Hale v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 18 September 1975
• Docket Number: S.F. 23287
• Citation: 124 Cal.Rptr. 57,15 Cal.3d 221,539 P.2d 817
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 539 P.2d 817 Jack L. HALE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

Page 57

124 Cal.Rptr. 57

15 Cal.3d 221, 539 P.2d 817

Jack L. HALE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF the CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

S.F. 23287.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Sept. 18, 1975.

Robert Nicco, Public Defender, and Estella W. Dooley, Deputy Public Defender, for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward

P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Eric Collins and Sanford Svetcov, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent and for real party in interest.

CLARK, Justice.

The question presented by this case is whether section 1368.1, subdivision (a), of the Penal Code is unconstitutional insofar as it provides that a hearing into a felony defendant's mental competency may not be held until an indictment or an information has been filed against him.

The question is raised by petition for writ of prohibition filed by a defendant charged by complaint with setting fire to a dwelling, a felony. (Pen.Code, §§ 17, subd. (a), 447a.) Certified to respondent superior court for a competency hearing, petitioner seeks to restrain respondent from conducting the hearing until an indictment or an information is filed. The People contend section 1368.1, subdivision (a), is unconstitutional, arguing it would be a denial of due process to conduct a preliminary hearing when doubt has arisen as to a defendant's competency.

Rather than denying due process, the statute promotes it by insuring that a felony defendant will not be committed for incompetency unless there is probable cause to believe he committed the crime with which he is charged. The problem noted by the People may be resolved by conducting another preliminary hearing (or a grand jury hearing) when a defendant adjudged incompetent subsequently regains his competence. (Chambers v. Municipal Court (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 809, 812--813, 118 Cal.Rptr. 120.) The statute being valid, the writ must issue.

Legislative History

California's incompetency commitment procedure was substantially amended in 1974 in response to this court's adoption in In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018, of the 'rule of reasonableness' announced by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. (Stats.1974, ch. 1511.) Prior to 1974, if a defendant did not regain competency, an incompetency commitment was, in effect, a life sentence. It made no difference whether the defendant was charged with murder or petty theft. ¹ Nor did it matter whether there had been a judicial determination that probable cause existed to believe him guilty of the crime charged; the question of competency could be raised 'at any time during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment.' (Pen.Code, § 1368, as amended by Stats. 1937, ch. 133, p. 373, § 1.) As one commentator has observed, '(T)he net effect of a scheme designed to protect a defendant's sixth amendment rights was, in some cases, more severely oppressive than a deprivation of those rights.' (Parker, California's New Scheme for the Commitment of Individuals Found Incompetent to Stand Trial (1975) 6 Pacific L.J. 484--485.)

(a) Jackson v. Indiana

In Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, the court held that Indiana's incompetency commitment procedure denied a defendant due process and equal protection of the laws. The petitioner in Jackson was a mentally defective deaf mute charged with robbery. The examining physicians testified that Jackson's inability to hear or communicate, coupled with his mental deficiency, rendered him incapable either of understanding the charges or of participating in his defense. However, the physicians also testified that it was doubtful whether Jackson had sufficient intelligence Ever to develop the communication skills necessary to be adjudged competent. Moreover, a teacher at the state school for the deaf testified that Indiana had no facilities to teach such skills to someone as severely handicapped as Jackson. Nevertheless Jackson was ordered committed until such time as he should be certified competent. (406 U.S. at pp. 718--719, 92 S.Ct. 1845.)

The high court held that the Indiana statute denied a defendant equal protection of the laws because it subjected him to commitment standards more lenient and release standards more stringent than the standards applicable to persons committed under Indiana's civil commitment laws. Whereas mere incompetency to stand trial was sufficient for criminal commitment, civil commitment required a showing that the person either was unable to care for himself or was dangerous to others--a showing not made in Jackson's case. Moreover, a person civilly committed became eligible for release whenever he no longer required custodial care, whereas a person criminally committed had to be competent to stand trial. The record strongly suggested that Jackson met the civil standard for release, but that his chances of meeting the criminal standard were 'at best minimal, if not nonexistent.' (406 U.S. at p. 727--729, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1852.)

The court further held that Jackson's indefinite commitment violated due process. 'At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.' (406 U.S. at p. 738, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1858.) The ostensible purpose of Jackson's commitment was to enable him to become competent to stand trial, but that purpose was impossible of achievement, no matter how long he was committed.

To prevent such abuses in the future, the court announced a 'rule of reasonableness.' '(A) person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. (Fn. omitted.) Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.' (406 U.S. at p. 738, 92 S.Ct. at p. 1858.)

(b) In re Davis

Constrained to adopt the Jackson rule because of similarities between California and Indiana incompetency commitment procedure, this court held that when there is no reasonable likelihood a defendant will regain his competency in the foreseeable future, he must either be released or subjected to civil commitment proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (hereinafter LPS Act). (In re Davis, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 807, 106 Cal.Rptr. 178, 505 P.2d 1018.)

The LPS Act then provided for longterm involuntary commitment only if, as a result of mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism, a person was 'gravely disabled,' that is, unable to feed, clothe or house himself. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 5008, subd. (h), as amended by Stats.1971, ch. 1593, § 366, p. 3336.) The LPS Act contained no specific provision for commitment of a criminal defendant found incompetent to stand trial. Although such a defendant might well have been subject to short-term commitment as a person dangerous to himself or others, he would not necessarily have been subject to long-term commitment as 'gravely disabled.' If he established he was incompetent to stand trial, but was capable of caring for himself, a defendant had to be freed after a short period of treatment, no matter now heinous the offense charged against him. To resolve this problem, and to otherwise bring California's incompetency commitment procedure into conformity with the Jackson-Davis guidelines, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1529. (See Paker, California's New Scheme for the Commitment of Individuals Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, supra, 6 Pacific L.J. 484, 487--489.) The statute challenged here was part of that legislation. (Stats.1974, ch. 1511, § 4.)

(c) The New Incompetency Commitment Law

1. Precommitment Procedure

When a judge doubts a defendant's mental competency, i.e., his ability to understand the proceedings and to rationally assist counsel, the judge shall state his doubt on the record and ask defense counsel's opinion. (Pen.Code, § 1368, subd. (a).) If counsel shares the court's doubt, a hearing shall be held in the superior court to determine the question. If counsel believes his client competent, the court may, nevertheless, order such a hearing. (Pen.Code, § 1368, subd. (b).)

A competency hearing may not be held in a felony proceeding until an indictment or an information is filed. A demurrer or a motion under sections 995 or 1538.5 of the Penal Code may thereafter be made by defense counsel even though the competency hearing is pending. (Pen.Code, § 1368.1, subd. (a).) In a misdemeanor proceeding, defense counsel may demur, or move to dismiss on the ground no reasonable cause exists to believe the defendant guilty of the crime charged, or make a 1538.5 motion. The defendant shall not be certified to the superior court for a competency hearing until the demurrer or motions are decided. (Pen.Code, § 1368.1, subd. (d).)

If the information, indictment or misdemeanor complaint survives the defendant's challenges to its validity, the question of his competency shall be tried by the court or a jury. (Pen.Code, § 1369.) Presumed competent, the defendant must be proven incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence, a unanimous verdict being required of a jury. (Pen.Code, § 1369, subd. (f).) If the defendant is found competent, the criminal proceedings shall resume; if he is found incompetent, he shall be committed to a treatment facility. (Pen.Code, §...