Haight v. Jordan
| Decision Date | 09 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 17-6095 |
| Parties | Randy Haight, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Scott Jordan, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Argued: June 24, 2021
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville. No. 3:02-cv-00206-Gregory N. Stivers, District Judge.
ARGUED:
John M. Bailey, Brentwood, Tennessee, Bruce P. Hackett, Floyds Knobs, Indiana, for Appellant.
Matthew R. Krygiel, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
John M. Bailey, Brentwood, Tennessee, Bruce P. Hackett, Floyds Knobs, Indiana, for Appellant.
Matthew R. Krygiel, OFFICE OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellee.
Before: GIBBONS, ROGERS, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Randy Haight, who was sentenced to death, appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, raising twenty-three grounds on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
In 1994, Haight was convicted of the 1985 robberies and murders of Patricia Vance and David Omer, who were found shot to death in the back of Omer's station wagon in rural Garrard County, Kentucky. Haight, who had escaped from the Johnson County Jail several days before the murders, was captured in a nearby cornfield after a brief chase. During the chase, police officers discovered the victims' possessions and both handguns used to commit the murders in a stolen pickup truck abandoned by Haight.
Haight initially pled guilty to the murders in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation of a life sentence without parole for twenty-five years on each count of murder and twenty years on each count of robbery, to be served concurrently. The trial court accepted Haight's guilty plea but rejected the prosecutor's recommendation and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court vacated the conviction on the ground that the trial court should not have accepted a guilty plea premised on the parties' "understanding" that the court would sentence Haight in accordance with the agreement when in fact the court retained discretion in sentencing. Haight v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Ky. 1988) ("Haight I"). Haight then sought specific enforcement of the terms of the plea agreement, to no avail. Haight v. Williamson, 833 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. 1992) ("Haight II"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 925 (1993). Haight was then allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial, which began in late January 1994.
Haight admitted to the murders from the witness stand during the guilt phase of trial. His defense was that he was suffering from "extreme emotional disturbance" at the time of the crimes. The same theory was presented at the mitigation phase to convince the jury to impose a sentence less than death. Haight maintained that at the time of his escape from jail several days before the murders, he was extremely emotionally and mentally disturbed due to his obsession with fellow inmate and escapee Mabel Music, a woman with whom he had a sexual relationship while in jail. After his escape with Mabel and another inmate, Haight embarked on a drinking binge, and Mabel abandoned him. Haight argued to the jury that due to his drinking and Mabel's departure, he was at the time of the shootings completely irrational, severely intoxicated, and extremely disturbed, all of which caused him to act impulsively. The jury rejected Haight's defense and found him guilty of both counts of intentional murder, both counts of first-degree robbery, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
The penalty phase began on February 1, 1994, immediately after the guilt phase was completed. Haight was sentenced to death for each murder, concurrent twenty-year terms of imprisonment for each robbery, and a concurrent five-year term for the firearm conviction. Haight's convictions and penalties were affirmed on direct review, Haight v. Commonwealth, 938 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1996) ("Haight III"), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837 (1997), and Haight was subsequently denied postconviction relief without discovery or an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel. Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001) ("Haight IV"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 998 (2001).
On April 12, 2002, Haight filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus and requested that the district court stay the habeas proceeding while he exhausted certain state claims not related to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel mitigation claim at issue. The district court stayed the federal action in November 2002. In state court, after briefing, the Kentucky Court of Appeals found it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of Haight's unexhausted issues. Without specifying the basis for dismissal of each claim, the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to consider the unexhausted issues on one of two grounds: (1) that it had previously denied the issue in Haight IV, or (2) that Haight had failed to raise it in his initial state collateral proceeding. Haight v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000344-MR, 2007 WL 2404494 (Ky. Aug. 23, 2007) ("Haight V"). Haight returned to federal court and successfully moved to have the two now-exhausted issues included in his amended § 2254 petition. His habeas petition raised forty-five grounds for relief.
When Haight returned to federal court in 2008, his petition was referred to a new magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation. Haight filed a detailed motion and application for the appointment of experts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). The magistrate judge denied the motion, and the district court upheld the denial. Haight moved for discovery and an evidentiary hearing, both of which were also denied by the magistrate judge. Haight's objections were overruled by the district court. Haight v. White, No. 3:02-CV-206-GNS, 2013 WL 5146200 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 12, 2013). Two years later, the magistrate judge recommended the habeas petition be denied. Haight v. Parker, No. 3:02-CV-206-GNS, 2015 WL 13548182 (W.D. Ky. July 17, 2015). Over Haight's objections, the district court adopted the Report and Recommendation, denied the petition for relief, and certified twenty-five issues for appeal. Haight v. White, No. 3:02-CV-206-GNS, 2017 WL 3584218 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 2017). Haight appealed to our court and moved to certify ten additional issues for review. We granted the request as to one additional issue concerning the jury instruction on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.[1] Haight v. Hart, No. 17-6095 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2019).
We review the district court's dismissal of a § 2254(d) petition de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Lovins v. Parker, 712 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir. 2013). Under § 2254(d), the district court "shall not [ ] grant[ ] [a habeas petition] with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . .; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings." "Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the [petitioner's] case." Id. at 413. "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, [the petitioner] must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Section 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), is a "purposefully demanding standard," Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 676 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc), and it requires that state court determinations "be given the benefit of the doubt," Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
When the state court denies a petitioner's federal claim, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This "presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely." Id. at 99-100. If the state court does not adjudicate a petitioner's claim on the merits, we review the claim de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).
Haight raises many claims relating to his trial counsel's ineffective assistance. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Haight must show that his counsel provided deficient performance and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense so as to render the trial unfair and the result unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Focusing on the performance prong, the Supreme Court e...
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