Halbrook v. Halbrook

• Decision Date: 12 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 14899,14899
• Parties: Dollie I. HALBROOK, Respondent, v. William L. HALBROOK, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 687

740 S.W.2d 687

Dollie I. HALBROOK, Respondent, v. William L. HALBROOK, Appellant.

No. 14899.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division One.

Nov. 12, 1987.

David G. Neal, Eminence, for appellant.

Ronald D. White, Robinson, Turley, Turley & White, Rolla, Joseph W. Rigler, Springfield, for respondent.

HOLSTEIN, Judge.

William L. Halbrook appeals from a judgment in what we take to be an equitable action to determine the parties' interest in two lots in Salem, Missouri, which were not specifically allocated or described in an earlier decree for dissolution of marriage. The brief contains three separate "Points Relied On." The essence of all three points is that the trial court erred in finding that real estate owned by appellant William Halbrook prior to his marriage to respondent Dollie (DePriest) Halbrook was marital property. We agree with appellant and reverse.

William was the owner of his home located on two lots in Salem, Missouri, prior to November, 1983. William and Dollie were married on November 15, 1983. Three days later both executed a warranty deed conveying William's home to William and his two daughters, Lucille Stinger and Shirley Milligan, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The deed was a standard form warranty deed, but immediately after the legal description was the following declaration: "Rebecca (Dollie) Halbrook does hereby reserve a life estate for and during her natural life."

Three months to the day after the inception of the marriage, Dollie and William separated. An action for dissolution of marriage was filed a short time thereafter. The cause was tried on May 1, 1984.

Both William and Dollie denied the existence of any marital property at trial. Dollie, while being examined by her attorney, testified as follows:

Q. Now you and your husband have certain separate property? In other words, property acquired before this marriage; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And neither of you have any marital property, is that correct?

A. Yes.

William, called to testify at the same proceeding by his attorney, testified as follows:

Q. According to her testimony, both of you have no marital property. In other words, property you acquired during the marriage;--

A. No, no.

Q. --is that correct?

A. That's right.

Q. All the property which each of you had you brought into the marriage and you consider it to be your separate property?

A. That's right.

....

Q. You have real estate which you brought into the marriage, too; is that correct?

A. Yes. Yes sir.

....

Q. And you're asking all those items [acquired prior to the marriage] to be set aside to you?

A. Yes, sir.

The deed was not mentioned at the trial.

At the end of that hearing, the trial judge stated the property would be divided "... as per the oral testimony presented this date and incorporated in the formal decree." The docket entry contained an identical declaration.

In the decree filed June 4, 1984, the trial court omitted making any specific finding regarding the real estate which was testified to by William. However, the trial court made the following finding: "The court further finds that there was no marital property." No appeal was taken from that judgment.

On October 3, 1985, William filed a pleading which was captioned as a "Motion to Set Aside the Dissolution Decree" but did not seek such relief. The pleading recited the facts noted above and asked that he be awarded the two lots in Salem. The pleading also asked for an order that Dollie be required to execute a quitclaim deed to the lots.

At the trial on this pleading, the parties agreed that the action would be treated as an equitable proceeding to distribute the property as authorized by State ex rel. McClintock v. Black, 608 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. banc 1980). See also Gehm v. Gehm, 707 S.W.2d 491 (Mo.App.1986). Issues tried by consent are treated as if they are raised by the pleadings, even though the latter are not formally amended to conform with the evidence. Once the issue of title to the particular tract is raised by the consent of the parties, it is incumbent on the trial court to adjudicate the same and render a judgment. Arnett v. Venters, 673 S.W.2d 67, 72 (Mo.App.1984); Rule 55.33(b). ¹

No additional testimony was presented in this proceeding; however, the parties stipulated that William was owner of the two lots prior to the marriage and that the parties executed the deed to the lots containing the clause in which Dollie purported to "reserve" a life estate. The parties also stipulated that the value of the two tracts, and home located on the property, was $21,000.

In its findings of fact, the trial court determined that inasmuch as both parties had executed the deed to the two lots, that indicated a "... clear intent of the parties that the property was transmuted to marital property."

A judgment was entered July 16, 1986, determining the two lots to be marital property. These lots, being William's home, were set aside to him as his share of the marital property. However, William was ordered to pay Dollie $7,557.48. According to the judgment, that amount was the value of a life estate of a person Dollie's age as computed using $21,000 as the full value of the lots. See § 442.550. From this judgment, William appeals.

A decree of dissolution, as it affects distribution of marital property, is a final order not subject to modification. § 452.360.2. The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to dissolution actions including all property dealt with under the original decree. State ex rel McClintock v. Black, supra, 406; In re Marriage of Quintard, 691 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Mo.App.1985). In the original dissolution action, Dollie and William both testified that the only property either of them had was nonmarital. William testified that he owned real estate prior to the marriage in which he retained an ownership interest at the time of the divorce. Dollie did not contest this testimony. The trial court declared both orally and in writing that the property would be divided according to the testimony of the parties. The decree, while it omitted any mention of the two lots, found there was no marital property. One aspect of res judicata is collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, a doctrine which precludes the same parties from relitigating issues previously adjudicated, unless it can be shown the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. Vinson v. Vinson, 725 S.W.2d 121, 123-124 (Mo.App.1987). There is no claim here that in the original action either of the parties ...