Haines v. Jones
| Decision Date | 10 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-cv-00726-BNB |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER HAINES, Applicant, v. WARDEN JONES, Fremont Correctional Facility, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Applicant, Christopher Haines, is a prisoner in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) and is currently incarcerated at the Fremont Correctional Facility. Mr. Haines has filed an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges the validity of his conviction and sentence in Case No. 03CR114 in the Pueblo County District Court. Mr. Haines has paid the $5.00 filing fee.
In an order filed on May 3, 3012, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland directed Respondents to file a pre-answer response addressing the affirmative defenses of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and exhaustion of state court remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). After obtaining an extension of time, Respondents submitted a pre-answer response on June 13, 2012. Mr. Haines filed a reply on July 20, 2012.
The Court must construe liberally the Application filed by Mr. Haines because he is not represented by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). However, the Court should not act as an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the Application as procedurally barred.
On April 8, 2005, Mr. Haines was convicted by a Pueblo County District Court jury of one count of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse. (ECF No. 13-1, at 2-3 of 29). The trial court imposed an indeterminate prison sentence of sixteen years to life with the DOC. (Id. at 3). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in People v. Haines, No. 05CA1589 (Colo. App. Dec. 27, 2007) (unpublished opinion) (ECF No. 13-2). Applicant filed a petition for rehearing that was denied on either April 17, 2008 or May 1, 2008. (ECF No. 13-9, at 1-2 of 2). Mr. Haines did not seek certiorari review in the Colorado Supreme Court.
Mr. Haines filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure (Crim. P.) 35(c) on June 2, 2008. (ECF No. 13-1, at 12 of 29). The motion was denied on November 19, 2008. (Id. at 10). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order in People v. Haines, No. 08CA2537 (Colo. App. May 13, 2010) (unpublished) (ECF No. 13-3). Applicant did not seek certiorari review in the Colorado Supreme Court.
Mr. Haines filed a second post-conviction motion pursuant to Crim. P. Rule 35(c) on September 2, 2010. (ECF No. 13-1, at 9 of 29). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying the motion in People v. Haines, No. 10CA2368 (Colo. App. Aug. 4, 2011) (unpublished) (ECF No. 13-4). The Colorado Supreme Courtdenied Applicant's petition for certiorari review on November 28, 2011. (ECF No. 13-19).
Mr. Haines filed a third motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. Rule 35(c) on December 27, 2011. (ECF No. 13-1, at 8 of 29). The trial court denied the motion on January 12, 2012. (Id.). Applicant did not appeal.
Mr. Haines initiated this action on March 22, 2012. He asserts four claims in the Application: (1) the trial court violated his right to speedy trial under state law and pursuant to the federal speedy trial statute (as applicable to the state courts through the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI) (ECF No. 1, at 7-8 of 17); (2) his sentence is illegal because the jury interrogatory defining the "pattern of abuse" sentencing enhancer used the word "acts" erroneously where the state statute requires a finding of multiple "incidents" of sexual contact (id. at 9-10); (3) the sentencing court misapplied Colorado statutes by sentencing him to a indeterminate term of imprisonment, with a minimum term set in the aggravated statutory "crime of violence" range and the maximum set at life (id. at 9, 11); and, (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict because the evidence did not prove that his wife's brother touched the victim's "intimate parts," as required by COLO. REV. STAT. ("C.R.S.") § 18-3-401(4) (2011).1 (Id. at 12-14).
Respondents concede in the pre-answer response that the Application is timely under the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (ECF No. 13, at 7-12 of 23). Respondents contend, however, that Applicant's second and third claims raise issues of state law that are not reviewable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.(Id. at 6-7). Respondents further argue that Mr. Haines has procedurally defaulted all of his claims. (Id. at 8-9).
A federal habeas court is limited to deciding whether a conviction "violat[ed] the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). "'[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'" See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)) (other internal quotations and citation omitted).
Mr. Haines asserts in his second claim that his sentence is illegal because the jury interrogatory defining the "pattern of abuse" sentencing enhancer used the word "acts" erroneously where the state statute requires a finding of multiple "incidents" of sexual contact. This claim concerns the proper interpretation of a state statute and does not appear to invoke a federal statutory or federal constitutional right. As such, it must be dismissed as raising solely an issue of state law not cognizable in habeas corpus. However, even if the claim can be construed liberally as an asserted due process violation,2 it is procedurally barred for the reasons discussed below.
In claim three, Mr. Haines alleges that the sentencing court misapplied Colorado statutes by sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment, with a minimum term set in the aggravated statutory "crime of violence" range and the maximum set at life. Again, this claim does not invoke a federal right, but instead concerns the properinterpretation of state statutory law. As such, it is not cognizable in this federal habeas proceeding. However, even if the claim was susceptible to liberal interpretation as a federal due process violation,3 it is procedurally barred for the reasons discussed below.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), an application for a writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted state remedies or that no adequate state remedies are available or effective to protect the applicant's rights. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999); Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1994). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied once the federal claim has been presented fairly to the state courts. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989). Fair presentation requires that the federal issue be presented properly "to the highest state court, either by direct review of the conviction or in a postconviction attack." Dever, 36 F.3d at 1534. A claim must be presented as a federal constitutional claim in the state court proceedings in order to be exhausted. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam).
If a habeas petitioner "failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred . . . there is a procedural default. . . . ." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1989)). A claim is precluded from federal habeas review if the claim has been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state proceduralground, unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the federal violation, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Cummings v. Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). "A state procedural ground is independent if it relies on state law, rather than federal law, as the basis for the decision." English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998). For the state ground to be adequate, it must be "'strictly or regularly followed'" and "applied 'evenhandedly to all similar claims.'" Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 797 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982)).
Mr. Haines' pro se status does not exempt him from the requirement of demonstrating either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Lepiscopo v. Tansy, 38 F .3d 1128, 1130 (10th Cir. 1994).
Respondents argue that the speedy trial claim is procedurally barred because Mr. Haines did not present the claim to the Colorado Court of Appeals as a federal statutory issue. Respondents further argue that if Mr. Haines attempted to raise the claim now in another post-conviction proceeding, it would be dismissed as successive.
In his federal Application, Mr. Haines argues that his speedy trial rights were violated "pursuant to the United States Constitution, Federal Laws, Colorado State Constitution and Laws." (ECF No. 1, at 7 of 17). However, in arguing that a violation of his federal Constitutional rights occurred, he references the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, not the Sixth Amendment. (Id. at 8) Mr. Haines asserts specifically that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitutional dictates thatthe state trial court should have applied the federal speedy trial statute, 18 U.S.C. §3161, in his case. (Id.).
On direct appeal, Applicant argued his right to a...
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