Hale v. Stimson
| Decision Date | 30 June 1906 |
| Citation | 95 S.W. 885,198 Mo. 134 |
| Parties | HALE v. STIMSON, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Phelps Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. N. Evans, Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
Arthur P. Murphy, Charles H. Shubert and James B. Harrison for appellant; L. F. Parker of counsel.
(1) Section 8 of article 8 of the Constitution should not be construed to disqualify the inmates of a Soldiers' Home but the disqualification should be confined to persons "kept at a poor house," or some "other asylum" of the same class as a "poor house," at public expense, upon the principle of ejusdem generis; in other words, the term "other aslyum," being a general term, following particular words, will be confined in its application to asylums of the same class as a "poor house." 2 Lewis's Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), secs. 422 to 435; Ex parte Hill, 3 C. & P. 225; Sandiman v. Breach, 7 C. & B. 96; St. Louis v Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559; St. L. A. & M. Assn. v Delano, 108 Mo. 221; State v. Dinnisse, 109 Mo. 434; State v. Schuchmann, 133 Mo. 123; State v. Krueger, 134 Mo. 269; State v. South, 136 Mo. 673. (2) The rule or doctrine of ejusdem generis applies to statutes affecting only civil rights and duties with equal force as to criminal or penal statutes. 2 Lewis's Sutherland, Statutory Construction, sec. 422; Ruckert v. Railroad, 163 Mo. 260. (3) A "poor house" is a refuge for aged, infirm, lame, blind or sick persons who are unable to support themselves, and has a superintendent, who has the power to coerce persons kept at such house to perform labor. Secs. 8994, 9001, 9002, R. S. 1899. (4) No Federal Soldiers' Home was in existence at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, the statute establishing the same not having been passed till 1897, and when created it is called, not a poor house, or an asylum, but a "home," a word evidencing an intention that the place of refuge given to these "disabled and indigent soldiers and sailors" shall be in a class not only different, but superior to the ordinary poor house. R. S. 1899, sec. 7797; Laws 1897, p. 28. (5) General words following particular words in a statute will never be construed to include any of a class superior to that to which the particular words belong, for if it had been the intention of the Legislature to include any of such superior class, the members of such superior class would have been first mentioned, and they cannot be implied. 2 Lewis's Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), sec. 435; Ambler v. Whipple, 139 Ill. 311; Casher v. Holmes, 2 B. & Ad. 592. (6) The same Legislature that established the Federal Soldiers' Home and the Confederate Home gave unmistakable expression to its intention that the inmates of these homes should not be deemed to belong to the same class as those who are kept at the ordinary "poor house," and clearly intended to enact that the fact that they were such inmates should not operate to disqualify them from voting. R. S. 1899, sec. 6994; Laws 1897, p. 109; 2 Lewis's Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), sec. 443. (7) Whatever the particular language of the Legislature may be, it is the duty of the court to ascertain from that language the result intended to be accomplished, and to so construe the statute as to accomplish the result intended, even if necessary to depart from or ignore the exact words of the statute. 2 Lewis's Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), secs. 347-348. (8) A statute will not be held unconstitutional unless clearly and unmistakably in conflict with some constitutional provision, and if the end sought to be accomplished by the Legislature, as gathered from the act, is within the power of the Legislature, or if a reasonable doubt exists whether the legislative intent is violative of the organic law, then the intent of the Legislature must be given effect and the act is valid. 1 Lewis's Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2 Ed.), sec. 83; State v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23; Powell v. Sherwood, 162 Mo. 605.
Joseph J. Crites and Watson & Holmes for respondent; Sherwood & Young of counsel.
