Haley v. Calif. Dept. of Rehab.

• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Docket Number: CV 22-8126-SB(E)
• Parties: DONOVAN LAMONTE HALEY, Plaintiff, v. CALIF. DEPT. OF REHAB., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

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DONOVAN LAMONTE HALEY, Plaintiff, v. CALIF. DEPT. OF REHAB., et al., Defendants.

No. CV 22-8126-SB(E)

United States District Court, C.D. California

November 22, 2022

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

STANLEY BLUMENFELD, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

For the reasons discussed below, the Complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint on November 4, 2022. Defendants are: (1) the California Department of Rehabilitation (“Department”); and (2) Department employee Isabel Lee, sued in her official and individual capacities. Plaintiff purports to allege claims for asserted violations of: (1) the First Amendment; (2) Titles I and II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. section 12101 et seq.; (3) section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. section 794; and (4) California Civil Code sections 51 and 54.^[1]

Plaintiff alleges:

Plaintiff is an African-American man with an unspecified mental disability (Complaint, p. 9). Plaintiff, who lives below the federal poverty guidelines, qualifies for Defendants' “services and programs” under Defendants' rules, regulations and policies (id., p. 5). Defendants have a duty to assist all disabled African-Americans in California who request aid (id.).

In June of 2020, Plaintiff sought from Defendants information concerning the status of an application for access to programs and services under Defendants' “selfemployment program” (id., p. 3). Defendants ignored Plaintiff by “failing to follow up” (id.).

In July of 2020 Plaintiff again contacted Defendants concerning the status of his application and sought access to services (id.). Although Plaintiff then was told he would be contacted within a week, Defendants again “failed to follow up” (id.).

By letter and email, Plaintiff filed a complaint with a supervisor at Defendants' Los Angeles District Headquarters (id.). Plaintiff was told he did not need to “continue the complaint” because Defendants “would take care of the issue internally” and “Plaintiff would receive access to specific programs and services” (id.). Plaintiff refused to withdraw the complaint based on Defendants' “pattern” of failing to follow up (id.).

On August 10, 2020, an employee of Defendants emailed

Plaintiff regarding “a virtual job fair,” which had “absolutely nothing to do with Plaintiff's original application to have access to funding, tools, uniforms, transportation funds, etc. under the self employment program and other services requested” (id., p. 4).

On August 17, 2020, Plaintiff called Defendants at the Department's Long Beach office to inquire regarding the status of his application (id.). Defendant Lee, acting in her official capacity, told Plaintiff that she would facilitate Plaintiff's request “as soon as time would permit” (id.). “As of today,”^[2] Plaintiff's application has not been processed and Plaintiff has not received services (id.).

On March 7, 2021, Defendant Lee called Plaintiff regarding his application for the self-employment program and services, and requested a “business plan” (id.). On June 22, 2021, Plaintiff emailed the requested information to Defendants, and verified Defendants' receipt thereof (id.).

On June 23, 2021, Plaintiff called Defendants again (id., p. 5). Defendant Lee asked Plaintiff if he had filed a complaint (id.). Plaintiff said that he had done so and that he was “only seeking access to programs and services” (id.). Lee said she would follow up with a phone call in a day or two (id.). “As of today,” Plaintiff has not received any such follow up (id.).

“On July 12, 2021, [Plaintiff] provided all documents requested of me by the Defendants. However, Defendants have continuously ignored Plaintiff” (id., p. 8).

On July 19, 2021, Plaintiff called Defendants again inquiring into his application, but Plaintiff was ignored (id.). On October 11, 2021, Plaintiff again contacted Defendants, “to no avail” (id.).

On February 18, 2022, Plaintiff again contacted Defendants and specifically requested services “as an African-American disabled person” (id.). Plaintiff was told that there was no assistance for African-American disabled people and that Plaintiff “needed to check with [his] local NAACP chapter” (id.). “As of today,” Defendants continue to ignore Plaintiff's request for services (id., p. 9).

Plaintiff was “denied access to all services and programs in violation of well established state and federal law” (id.). Defendants “exercised a pattern” of disregarding Plaintiff's application “in violation of current well established state and federal law” (id.). Defendants used Plaintiff's race and “disability of mental illness” to deny Plaintiff access to “all services and programs in violation of current well established state and federal law” (id.). Defendants have no rules, regulations or policies precluding Plaintiff from access to the programs and services he requested (id., p. 10s).

Defendants denied Plaintiff access to programs and services in retaliation for Plaintiff's filing of a formal complaint, in violation of the First Amendment (id.). Defendants also violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and California Civil Code sections 51 and “54-55.2" (id.).

Plaintiff seeks the following relief: (1) a “declaration order pursuant to all laws enjoyed by the public”; (2) “injunctive relief granting Plaintiff access to program [sic] and services”; (3) a “daily fine” against both Defendants in the sum of $150/day; (4) compensatory damages in the sum of $250,000; and (5) punitive damages in the sum of $250,000 (id., p. 12).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff may not sue the Department, a state agency,^[3] in this Court. “[I]n the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1979) (footnote omitted). California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to section 1983 claims. Brown v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); Dittman v. State of Cal., 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000). The Eleventh Amendment also bars suits in federal court for damages against a state official, such as Defendant Lee, sued in her official capacity. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Mitchell v. Wash., 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016); Avila v. State of Cal., 2021 WL 518710, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021), adopted, 2021 WL 515385 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2021), app dism'd, 2021 WL 9540025 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2021), cert. denied, __ U.S. ___, 2022 WL 4656572 (U.S. 2022) (“courts have specifically found California [Department of Rehabilitation] and its employees are entitled to [immunity under the Eleventh Amendment]”) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff's retaliation claim is legally insufficient. “A plaintiff making a First Amendment retaliation claim must allege that (1) he was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant's actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's conduct.” Bello-Reyes v. Gaynor, 985 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff alleges no facts plausibly showing that: (1) any Defendant (or any other person) engaged in any conduct which would chill a person from complaining about service denials; or (2) the filing of Plaintiff's administrative complaint purportedly was a substantial or motivating factor in the denial of any services to Plaintiff. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of retaliation do not suffice to state any plausible claim for relief. See Guillen v. Owens, 577 Fed. App'x 664 (9th Cir. 2014) (conclusory allegations of retaliation insufficient); Williams v. Harrington, 511 Fed. App'x 669, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); see generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (conclusory allegations insufficient to allege a claim for relief).

The Complaint fails to allege any violation of Title I of the ADA, which concerns disability discrimination in employment. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's claims for alleged violations of Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are also legally insufficient.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides:

No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

To state a claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act Plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services,...