Haines v. McLean

• Decision Date: 09 March 1955
• Docket Number: No. A-4689,A-4689
• Citation: 276 S.W.2d 777,154 Tex. 272
• Parties: Lydia Grabow HAINES et al. (J. M. Boothe et al.), Petitioners, v. William J. McLEAN et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 777

276 S.W.2d 777

154 Tex. 272

Lydia Grabow HAINES et al. (J. M. Boothe et al.), Petitioners, v. William J. McLEAN et al., Respondents.

No. A-4689.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 9, 1955.

Rehearing Denied April 13, 1955.

Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Sears and V. S. Donoghue, Houston, for Lydia Grabow Haines and others.

Wayland G. Holt, Snyder, Kilgore & Kilgore and Kiel Boone, Dallas, for J. M. Boothe, Sr., and others.

Prentice Wilson, Dallas, and McMahon, Springer, Smart & Walter and Wagstaff Harwell, Alvis & Pope, Abilene, for William J. McLean and others.

GARWOOD, Justice.

In this three-cornered contest over the mineral right underlying some thirteen acres of separate but adjoining railroad and highway easements in Scurry County, we granted writ of error to all parties. The following quite rough sketch affords a basis for further explanation of the facts:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The rights of way in question are the eastwardly three of the four indicated, being, in order from east to west and with respective widths, (a) a county road of sixty feet, (b) the Santa Fe Railroad of one hundred feet and (c) the old Roscoe, Snyder & Pacific Railroad of one hundred feet. The easement use of (c) has now been abandoned, but this fact does not affect the legal issues in the case.

The rectangle W-X-Y-Z covers about 259 acres, including the 13 easement acres in dispute, and is the northerly portion of survey or Section 179, of 640 acres, out of Block 3, H. & G. N. Ry. Co., its dimensions being approximately 777 varas north and south and 1,900 varas east and west. The balance, or southerly part, of the section, not shown on the sketch, is likewise crossed by the easements. The indicated fourth or western strip (d) is the relatively new U. S. Highway No. 84. The minerals underlying this highway are not sued for, nor is the State nor Scurry County a party to the suit, although, as hereinafter explained, the nature and consequences of their rights concerning (d) are importantly involved.

The defendants (so far as necessary to this opinion) are (1) the McLean heirs, who are the common source of title, having jointly owned Section 179 (subject to the easements) in the year 1915, and (2) persons claiming with the McLeans and under transfers from them occurring subsequent to the origin of the plaintiffs' chain or chains of title from the McLeans. The so-called 'Haines Plaintiffs' (Lydia Grabow Haines, her husband and parties holding under her) and 'Boothe Plaintiffs' (J. M. Boothe, Sr., his wife and parties holding under them) brought the suit together and claim that they together own all the property in suit, although they disagree between themselves as to the extent of their respective ownerships.

In 1915 Section 179 was judicially partitioned among the then three McLean heirs, who, as stated, then owned it, subject to easements (a), (b) and (c) then subsisting. Generally speaking the partition adjudged the northerly, or sketched, portion to William J. McLean, the rest being divided between the other heirs, but the proceedings contained certain exclusionary reference to the easements, which, with corresponding language in subsequent conveyances in the plaintiffs' chain, are a primary ground of defense against both groups of plaintiffs.

In 1924, William J. McLean conveyed to A. F. Grabow (father of plaintiff Lydia Grabow Haines) by deed stating the land conveyed to be that apportioned to the grantor in the McLean partition and following the descriptive language of the latter. Grabow in turn conveyed to one Yoder in 1929 by deed describing the land conveyed as the 127.8 acres lying east of the disputed area (see 'Boothe Plaintiffs' on the sketch) the field notes naming the west line of the 127.8 acres as also the east line of strip (a). The Boothe plaintiffs have admittedly thus acquired whatever interest in the disputed area may have passed by the Grabow-Yoder deed and assert no other claim, although the extent of this interest is much in question.

Grabow retained until his death whatever was left him by his deed to Yoder. Following his death, his ownership was passed, or purportedly passed, in 1932 to plaintiff Lydia Grabow Haines by the hereinafter mentioned deed of the other Grabow heirs as part of a voluntary partition. Later in the same year, Mrs. Haines and her husband made a deed to Scurry County purporting to convey strip (d), now U. S. Highway 84, for the exclusive purpose of a road, the nature of which deed and its effect on the rights of the Haines plaintiffs in the adjoining strips in suit are much in issue.

