Hale v. Harney

• Decision Date: 07 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1472,85-1472
• Citation: 786 F.2d 688
• Parties: Ronal D. HALE, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Honorable Naomi HARNEY, Individually and as Judge of the 251st District Court, Randall County, Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 688

786 F.2d 688

4 Fed.R.Serv.3d 643

Ronal D. HALE, Individually and on behalf of all persons

similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Honorable Naomi HARNEY, Individually and as Judge of the

251st District Court, Randall County, Texas, et

al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-1472

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 7, 1986.

James J. Leonard, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph Paul McGuffey, Amarillo, Tex., for Judith Prescott Hale.

Gibson, Ochsner & Adkins, Wayne P. Sturdivant, Amarillo, Tex., for Naomi Harney.

Stokes & Fields, Thomas D. Farris, Amarillo, Tex., for Jim B. Brown.

Jerry L. Benedict, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for Judge Naomi Harney.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before GEE, RANDALL and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

GEE, Circuit Judge:

This misbegotten attempt at a civil rights action has its origins in a state court decree, one that granted a divorce on grounds of cruel treatment, the bulk of the marital property, and custody of the parties' three children--with substantial child support--to the wife of appellant Ronal D. Hale. While his appeal of these awards was pending, Dr. Hale, a physician, filed his complaint in federal court against his former wife, her lawyer, and the state judge who rendered the decree. Except for vague allegations of conspiracy to deprive Dr. Hale of constitutional rights, its sole factual allegations are:

(A) Defendant HARNEY presided over the divorce litigation which is the subject of this complaint. Defendant HARNEY is biased and prejudiced against males as a class, and plaintiff HALE in particular. Defendant HARNEY openly discussed the litigation while it was pending at cocktail parties and functions in a way which did not promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and demonstrated her hostility towards plaintiff HALE as an individual and as a member of the class of males which he now represents.

(B) Defendant BROWN and HALE did conspire with each other and with defendant HARNEY, both tacitly and overtly, to deny plaintiff a fair trial, by intimidation of one of plaintiff's witnesses, and to exploit the well-known bias and prejudice of defendant HARNEY against plaintiff, all of which worked to deny plaintiff of his property without due process of law and furthered the destruction of his parent-child relationship with his three minor children.

(C) Plaintiff was further intimidated by defendant HARNEY from exercising his right to a jury trial in the matter of child On motion of the defendants, the trial court dismissed the action, assessing sanctions under Rule 11 against Dr. Hale's attorney. Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., provides, in pertinent part:

custody and other issues properly presented to a jury under Texas law. ¹

Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction.

Undaunted, Dr. Hale appeals on the merits, his attorney from the sanction imposed on him. Both appeals being frivolous, we affirm and impose further sanctions.

THE MERITS

Dr. Hale's action against the state judge, Ms. Harney, is palpably frivolous. It is hornbook law, settled in our jurisprudence for over a century, that such a judge as she enjoys an absolute immunity from liability for damages for judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). Dr. Hale's complaint does not so much as allege that Judge Harney's decree from which his claims of injury derive was beyond her jurisdiction. As to her, it was properly dismissed. See Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.1980), and authorities collected at 94-95.

Dr. Hale claims that Mr. Brown and the former Mrs. Hale conspired with Judge Harney to intimidate a witness. Private acts or conduct may engender liability under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 if the individual is a willing participant in joint action with the state or its agents. Earnest v. Lowentritt, 690 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.1982); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). The complaint here, however, fails to state any factual basis to support the conspiracy charge. Nowhere does Dr. Hale allege facts tending to show that Judge Harney agreed with the private conspirators. Sooner Products Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir.1983). In Sec. 1983 cases, "we consistently require the claimant to state specific facts, not merely conclusory allegations." Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir.1985)). "Mere conclusory allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts," state a substantial claim of federal conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983. Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir.1982). Moreover, as in Arsenaux, Dr. Hale chose to file nothing in response to two requests for a more definitive statement of the conspiracy. Record Vol. 1 at 37-39, 241-44. Thus, "[h]e elected to rely on an insufficient charge." Arsenaux, 726 F.2d at 1024.

A review of the complaint reveals that the suit is inextricably intertwined with the state court Decree of Divorce, and that much of the relief sought by Dr. Hale is a modification of that decree. A lengthy line of decisions in our court, commencing with Sawyer v. Overton, 595 F.2d 252 In today's case, Dr. Hale complained of the trial court (or its decree) as follows:

                (1979) and Kimball v. The Florida Bar, 632 F.2d 1283 (1980), holds that litigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing complaints about those actions in lower federal courts cast in the form of civil rights suits.  Nor is the principle stated limited to actions, such as Sawyer, supra, which candidly seek review of the state court decree;  it extends to others in which "the constitutional claims presented [in federal court] are inextricably intertwined with the state court's" grant or denial of relief.    District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1314-15 n. 16, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).  In such a case, "the District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.  This the District Court may not do."    Ibid.  Judicial errors committed in state courts are for correction in the state court systems, at the head of which stands the United States Supreme Court;  such errors are no business of ours
                

(D) Further, plaintiff was ordered to pay temporary support and maintenance in a manner which deprived him of due process and equal protection of the law as follows:

(1) It required him to earn income in the same quantity as was earned prior to his becoming respondent in a divorce action which had torn apart the fabric of his life and work routine prior to that...