Serv. Corp.. Int'l v. Guerra

• Decision Date: 17 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–0941.,09–0941.
• Citation: 348 S.W.3d 221,54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1191
• Parties: SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL and SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc., d/b/a Mont Meta Memorial Park, Petitioners,v.Juanita G. GUERRA, Julie Ann Ramirez, Gracie Little and Mary Esther Martinez, Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

348 S.W.3d 221

54 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1191

SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL and SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc., d/b/a Mont Meta Memorial Park, Petitioners,

v.Juanita G. GUERRA, Julie Ann Ramirez, Gracie Little and Mary Esther Martinez, Respondents.

No. 09–0941.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Dec. 19, 2010.Decided June 17, 2011.

Mike A. Hatchell, Charles R. Watson Jr., Molly H. Hatchell, Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP, Austin, Charles C. Murray, Lisa D. Powell, Adriana Hernandez Cardenas, Atlas & Hall, L.L.P., McAllen, Sarah B. Duncan, Kirsten M. Castaneda, Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP, Austin, for Petitioners.Richard G. Roth, Law Offices of Richard G. Roth, South Padre Island, J. Scott McLain, Kristin Ann Gaston, Reed, McLain & Guerrero, LLP, Mark L. Kincaid, Elizabeth Rose Von Kreisler, Kincaid & Horton, L.L.P., Austin, for Respondent.Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal we address whether the evidence was sufficient to support jury findings that (1) both the corporation that owned and operated a cemetery and its parent corporation were liable for actions of the cemetery's employees, and (2) the daughters and widow of a decedent suffered compensable mental anguish because the decedent's body was disinterred and moved to another grave without permission. We also address whether evidence of other lawsuits against the cemetery owner was properly admitted.

Marcos Guerra was buried at Mont Meta Memorial Park cemetery in a plot that had been sold to someone else. His family refused the cemetery's request that it be allowed to move the body to another burial plot, but the cemetery did so anyway. When family members discovered that Mr. Guerra's body had been moved, his daughters and widow sued both SCI Texas Funeral Services, Inc. d/b/a Mont Meta Memorial Park (SCI Texas), the corporation that owned and operated the cemetery, and its parent corporation, Service Corporation International (SCI International). Pursuant to a jury verdict, the trial court rendered judgment against both corporations for actual and exemplary damages. The court of appeals modified the judgment as to exemplary damages and otherwise affirmed.

We hold that there was legally insufficient evidence to support either the liability findings against SCI International or the mental anguish findings in favor of Mr. Guerra's daughters. We further hold that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of other lawsuits, verdicts, and judgments against SCI Texas. We reverse and render in part and remand for a new trial in part.

I. Background

SCI Texas owns and operates several cemeteries in Texas, including Mont Meta Memorial Park in San Benito. Through an intermediary corporation not involved in this litigation, SCI Texas is wholly owned by SCI International.

When Mr. Guerra died unexpectedly on October 5, 2001, his family decided to have him buried at Mont Meta. Two of his three daughters, Julie Ann Ramirez and Gracie Little, went to Mont Meta and made funeral arrangements. Pursuant to the wishes of their mother, Juanita Guerra, Julie and Gracie arranged for Mrs. Guerra to purchase burial plots 5 and 5X at Mont Meta. One of the plots was to be used for Mr. Guerra and one was to eventually be used by Mrs. Guerra.

SCI Texas requires that before a burial takes place a “blind check” of the arrangements must be performed by an employee other than the employee who made the original arrangements. The blind check is to verify (1) the location of the burial plot to be used, (2) that the plot has not been previously sold, and (3) that no one is already buried in the plot. A Mont Meta employee performed the blind check on the day of Mr. Guerra's burial as part of her duties at Mont Meta. She concluded that the cemetery's records showed plot 5, where Mr. Guerra was to be buried, had been previously sold to another family. She brought this to the attention of her supervisor, who concluded that the burial could proceed because plot 5 had been quitclaimed to the Guerras.