Thereafter it appears that in 1949 there were executed and recorded quitclaim deeds from each of the two McLean heirs other than William J., to Mrs. Haines, these deeds describing the property conveyed as being bounded on the east by the west line of strip (d) above mentioned. It also appears that in 1950 plaintiff Warren Petroleum Corporation as holder of an oil and gas lease executed by Mr. and Mrs. Haines filed with the Railroad Commission, for oil allowable purposes, a map corresponding to the westerly portion of the area shown in our sketch and indicating the east boundary of the lease to be the west line of strip (d).

From the foregoing it is clear that the position of both sets of plaintiffs is common down to Grabow, whom both assert to have acquired title to all of the disputed area as a result of the McLean partition and the deed to Grabow from William J. McLean. And the Haines plaintiffs admit that the subsequent Grabow-Yoder deed to the east 127.8 acres passed title also, and by operation of law, to the fee of the adjoining east half (30 feet) of easement strip (a). But the Boothe plaintiffs assert that the three easement strips should be treated as one for the purposes of the rule of law in question, and that their predecessor Yoder accordingly acquired the fee of the east half of the combined strips, being all of (a) and the adjoining east 70 feet of strip (b), or alternatively that Yoder acquired all of strip (a) instead of merely the east half of (a).

The defendants take the position that the McLean partition and other title evidence above mentioned does not show title to the disputed area to have passed out of the McLeans or into the Haines or Boothe plaintiffs. In this connection, they also rely for one purpose or another upon the above-mentioned quitclaim deeds to Mrs. Haines and the map filed by plaintiff Warren Petroleum Corporation with the Railroad Commission. They also assert that, in any event, the Haines deed to Scurry County, being a conveyance of strip (d) as a fee rather than a mere highway easement, transferred also, and by operation of law, the Haines fee interest, if any, in the adjoining easement strips, thus creating an outstanding title to the area in suit.

The trial court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing, making findings, styled as both of fact and law, upholding all of the contentions of the defendants. The Eastland Court of Civil Appeals, in an able opinion, considerably modified this judgment Boothe v. McLean, 267 S.W.2d 158. Treating all points as questions of law only, it held: (1) that title passed out of the McLeans and into Grabow as a result of the partition and the deed from William J. McLean to Grabow; (2) that accordingly, and on the strength of the Grabow-Yoder deed, the Boothe plaintiffs should recover, but only to the extent of the eastern half (30 feet) of strip (a) as against their greater claims above mentioned, (3) that, as to the Haines plaintiffs, the effect of the deed of strip (d) from Mrs. Haines to Scurry County was as contended for by the defendants, except that it carried title to no more of the disputed area than the adjoining half (50 feet) of strip (c); that the Haines plaintiffs were thus properly denied recovery of the last-mentioned half strip, but should recover all of the area between that strip and the east half of strip (a) awarded to the Boothe plaintiffs as above.

We agree with the court below that title passed out of the McLeans and into Mrs. Haines and the Boothe plaintiffs. But we also conclude, with much deference and some doubt, that the court should have awarded the Boothe plaintiffs their maximum claim of half of the three strips treated as one, and should have awarded the entire remaining half to the Haines plaintiffs. Our discussion requires a more detailed reference to the title history above outlined.

The petition in the McLean partition did, indeed, describe the property there involved as

'All of Sec. No. One Hundred Seventy Nine (179) * * * less the right-of-way heretofore conveyed and condemned for the purposes of the R. S. & P. Ry. Co. and the P. & N. T. Ry. Co.' (Emphasis supplied.)

And the order granting partition and appointing commissioners found the three heirs to own one-third each of

'* * * the above Section No. 179, Block No. 3 H. & G. N. Ry. Co. Survey, * * * which said section of land consists of 640 acres of land less that portion occupied by the right of way of the Roscoe, Snyder and Pacific Railway Company and the Pecos and Northern Texas Railway Company consisting of about 36.54 acres of land, * * *'

the order proceeding thence to decree that said heirs

'* * * are the owners in fee simple of said Section No. 179, Blk. No. 3, H. & G. N. Ry. Co. Survey * * * and that they are entitled to have partition of said land in kind * * *.'

The commissioners' report describes each portion of the division by metes and bounds which include, but do not refer to, the easement strips crossing each. The description of the William J. McLean portion first refers to it as 'the North portion of said Section No. 179, Blk. No. 3', and after giving the course and distance calls for a square of 1900 by 777.40 varas (W-X-Y-Z) on the sketch) concludes with the words 'containing 246.46 acres of land more or less.' The other...