Lance v. Lance

• Decision Date: 17 November 1998
• Docket Number: Nos. WD,s. WD
• Citation: 979 S.W.2d 245
• Parties: Clara E. LANCE, Appellant, v. Charles W. LANCE, Respondent. 54101, WD 54234.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 245

979 S.W.2d 245

Clara E. LANCE, Appellant, v. Charles W. LANCE, Respondent.

Nos. WD 54101, WD 54234.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Nov. 17, 1998.

Jean A. Wells, Kansas City, Missouri, for appellant.

Marcia J. Lamkin, Overland Park, Kansas, Paul Mudd, Independence, Missouri, for respondent.

Before ELLIS, P.J., and LOWENSTEIN and RIEDERER, JJ.

ELLIS, Judge.

Clara E. Lance (Wife) appeals from a Judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County dissolving her marriage to Charles W. Lance (Husband).

Husband and Wife married each other for the second time on July 6, 1983 in Kansas City, Missouri. The parties separated on or about April 18, 1995. Wife subsequently filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in the Circuit Court of Jackson County on April 20, 1995. On June 15, 1995, Husband filed a Counter-Petition for Dissolution of Marriage.

The Lances' children were emancipated at the time of dissolution of the second marriage. Thus, there were only property issues to be decided in the dissolution. When the parties married the second time, Wife owned a fifteen-acre parcel of land located at 8409 South Hillside School Road in Oak Grove, Jackson County, Missouri. This property contained a residential trailer which the couple used as the marital residence. Husband owned a seven-acre parcel of land with a four-room concrete house. During the marriage, Husband sold this property for $20,000, part of which the couple used to improve the marital residence. There was a mortgage of $50,000 on the marital residence in Wife's name, which the couple refinanced twice, with part of the equity spent on the family business. One year prior to separation, Wife added Husband's name to the mortgage at the request of the mortgagee, resulting in a joint title held by the parties. At the time of trial, the value of the property was between $92,500 and $103,000, subject to a mortgage of $43,680.14.

Also at the time of the marriage, Husband operated a used car lot known as Lance Auto Investments in Bates City, Lafayette County, Missouri. The business was owned jointly by Husband and Wife, although Husband alone operated the business throughout the course of their marriage. ¹ According to Wife's Statement of Marital and Non-Marital Assets and Debts, the value of the vehicles owned by Lance Auto Investments totaled $137,800 at the time of trial.

The case was tried to the court beginning on October 22, 1996. The trial court rendered its Judgment and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on December 10, 1996. The court ordered the marital property relevant to this appeal be divided as follows: (1) Wife to be the sole and separate owner of the real estate located at 8409 South Hillside School Road, Oak Grove, Missouri, and responsible for the mortgage on the property; and (2) the business owned and operated as Lance Auto Investments and all the assets thereof to be marital assets, equally divided between Wife and Husband. Because the court found it impossible to identify specific motor vehicles possessed by Lance Auto Investments, it awarded 50% of the value of the vehicles in three identifiable categories to each party as their sole and separate property in satisfaction of (2) above.

On January 8, 1997, Wife filed a Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Motion to Reconsider and Amend Judgment and Suggestions in support. Husband filed a counter-motion for new trial January 9, 1997. The circuit court overruled both the motion and counter-motion for new trial on March 4, 1997. Wife brings two points on appeal, and Husband raises four in his cross appeal.

In reviewing this court tried case, we must affirm the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it is an erroneous declaration or application of the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 837 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Mo.App. W.D.1992).

In her first point, Wife asserts the trial court erroneously applied the law by failing to include a legal description of the marital residence awarded to her. In the dissolution order, the trial court awarded Wife "the real estate located at 8409 South Hillside School Road, Oak Grove, Missouri." Wife claims this description was insufficient to allow her to record the judgment. Husband concedes that the court erred in failing to set forth the legal description of the real estate.

A court must include a complete legal description of real estate awarded in a dissolution proceeding. Marriage of Swofford, 837 S.W.2d 560 (Mo.App. S.D.1992); Halbrook v. Halbrook, 740 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo.App. S.D.1987); Fields v. Fields, 584 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Mo.App. W.D.1979). In Fields, this court stated:

Where real estate is affected by a dissolution decree either by setting apart non-marital property and thereby extinguishing one spouse's claim through the marriage relationship or by division of marital property as equivalent to conveyance, full legal descriptions must be included in the judgment. Such is necessary to the end that Section 452.330-5 ... requiring filing of the decree in the office of recorder of deeds be effective in dispelling future questions as to land titles.

Id. ² The parties agree that the description contained in the judgment is not a proper legal description of the real estate. The trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to set forth the legal description of the marital residence awarded to Wife in its Judgment and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. Fields, 584 S.W.2d at 167.

While conceding that the trial court should have included the legal description of the real estate in the judgment, in his first point on cross appeal, Husband argues, nevertheless, that the overriding error was the trial court's award of all marital real estate to Wife.

The trial court has substantial discretion in dividing marital property. Stratman v. Stratman, 948 S.W.2d 230, 237 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). Once the trial court determines property is marital in character, the court's division of that property is not subject to either the source of funds rule or the transmutation rule. Woolridge v. Woolridge, 915 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.App. W.D.1996). We will interfere with the trial court's determination only if the division of property is so heavily weighted in favor of one party as to amount to an abuse of discretion. Id. at 376 (citing Dodson v. Dodson, 855 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Mo.App. W.D.1993)). "In dividing marital property, the trial court is vested with great flexibility and far reaching power, and no specific formula exists respecting the weight to be given to the factors required to be considered under § 452.330. Id."

Section 452.330 governs division of marital property. It provides in pertinent part:

In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage ... the court shall set apart to each spouse his nonmarital property and shall divide the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including (1)[t]he economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children; (2)[t]he contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker; (3)[t]he value of the nonmarital property set apart to each spouse; (4)[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage; and (5) [c]ustodial arrangements for minor children.

§ 452.330.1 (emphasis added).

The trial court acknowledged the transmutation of real estate, finding that "[a]lthough the property was converted from [Wife's] non-marital property to marital property during the period of the marriage, an equitable division of the marital estate requires said property to be set aside to [Wife]." Wife received the real estate in the parties' first divorce, and only added her husband's name to the title at the request of the lending institution shortly before their current separation. A portion of the funds obtained through refinancing of the mortgage went to purchase vehicles for the auto business. Husband has not contributed to payment of the mortgage since the separation. There is no evidence in the record that the court failed to consider the factors of § 452.330.1 in making its determination, including Husband's claimed monetary and "sweat equity" contributions to the property and his lack of marital misconduct. Crews v. Crews, 949 S.W.2d 659, 665 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). The statute does not require a formal opinion of grounds for decision, Hopkins v. Hopkins, 597 S.W.2d 702, 709-10 (Mo.App. W.D.1980), nor does it require that property division be equal. Dardick v. Dardick, 670 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. banc 1984). The trial court may place any amount of weight it deems appropriate to the statutory factors. Crews, 949 S.W.2d at 665. We presume the trial court considered all factors under § 452.330 and that the division is proper. Id. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the marital real estate to Wife.

In her second point on appeal, Wife contends that the trial court erred when it made Husband and Wife tenants in common of the marital business. She argues that the judgment is too vague for execution, it leaves Wife unable to realize her share of the business, and punishes Wife while rewarding Husband for his misconduct in failing to provide adequate documentation to the court and attempting to hide assets. In his cross-appeal, Husband agrees that the trial court's decree was vague and ambiguous and that the business property should be divided, but contends that equal division of the business assets...