Another Mont Meta employee reviewed the paperwork after the funeral and discovered that the supervisor had not been correct: plot 5 had not been quitclaimed to the Guerras. A Mont Meta employee contacted the Guerras and told them that the plot where Mr. Guerra was buried belonged to someone else. The Guerras met with Mont Meta's general manager, Jaye Gaspard, and declined his request that the cemetery be allowed to move Mr. Guerra's body to another plot.

Sometime after the meeting with Gaspard, the Guerras noticed that grass on Mr. Guerra's grave appeared to have been disturbed. They contacted Mont Meta about the situation. Gaspard responded with a letter in which he indicated that resodding had taken place in the cemetery and a passageway next to where Mr. Guerra was buried had been converted to a plot to ensure that a place beside Mr. Guerra was available for Mrs. Guerra. When the family received deeds for the plots they had purchased, however, the deeds were for plots 5X and 5XX rather than 5 and 5X. The Guerras suspected that Mr. Guerra's body had been moved and they filed a complaint with the Texas Funeral Commission. Six months later, Vicky Trevino, who was by then general manager at Mont Meta,¹ disclosed to the Guerras that they were correct: Mr. Guerra's body had been moved about 12 to 18 inches laterally into plot 5X.

Mrs. Guerra and her daughters Julie, Gracie, and Mary Ester Martinez (collectively, the Guerras) sued SCI Texas and SCI International. They asserted causes of action for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and trespass. A jury found in favor of the Guerras on the three liability theories submitted—intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and trespass—and awarded damages of $2 million for past mental anguish to Mrs. Guerra, $100,000 for past mental anguish to each daughter, and allocated responsibility 70% to SCI International and 30% to SCI Texas. The jury also awarded exemplary damages of $3 million against SCI International and $1 million against SCI Texas, allocated 70% to Mrs. Guerra and 10% to each daughter.

Both defendants appealed. The court of appeals modified the judgment and reduced the exemplary damages to $750,000 for each defendant in accordance with the statutory cap, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 41.008(b), but otherwise affirmed. 348 S.W.3d 221 at 226. In this Court the SCI entities argue that (1) there is no evidence to support the finding of liability as to SCI International; (2) there is no evidence to support the award of, or the amounts awarded for, mental anguish damages; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of suits against other SCI Texas cemeteries and of a suit against and settlement entered into in Florida by SCI International; (4) two of the liability theories in the jury charge were not legally viable and it is impossible to determine if the jury awarded damages based on an invalid theory of liability because the charge contained only one damages question conditioned on an affirmative finding to any of the three liability questions; (5) the trial court erred by admitting testimony that Mrs. Guerra would put any punitive damages in a trust for use by people who cannot afford funerals; and (6) the jury's award of damages was influenced by an improper “Golden Rule” argument.

We begin by addressing the challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to SCI International.

II. SCI International

The charge submitted three liability questions to the jury: (1) Did either of the Defendants intentionally inflict severe emotional distress on the Plaintiffs; (2) Did the negligence of either Defendant proximately cause the occurrence in question; and (3) Did either Defendant commit a trespass upon the property of the Plaintiffs? ² Each question required the jury to answer separately for SCI International and SCI Texas, and the jury answered “Yes” as to each defendant for each question.

The Guerras argue that the testimony of several cemetery employees who said that they worked for “SCI” and records in Jaye Gaspard's personnel file with the SCI logo and referencing “Service Corporation International” are evidence that SCI International employed the Mont Meta workers and was therefore liable for their actions. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

A no-evidence challenge will be sustained when “(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.2003). Evidence is more than a scintilla if it “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Ford Mtr. Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex.2004). If, however, the evidence does no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion and is so slight as to necessarily make any inference a guess, then it is no evidence. Id. We presume that jurors made all inferences in favor of the verdict, but only if reasonable minds could do so. Jurors may not simply speculate that a particular inference arises from the evidence. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821 (Tex.2005).

B. Liability Findings

Corporations are liable for the negligence of corporate employees acting within the scope of their employment. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 541 (Tex.2002). But except for a few circumstances which the Guerras do not claim apply in this case, a corporation is not vicariously liable for the negligence of someone who is not its employee. See id. at 542–43 (noting that a person may be held liable for the actions of another if he has a certain degree of express or implied control over the actor).

SCI...