(1) The doctrine of ejusdem generis has been invoked in this case. Webster defines the term "asylum" as "any place of relief and security," as "an institution for the protection or relief of some class of destitute, unfortunate, or afflicted persons; as, an asylum for the aged for the blind, or for the insane; a lunatic asylum; an orphan asylum." This word is of similar signification with "almshouse," "a house appointed for the use of the poor; a poor house." Section 8994, Revised Statutes 1899, describes the poor to be "aged, infirm, lame, blind or sick persons, who are unable to support themselves." Section 7797, Revised Statutes 1899, declares that the "home" required by that section to be established is to be "for disabled and indigent soldiers and sailors and army nurses who enlisted, served or participated in the Mexican war and the war of the Rebellion for the preservation of the United States, and also the aged wives of such soldiers and sailors." Laws 1897, p. 28. This shows that institution to be strictly an eleemosynary one in its character. The Constitution of 1865 in section 10 of article 2, said that for the purposes of voting no person should be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason, etc., . . . . nor while a student in any seminary of learning, nor while kept at any poor house or other asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison. The same language in all essentials is employed in section 2 of article 8 of our present Constitution. Not satisfied with the above provisions, the framers of the latter instrument declared: "No person, while kept at any poor house or other asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison, shall be entitled to vote at any election held under the laws of this State." Sec. 8, art. 8, Const. This section manifests in an especial manner that the framers of that section were determined that they would absolutely prevent some of those named in the preceding section as not having gained or lost a residence, to-wit, those "kept in a poor house or other asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any public prison," from voting at all. If this was not the design of the framers of that section, then they used singularly inapt and inept language to convey the idea of the contrary purpose. Right in the face of this mandatory and prohibitory declaration of the organic law the Legislature enacted section 6994, R. S. 1899, which, among other provisions, contains this proviso: "Provided, further, no person while kept at any poor house or other asylum at public expense (except the Soldiers' Home at St. James and the Confederate Home at Higginsville) nor while confined in any public prison shall be entitled to vote at any election under the laws of this State," etc. This very exception recognizes and declares that the soldiers at the "Home" at St. James and at the "Home" at Higginsville are kept at a poor house or other asylum at public expense. Such exception cannot stand unless the Constitution falls. (2) Nothing is better settled than that constitutions, as well as statutes, are to be deemed and adjudged prospective alone in their operation, unless on their face there appears something manifestly contrary and inconsistent with such ideas. Cooley's Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), 77, 445; State v. Grant, 77 Mo. 113; Leete v. Bank, 115 Mo. 184; State v. Julow, 139 Mo. 163. That section, in its exception clause aforesaid, is a local and special law; local because it alone can operate as to two counties in the State, and special because it operates not on a whole class, but on a number of persons segregated from that class (Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 372), and is, therefore, forbidden by section 53, article 4, Constitution. Earle v. Board, 55 Cal. 489; Cricket v. State, 18 Ohio St. 22; State ex rel. v. Judges, 21 Ohio St. 11; Devile v. Comrs., 84 Ill. 590; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N.Y. 381; Gaskin v. Meek, 42 N.Y. 186; King v. State (Tenn.), 3 L. R. A. 210. General laws are those which bind all within the jurisdiction of the law-making power. People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585; City v. Clark, 68 Mo. 588; State ex rel. v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340.
OPINIONIn Banc
-- In obeying the order of this court to formulate its pronouncement in this cause, a meed of credit is due at the threshold, to be likened to and read as an inscription over a gateway. That meed of credit is this: the labor of the writer has been made light and pleasing by the research and erudition of our Brother Marshall, who (going on before as a pioneer in the path of investigation), has not only blazed the way but left map, survey and memoranda of his route -- the ultimate conclusion reached by him, on the main question, the old soldiers' vote -- being adopted.
Hale and Stimson were opposing candidates in the general election of 1904 for the office of collector of the revenue in the county of Phelps. Stimson was declared elected on a canvass of the poll-book returns; he received a majority of 41 votes, it seems. Having (presumably) received his commission, qualified and entered on the performance of his official duties, in due time Hale brought proceedings of contest by causing to be served on Stimson the following notice:
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