Haight v. Com.
| Decision Date | 08 September 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-SC-971-MR,86-SC-971-MR |
| Parties | Randy Winton HAIGHT, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Upon his plea of guilty to two counts of murder and two counts of robbery, the trial court sentenced appellant to death. Claiming numerous errors and violation of his constitutional rights, appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right.
On September 3, 1985, appellant was indicted for the robberies and murders of Pat Vance and David Omer. After arraignment and entry of a plea of not guilty, the Commonwealth gave notice of its intention to seek the death penalty.
During the following weeks and while pretrial discovery and investigation was ongoing, counsel for the Commonwealth and counsel for appellant commenced negotiations toward a plea agreement. As a result of these negotiations, in January, 1986, the Commonwealth made an offer to appellant whereby, in return for his guilty plea to two counts of murder and two counts of robbery in the first degree, it would recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a period of twenty-five years. After consultation with appellant, defense counsel informed the Commonwealth's Attorney that the offer would be accepted. A short time later, in February, 1986, counsel for the parties met with the trial court and informed him of the terms of the agreement and of the considerations which influenced the agreement. At this meeting, the court expressed no disagreement, but made no commitment as to the imposition of sentence.
Between February and April, 1986, several discussions, some of which were ex parte, took place between counsel and the court. These discussions and the comments made by the trial court can, at best, be described as confusing and ambiguous. On some occasions the court strongly indicated that he would follow the Commonwealth's recommendation and on other occasions reiterated that he would not be bound by any agreement. On some occasions he indicated that he would permit withdrawal of the guilty plea in the event the recommendation was not followed and on other occasions tended to say otherwise. Throughout these discussions, counsel for appellant steadfastly maintained that in the absence of a commitment from the court to follow the agreement or permit withdrawal, there would be no guilty plea.
Toward the end of March, 1986, in separate conversations with the Commonwealth's Attorney and the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney, the trial court strongly indicated an inclination to sentence in accordance with the agreement. He told the Commonwealth's Attorney, "You know I almost always take your recommendation." This statement was understood by the Commonwealth's Attorney, who informed appellant's counsel of such, that sentence would be imposed in accordance with the plea agreement.
On April 8, 1986, two days before the scheduled guilty plea hearing, counsel for appellant took a partially executed pretrial plea agreement to the judge. He was asked if it was still his policy to follow the recommendation of the Commonwealth's Attorney unless something unusual appeared in the pre-sentence investigation report. This question was answered affirmatively and the court further said, Appellant's counsel took this to be an informal commitment to sentence in accordance with the agreement or permit withdrawal of the plea.
Prior to the guilty plea hearing, counsel explained to appellant what would likely transpire. Appellant was assured that an agreement had been reached whereby he would be sentenced in accordance with the recommendation of the Commonwealth, but a meaningless ritual was required in which he would have to say that no promise had been made to him in return for his guilty plea. Based on the foregoing, appellant signed an instrument denominated "Waiver of Further Proceedings and Petition to Enter Guilty Plea."
The waiver/petition instrument is a standard form which is designed to make a written record of the identity of the defendant, that he has been informed of his constitutional rights, his representation by counsel, his understanding of the proceedings, and the voluntariness of the guilty plea. The form contains clear, unequivocal language and is not designed for amendment or modification. Despite this, the form which appellant signed contained numerous handwritten additions (appearing hereinafter in brackets) which in many respects defeat the very purpose the form is designed to accomplish. For instance paragraph 10 says:
I understand that if I plead guilty I waive/give up [some of] my constitutional rights and will permit the court without jury to impose sentence within the same punishment range a jury could impose sentence. [However, this plea is being entered as a result of plea negotiations, and it is my understanding that it is the general policy of the court to accept the recommendation of the Commonwealth.]
And paragraph 12 says:
I understand that if I elect to plead guilty I will be giving up my appeal rights [as to guilt or innocence] and the court's imposition of sentence will conclude the matter [of guilt or innocence].
Finally, the additions to paragraph 13 virtually contradict the printed portion as follows:
I understand that the Commonwealth attorney and my attorney have indicated that a recommendation would be made to the court on my behalf. I realize that this will only be a recommendation and that the court is not bound or required to accept it[*], said recommendation being [ (see pretrial agreement) * But it is my understanding that it is the announced general policy of this court to accept the recommendation of the Commonwealth; otherwise I would not be pleading guilty.]
In the context of the foregoing negotiations, statements by the court and counsel, and documents, on April 10, 1986, the court undertook to hold a hearing to determine whether a guilty plea would be entered. At the outset, the Court noted that the waiver/petition instrument and the pre-trial agreement had been reviewed, inquired of appellant as to his identity and certain factual matters, and then asked the Commonwealth if it had a recommendation. In response the Commonwealth's Attorney said:
[T]he Commonwealth has recommended that the sentence be imposed of life without parole for 25 years on each of the two counts of murder, Counts 1 and 2. And for 20 years each on Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment (the robbery charges) and all counts to run concurrently.
A discussion then ensued concerning paragraph 13 (quoted, infra ) of the waiver/petition instrument. Repeatedly, counsel insisted that in pleading guilty, appellant was relying on the court's announced general policy to follow the recommendation of the Commonwealth. The court acknowledged that he generally followed such recommendation except in unusual circumstances and unusual cases and characterized this case as such. The trial court reiterated that no commitment was being made to follow the recommendation of the Commonwealth. Upon receiving this information, appellant's counsel requested and was granted a recess to confer with their client. When the proceeding resumed, appellant's counsel stated that it was his understanding that in the absence of unforeseen and unusual circumstances, the court would abide by its normal policy of accepting the Commonwealth's recommendation. The discussion continued and finally the court said:
As a general policy because of the number of cases that you have to deal with, I follow the Commonwealth's recommendation because Mr. Veal is a confident prosecutor and his staff and they prepare these cases and they know what they feel the evidence can stand to the extent of going to a jury.
And further:
All I am saying is that that is a possibility, and the policy of the Court is to generally go along at sentencing with the Commonwealth Attorney.... The Commonwealth has recommended and I...
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