Haji v. Valentine Enters., Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | NO. 02-13-00066-CV,02-13-00066-CV |
| Parties | AIDA HAJI, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BEHNAM WILLIAM ARABU, DECEASED, AND AS NEXT FRIEND OF ALEXANDER BEHNAM WILLIAM, A MINOR APPELLANT v. VALENTINE ENTERPRISES, INC.; VALENTINE DELIVERY SERVICES, LLC; AND DARRELL VALENTINE APPELLEES |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
FROM THE 48TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
Aida Haji, individually and as representative of the estate of Behnam William Arabu, deceased, and as next friend of Alexander Behnam William, aminor, appeals the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment on her claims in favor of Valentine Enterprises, Inc., Valentine Delivery Services, LLC, and Darrell Valentine (collectively, the Valentine defendants). We affirm.
Arabu worked for Valentine Enterprises as a truck driver. In the very early morning of January 26, 2009, Arabu was driving his truck to make a delivery when he was hit by another truck that had made an unsafe lane change. Arabu died as a result of the collision. The Fort Worth Police Department Traffic Investigation Unit found a cell phone in Arabu's front seat. The department's report indicated that a phone call had been made at 3:51 a.m. and had lasted about three and a half minutes.
Arabu's wife, Haji, sued Valentine Enterprises, the driver of the other truck, and the other driver's employer, UFP Transportation. Haji later amended her petition to name Valentine Delivery Services, Valentine, and UFP's parent companies as defendants. Haji sued for wrongful death, negligence, and gross negligence. Specifically as to the Valentine defendants, Haji alleged that they had provided Arabu with substandard equipment. Haji also sought punitive damages because the Valentine defendants' conduct "constituted gross negligence, legal malice, and/or fraud."
Haji also stated that the Valentine defendants did not carry workers' compensation insurance at the time of Arabu's injury.
Haji also filed a response to the Valentine defendants' no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Haji argued that Arabu was an employee of Valentine Enterprises, citing evidence that Arabu worked exclusively for the company, that the Valentine defendants supplied the truck that Arabu drove and paid for the truck's fuel, and that Arabu wore a Valentine company shirt while working. Haji pointed to Valentine's testimony that he did not know that the truck Arabu drove did not have an airbag and, if he had known, he would have purchased a truck with an airbag. Lastly, Haji noted the Tarrant County Deputy Medical Examiner's belief "that more probably than not [that] Mr. Arabu would have lived with the use of an air bag restraint."
In a letter to the parties, the trial court stated, The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Valentine defendants as to Haji's allegations that they had provided Arabu with substandard equipment, that they had failed to warn Arabu that the vehicle did not have an airbag, that they had provided an unsafe workplace by failing to provide a vehicle with an airbag, and that they had committed fraud.
The Valentine defendants filed a second no-evidence motion for summary judgment on Haji's remaining claims against them. As stated in their motion, the Valentine defendants understood the remaining claims to be that they were negligent by not restricting Arabu's cell phone use while on the job, that they were negligent by overworking Arabu, and that they were generally negligent by not providing Arabu with a safe workplace. They argued that there was no evidence that Arabu was an employee but that he was only an independent contractor, and therefore they had no legal duty to control his cell phone usage or "to not overwork" him. They argued that because the trial court had already granted summary judgment on "the airbag issue" and because there was no other alleged failure that created an unsafe work environment, there was no evidence supporting Haji's unsafe workplace claim. The Valentine defendants also argued that there was no evidence of gross negligence.
Haji responded to the motion and objected to the Valentine defendants seeking no-evidence summary judgment on her gross negligence claim. Haji attached a number of exhibits to her response, including her own affidavit, a questionnaire that Haji claimed to have received from the IRS in August 2011 "to assist in helping [the IRS] determine . . . whether [Arabu was] an employee or independent contractor," and publications regarding studies on cell phone usage while driving. The Valentine defendants objected to the affidavit, questionnaire, and publications.
The trial court initially denied the Valentine defendants' second motion for summary judgment on February 2, 2012. On November 8, 2012, the trial court sent a letter to the parties stating that it had reconsidered the Valentine defendants' second motion and had decided to grant it. In an order on November 21, 2012, the trial court granted the motion, overruled Haji's objections, and sustained the Valentine defendants' objections. The order stated that it disposed of all of Haji's claims against the Valentine defendants. The trial court severed the Valentine defendants from the remaining defendants, and Haji then filed this appeal.
After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant's claim or defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The motion must specifically state theelements for which there is no evidence. Id.; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008).
When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex. 2006). We review a no-evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)). If the nonmovant brings forward more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact, then a no-evidence summary judgment is not proper. Smith v. O'Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1030 (2004).
We address Haji's third issue first, as it pertains to the evidence to be considered in addressing her first issue. In her third issue, Haji complains that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the Valentine defendants' objections to Haji's summary judgment evidence. A trial court's rulings in admitting or excluding evidence are reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. Serv. Corp. Int'l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221, 235 (Tex. 2011); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005). An appellate court must uphold the trial court's evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis in the record for the ruling. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998).
The Valentine defendants objected to the press release on the grounds that it was irrelevant, not properly authenticated, contained inadmissible hearsay, and did not have the proper predicate. The Valentine defendants objected to the IRS questionnaire on the grounds that it was unauthenticated, undated, irrelevant, and did not have the proper predicate. On appeal, Haji does not address the objections that the press release and questionnaire were irrelevant and that she had not laid the predicate. See Tex. R. Evid. 402 (). Because Haji has not challenged the trialcourt's rulings on those objections, we cannot consider the evidence. See Retzlaff v. Mendieta-Morales, 356 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) ( to consider summary judgment evidence when the appellant did not challenge the trial...
To continue reading
Request your trial