Haines City Community Development v. Heggs, 94-00524

• Decision Date: 22 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-00524,94-00524
• Citation: 647 So.2d 855
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1386 HAINES CITY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT d/b/a Parkview Village, Petitioner, v. Leila HEGGS, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 855

647 So.2d 855

19 Fla. L. Weekly D1386

HAINES CITY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT d/b/a Parkview Village, Petitioner, v. Leila HEGGS, Respondent.

No. 94-00524.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Second District.

June 22, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 11, 1994.

Jerri A. Blair of Blair & Cooney, P.A., Tavares, for petitioner.

Nora Leto, Lakeland, for respondent.

LAZZARA, Judge.

The petitioner, the owner of a low-income housing development for domestic farm workers, seeks certiorari review of the circuit court's order reversing a county court's final judgment evicting the respondent for non-payment of rent. We have jurisdiction based on Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(2)(B), which provides that "[t]he certiorari jurisdiction of district courts of appeal may be sought to review ... final orders of circuit courts acting in their review capacity." We deny the petition because the petitioner has not demonstrated that the circuit court's action has resulted in a miscarriage of justice as required by Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla.1983). We also certify a question of great public importance concerning the proper scope of certiorari review by a district court of appeal.

The circuit court acknowledged in its order that the county court's judgment came to it clothed with a presumption of correctness. The court determined from its review of the record, however, that the county court abused its discretion by not finding that the petitioner was equitably estopped from seeking eviction of respondent based on the petitioner's past conduct in collecting unpaid rent. Thus, even though the circuit court found that respondent had a history of repeated non-payment of rent, it reversed the final judgment of eviction.

As noted, our discretionary standard of review is governed by Combs. In Combs, the supreme court promulgated several principles to guide district courts of appeal in determining whether to grant certiorari review of a decision of a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity reviewing a final order of a county court. The court made it clear that we "should not be as concerned with the mere existence of legal error as much as with the seriousness of the error" and that we should only exercise our discretion to grant certiorari "when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." 436 So.2d at 95-96 (emphasis added). The court also noted that we may refuse to grant certiorari even if there is a departure from the essential requirements of the law and cautioned us against allowing certiorari to be used as a second appeal. 436 So.2d at 96.

In this case, even if we were to conclude that the circuit court's order departed from the essential requirements of the law, we cannot say that such a departure was serious enough to result in a miscarriage of justice. The order did nothing more than reverse a county court's eviction judgment based on a peculiar set of facts. It did not deprive the petitioner of its day in court, nor has it foreclosed the petitioner from seeking eviction of the respondent because of future non-payment of rent. See State v. Roess, 451 So.2d 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Thus, we are unable to conclude that this is one of "those few extreme cases where the appellate court's decision is so erroneous that justice requires that it be corrected." Combs, 436 So.2d at 95.

In order to avoid the possibility that our opinion can be construed as being in conflict with the standard of certiorari review outlined in Education Development Center, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Zoning Board of Appeals, 541 So.2d 106 (Fla.1989), we take this opportunity to distinguish that case. There, the supreme court held again that when a district court of appeal reviews a circuit court's order under rule 9.030(b)(2)(B), the district court's standard is to determine "whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law." 541 So.2d at 108 (quoting City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982)). Accord Manatee County v. Kuehnel, 542 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 548 So.2d 663 (Fla.1989). This standard is quite different from the one announced in Combs and could compel a different result in this case were we to find an incorrect application of the law by the circuit court.

We note, however, that both Vaillant and Education Development Center, Inc., as well as Kuehnel, concerned the scope of review by a district court of a circuit court's order relating to a decision of an administrative agency. Indeed, every case that we have found that uses the standard of Education Development Center, Inc. does so in the context of a review of administrative action. Of equal significance is that even after Education Development Center, Inc., the district courts of appeal continue to use the Combs ' standard when reviewing a final order of a circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity over a county court. E.g., State v. Frazee, 617 So.2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Horatio Enter., Inc. v. Rabin, 614 So.2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Krebs v....