of proteid food, which has been contaminated either by specific germs or by their poisons prior to its introduction into the body."

In McFarland v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 160 Tenn. 546, 26 S.W.2d 159, it was held that infection of the eyes from gonococci germs, which were not consciously or voluntarily communicated to insured's eyes and which were not present as a result of his previous infection with gonorrhea, is an accidental injury within the meaning of an accident policy which insures "against disability resulting directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily injury sustained through external violent, and accidental means." This case had been previously before the court (157 Tenn. 254, 8 S.W.2d 369, 370, 64 A. L. R. 962) when the court said: "The authorities appear to sustain a recovery under the standard clause under consideration in cases of infection similar to this, where the means--that is the infection--was accidental, as distinguished from being merely the unexpected result of voluntary or intentional acts of the insured."

In Sullivan v. Modern Brotherhood, 167 Mich. 524, 133 N.W. 486, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 140, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1116, it was held that the infection of an eye with gonococci to its destruction by splashing water from a tub while washing clothes therein is within the operation of a policy providing indemnity in case of the loss of sight by accident.

Ptomaine poisoning due to partaking of tainted food through mistake is within the terms of a policy insuring against death by external, violent, and accidental means. Newsoms v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 147 Va. 471, 137 S.E. 456, 52 A. L. R. 363; Johnson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 184 Mich. 406, 151 N.W. 593, L. R. A. 1916A, 475; Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 187 Ark. 974, 63 S.W.2d 535; United States Casualty Co. v. Griffis, 186 Ind. 126, 114 N.E. 83, L. R. A. 1917F, 481. It is stated in 5 Couch on Insurance, pp. 4003, 4004:

"There are also numerous cases of death or disability incident to the partaking of food or drink, and resulting either from poisoning or from disease. In the case of death or disability resulting from the mechanical action of food or drink, the cases are largely agreed that it was by accident or the result of accidental means. And the authorities agree that death directly from poisoning following the unintentional eating of bad, but apparently wholesome food, is effected by accident, or is the result of accidental means, unless causes of such a character are expressly excepted."

See, also, Vance on Insurance (2d Ed.) pp. 874-880; Sutter v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 215 I11. App. 341.

It must be concluded that the death of the insured was caused by external means of an accidental or violent nature.

Passing to a consideration of the question of whether the death of the insured was the result of "poison," within the meaning of the contract, the language used in the contract of...